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

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THE

TRIPARTITE NATURE OF MAN

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND BODY

APPLIED TO ILLUSTRATE AND EXPLAIN THE DOCTRINES OF ORIGINAL SIN, THE NEW BIRTH, THE DISEMBODIED STATE, AND THE SPIRITUAL BODY

BY

REV. J. B. HEARD, M.A.

THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.

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PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION.

I HAVE little to add to this Edition, beyond the expression of thankfulness that this important subject is gradually attracting in this country the attention which it deserves.

As it seems to me that the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma throws light on the subject of the Fatherhood of God, on which a discussion has arisen in Scotland since the First Edition of this work was published, I have added in an Appendix a few considerations which lead me to incline to Dr Crawford's view of the General Fatherhood of God, and to differ from Dr Candlish, who maintains the Particular or Adoptive theory of the Fatherhood of God. On this, as on many other cognate questions, Sir William Hamilton's dictum seems applicable, that "no question emerges in Theology which has not previously emerged in Philosophy." The Psychology of Scripture throws light on its Theology.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

In preparing a Second Edition for the Press, I have given the work a thorough revision, and corrected several errors which had escaped my attention when the First Edition was preparing for the Press.

I desire to thank my critics in general for their encouraging remarks on this attempt to trace out the bearings of that important distinction between the psychical and pneumatical natures, which seems to me to be the key to many theological questions still under controversy. I have been charged with inconsistency in describing the conscience as the dead or dormant pneuma in the unregenerate. If dead, my critics say, it is not dormant; and, if dormant, not dead. But I do not consider dead and dormant to be logical contradictories, the one excluding the other. I can conceive the conscience to be dead as to its higher or spiritual functions, properly so called; while, at the same time, it is only dormant as the rule of right and wrong between man and man. Death and sleep are only differences of degree—in the one, there is the suspension of sense; in the other, of all the functions of life.

Were the conscience wholly dead, then, as it seems to me, there could be no awakening it out of sleep. Men would be beyond the reach of redemption, as we have reason to suppose the devils are. On the other hand, were the conscience awake and active, men would not be in a fallen state at all, and the new birth would be identical with the birth of the flesh. Truth lies in a golden mean between these two extremes, to which the theories of Augustine and Pelagius incline. From attending to this distinction between Psyche and Pneuma, the Greek fathers seem to me to have reached that golden mean, which was lost in Latin theology generally, and which even the Reformers, Lutheran and Calvinist, alike failed to reach. If I have succeeded in pointing out the true Eirenikon to the free-will controversies which have died out in our day from sheer exhaustion of the subject, I shall only feel that I have acted on Bishop Butler's wise suggestion, "that it is not at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered, and that the whole scheme of Scripture is only to be understood by thoughtful men tracing out obscure hints, as it were, dropped us accidentally."

PREFACE.

A VERY few words will explain the object and scope of the following treatise. It is the attempt to weave into one connected whole those passages scattered up and down the Word of God which speak of human nature as consisting of three parts—spirit, soul, and body. The distinction between soul and body is obvious, and is as old as philosophy itself. But what of the distinction between soul and spirit? It is this which distinguishes Christian psychology from that of the schools. The Pneuma is that part of man which is made in the image of God—it is the conscience, or faculty of God-consciousness which has been depraved by the fall, and which is dormant, though not quite dead.* The pneuma in the psychical or natural man has some little sense of the law of God, but no real

* A remark of Auberlen (Bei Jesus ist niemals von einem Gewissen die Rede, weil er den Geist als Kraft besitzst, *v. Geist*, Herzog's Encyclopädie, vol. iv. p. 733) suggested to the writer the true theory of what the Pneuma is at present in fallen human nature. He stood long in doubt whether to describe it as dead altogether or as dormant only. Now he sees that what the moralist describes as conscience is the same as the Pneuma of Scripture, with this important difference, however, that the unconverted conscience is only conscious of the law of God, not of the gracious character of the Lawgiver, and when sincere, is an "excusing or accusing conscience," not an approving. It is only when the conscience is quickened and converted, and when perfect love has cast out fear, that the Spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the sons of God (Rom. viii. 16).

love for Himself, and therefore it drives man from God, instead of drawing him to God.

Thus the psychology of the schools is radically different from that of Scripture; yet to this day divines treat the distinction of soul and spirit as if it were only a verbal one, and speak of mortal body and immortal soul in phrases which are unconsciously borrowed from Plato rather than from St Paul. That philosophy should be content with a division of human nature into two parts only, "the reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting," is neither strange nor inconsistent. The wonder rather would have been if the Pneuma had been detected by those old Greeks who, with all their wisdom, knew not God, and therefore knew not of a dormant faculty of God-consciousness which exists only as a bare capacity for good, not as an active energy or habit in man until he is born from above. Thus the trichotomy of human nature into spirit, soul and body is part of that "hidden wisdom which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived" till it was taught us by God in His Word. The Bible which contains the only sound system of theology, is also the teacher of the only sound system of psychology. Yet divines have paid too little attention to the psychology of the Bible, and in consequence, obscurities, if not positive errors, have crept into theology, which can only be cleared up by bringing the light of Biblical psychology to bear on theology.

This was attempted in the early Church, but only carried out with very indifferent success. The Greek Fathers, generally speaking, understood the psycho-

logy of Scripture aright: but unfortunately confounding the Platonic Logos or Nous with the Pneuma of the New Testament, they either distinguished the pneumatical and psychical as the *intellectual* and the *carnal* man respectively (which was the root error of the Gnostics) or confounded in a semi-pantheistic way the human Pneuma with the divine, which, in the case of Origen and Apollinaris, led to distinct heresies, which the Church afterwards formally condemned. The consequence of this was, that in the reaction against these errors the Latin Church generally, as guided by Augustine and Jerome, rejected altogether the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma, for which the Latin tongue was not flexible enough to find equivalents, and so the usual dichotomy of man into body and soul only became the prevailing view throughout the West. A proof, by the way, that the Athanasian creed was of Latin origin is seen in this, that no Greek writer would have made a dogmatic statement of the union of the two natures in one person in such terms as these: "Perfectus Deus perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens." The expression furnishes not only documentary evidence as to the probable date and authority of the creed itself, but also proves the complete oblivion into which the Pauline distinction of Psyche and Pneuma had fallen. In plucking up the tares of Origen and other gnostic errors, the Latin Fathers had plucked up the wheat as well.

As Augustine reigned as a Church teacher without a rival not only up to, but even two centuries after the Reformation, it is not surprising that the true psychology

of Scripture was not discovered even by Melancthon, whose *Liber de Animâ*, printed in 1552, is not only scholastic in form, but also dichotomist in spirit, and throws no real light on the great doctrines of original sin and the new birth, to which the distinction of Pneuma and Psyche is in truth the only key.

Real Biblical criticism, which may be said to have begun with Bengel, 1750, has at last ascertained and set on the sure foundation of a comparative study of proof passages the true psychology of the New Testament.

A number of recent writers, principally German, have caught the true meaning of the distinction between Pneuma and Psyche. Roos, Schubert, Olshausen, Beck, Haussman, Oehler, Hofmann, Meyer, Göschel, Von Rudloff, a general in the Prussian army (it is only in Prussia that generals handle points in speculative theology), and lastly, Delitzsch, have discussed the trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body with varying degrees of ability and success. In this country Bishop Ellicott is, so far as we are aware, the only divine who has given the subject more than a passing notice. A valuable sermon on the threefold nature of man, in the *Destiny of the Creature*, contains some sound and suggestive hints on which a correct system of Christian psychology may be built up. Dean Alford has also some good remarks on the distinction in his Notes to the New Testament; and several writers in critical and theological Reviews, both English and German, have thrown out a few scattered hints which show that they have caught the distinction, though they do not, in

most cases, carry it out directly into details. They generally either follow Philo in classifying the Psyche under the three principles—the nutritive, the emotional, and the rational, as subdivisions of it—or they confound the Psyche with the animal life, from which it is distinct, and then interpolate a third faculty called Nous, distinct and intermediate between Psyche and Pneuma. Now the key to Christian psychology seems to be to take Aristotle's psychology as far as it goes, and at the point where Aristotle's draft of the psychical man stops, to begin with that of Scripture.

We shall gather in this way that there are two parts of human nature, the body and psyche, or sense and intellect, of which Aristotle knew as much as we do, and a third faculty, the pneuma of St Paul, which lies wholly beyond the psychical man's horizon, and of which all that we know is to be gathered from one book—the Bible. Thus, of the three forms of consciousness,—sense-, self-, and God-consciousness,—Philosophy can tell us of the two former, Revelation alone discovers to us the existence of the third and highest. The *organ* of God-consciousness, or the pneuma and its *function*, or the life of God in the awakened spirit, are thus made known to us in God's word, and there only. If man's existence were bounded by time, and the Being of God were only one of many hypotheses to account for the existence of matter, then Aristotle's treatise, *De Anima*, would probably be a complete, as it is undoubtedly a correct draft of human nature as far as it goes. It is exactly where the psychology of the Schools stops that Christian psychology takes up the account of man's origin,

and of the end and aim of his existence. Till we clearly understand wherein the image of God in man consists, we shall miss the meaning of the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma, and our criticisms will be verbal only, not piercing, as the Word of God is said to do, to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and (or, as if) of the joint and marrow.

That this has not been done in any thoroughgoing way before is our excuse for venturing into print. Scattered hints have been thrown out by modern expositors of Scripture, interpreting such passages as 1 Cor. ii. 14, 1 Thess. v. 23, Heb. iv. 12, but the full inferences which flow from these psychological hints of God's word have never, so far as we are aware, been fully traced out. German divines, who have traced out in detail the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma, have not built on it any formal argument; 1, for the nature of original sin; 2, for the new birth; 3, for consciousness in the intermediate state; and 4, for the nature of the pneumatical or resurrection body. Even Delitzsch, with much that is most valuable and suggestive, has treated the question as one of pure psychology, rather than as one which is the key to four of the cardinal doctrines of theology. Thus the distinction between applied and pure mechanics exactly expresses the distinction between the present work and Delitzsch's *Psychologie*, to which we desire here once for all to express our deep and constant obligations.*

* Messrs Clark have conferred a benefit on English Theology by a translation of Delitzsch's *Psychologie*, which we are glad to see is published in their Theological Library. The writer will be well rewarded if the present

The present writer felt that if the distinction were Scriptural at all, it was much more than a mere verbal distinction, and he has endeavoured to use it to clear up what previously seemed to him to be unexplained, in our popular evangelical theology, *i.e.*, how, on the one hand, man's intellect is alive and interested in the works of God, but dead or indifferent to his person and character. There must be some stupendous fault in human nature to account for this, of which of course the psychology of Aristotle would take no notice, but which the Bible would explain, and which, when rightly understood, would throw light on the doctrine of original sin and of the new birth. The writer has thus used the Scripture trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body to interpret and explain, doctrines which must remain dogmas until internal experience comes to confirm external authority, and we feel that they are not only theologically but also psychologically true as well. If the psychology of Scripture thus recommends its theology, it is only another instance of the old remark, that the obscurities of the Bible arise from our viewing its truths from one side only. We must "walk about Jerusalem and mark well her bulwarks, and tell the towers thereof," if we would see how "she is beautiful for situation, and the joy of the whole earth." There is nothing, it has been said, makes success like success. It is much more correct

work draws attention to Delitzsch's work, which is by far the most learned which Germany has yet produced on the subject. For non-theological readers we should particularly recommend Schubert's *Geschichte der Seele*, or General von Rudloff's *Die Lehre von Menschen*.

to say that nothing serves the truth so much as truth. Separate fragments of truth, when they are found to piece in together, give us that sense of conviction which nothing can afterwards shake. So it was that the discovery of the telescope set at rest the Copernican theory, which, however mathematically true and undeniable, wanted this optical confirmation, to overturn the prejudice of the senses and the partiality of human nature for old opinions. We thus look forward to Christian Psychology, setting the old truths of theology in a new light, by which the cavils of the mere psychical man at the new birth will be seen to be only cavils, the objections of a blind man to the laws of light, or of a deaf man to the laws of sound. The theology of the Bible tells us of the *function* of spiritual-mindedness; its psychology tells us of the *organ* itself. The one thus explains the other, and in the mouth of two witnesses every word is established. If the writer has thus succeeded in underpropping our current evangelical theology with a sound psychological principle, on which to explain the doctrines of original sin, the new birth, consciousness in the Intermediate state, and the spiritual body, his studies will not have been undertaken in vain, and he will bless God for enabling him to direct others to a solution which has cleared up some of the difficulties of belief to his own mind.

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1. Man a tripartite nature,
2. With two tendencies, flesh and spirit.
3. The fall deadened the spirit.
4. The Pneuma in fallen man is conscience.
5. The new birth is the quickening of that Pneuma.
6. Man's immortality not in the Psyche, but in the Pneuma.
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THE CASE STATED.

PSYCHOLOGY and Ethics are the two subjects on which the Bible may be expected to speak with authority. However distinct the orbits of reason and faith may be, they intersect each other at least at two points. Self-knowledge, and the knowledge of our duty, are the two sciences which descend from heaven, or of which a revelation from heaven must determine at least the outlines. Psychology and ethics must be Christian, if Christianity is to exist at all. Whatever may be said of its relation to other sciences, the Bible will fall behind the age, and lose the allegiance of the educated classes, if it cannot maintain its supremacy in this department of the mental and moral sciences. These it claims by right as its own. It professes to be a revelation of the character of God; and from the nature of the case, it must also contain a revelation of the character of man. Whatever may be said about leaving the physical sciences to take their own course, unfettered by traditional interpretations of the word of God, the same cannot be said of the moral sciences.

While we renounce all jurisdiction over the other

natural sciences, we must put in a claim for the Bible as an authority on all questions connected with human nature. Psychology and ethics are the two departments of human knowledge which Revelation claims as its own. It can never give up its right to regulate these. It must tell us of our nature as made in the image of God; that is the task of Christian psychology. It must point out the duties of such a Godlike nature; that is the task of Christian ethics.

We are not without a system of Christian ethics. The writings of Chalmers and Vinet, Wardlaw and Wayland, Harless and Rothe, have shown the dependence of morality upon religion in a light which is not now disputed as it was a century ago. The Christian code of ethics is no longer treated as obsolete, as Bishop Butler declared it was by the polite world of his day. But we are as yet very far from recognising a scheme of Christian psychology distinct from the psychology of the schools, in the same sense that the ethics of the Bible is distinct from the ethics of India and Greece. To this day divines accept the distribution of the mind which the reigning philosophy, whatever it be, lays down, and work upon it, quite unconscious that it may be wholly subversive of what the Bible teaches of the inner nature of man. The old scholastic division of the mind into memory, intelligence, and will—

> "Memoria, intelligenzia, e voluntade."
> —Dante Purg. xxv. 85.

which we find in Dante, and traces of which appear

in Bacon's division of the sciences into history, poetry, and philosophy, lasted until the time of Descartes. Then arose the new school of dichotomists, who repeated the Cartesian formula of soul and body, reason and instinct, until it has stamped itself into our theology, as well as into all other modes of thought. The controversy between those who took reason for a faculty *sui generis*, and those who made it only a modification of instinct, has lasted down to our own day. There have been almost endless refinements and distinctions from Locke's "reflection" and Leibnitz's "monads," down to Kant's analytic and synthetic faculty, and Coleridge's repeated distinction between reason and understanding, the Vernunft and Verstand of Schelling.

All the while we have scarcely taken the trouble to ask whether the Bible might not throw light on these and similar questions. Men have persisted in disputing on a point which had been settled beforehand, if they had only thought of consulting the oracles of God. When it is said that man was created "in the image and after the likeness of God," these two expressions might have suggested—the one, that essential part of man which sin has not quite effaced; the other (likeness, ὁμοιώσις in the LXX.) that moral resemblance which sin has destroyed. And again, the New Testament distinction between Psyche and Pneuma might have set, we should have supposed, almost every thinker on the right track for a true theory of human nature. The tripartite nature of man, which heathen philosophers had guessed at, but never truly discovered,

was as clearly intimated in Scripture as any other fact connected with human nature. We can only attribute the adherence of divines to the old psychology of body and soul partly to timidity, and partly to not seeing clearly how much a defective psychology affected their conclusions in theology.

We do not mean to imply that the trichotomy of man, as made up of body, soul, and spirit, was not traced out by the early Greek fathers. The distinction of Psyche and Pneuma,* on which the doctrine of the trichotomy chiefly rests, was caught by the Greek fathers, but in most cases they founded no teaching on it; and as the only fathers who did so, Origen and Apollinaris, fell into error on the subject, we hardly wonder that Augustine thought it safer to pass it by as an unprofitable distinction: Origen, by holding that the spirit of man was ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν χειρόνων, impassive of evil, led the way to a theory of the purgation of evil by punishment, which must result in the salvation of all; Apollinaris, by denying to Christ a human Pneuma, and declaring that the Holy Spirit in His

* It is only what we might expect, that the distinction of Psyche and Pneuma was caught by the Greek, but lost or neglected by the Latin fathers. The Latin language wanted the precision of the Greek, and *spiritus* and *anima* never acquired the same precision of meaning as Pneuma and Psyche. Irenæus, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Didymus of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, and Basil of Cæsarea, all note the distinction of soul and spirit, and designate the spirit as that which bears the truest image of God. With the error of Apollinaris, who denied to Christ a human Pneuma, the reaction came, and the trichotomy fell into disfavour, and was neglected even in the East. In the West it cannot be said to have ever received the attention it deserved. Tertullian opposed it from the first, and Augustine thought it safest to neglect it.—*See Bishop Ellicott's Destiny of the Creature*, p. 117.

case supplied the place of the third part of our nature, thus impaired his humanity. For this reason the doctrine of the Pneuma fell into undeserved reproach, and at last was quite lost sight of.

But it might have been otherwise. To take one instance only out of many. If Augustine, the authority and the oracle, not only of his own age, but of the whole western Church down to our day, had adopted the trichotomy, instead of the prevailing dichotomy of body and soul, how much smoother would have been the course of theology, how much less disturbed by a controversy in which we now see that both sides were right in what they affirmed, and wrong only in what they denied. Pelagius asserted, and Augustine denied the reality of human goodness, till, heated by controversy, the one bordered on denying the fall, and certainly quite frittered away its meaning; while the other went so far as to call the virtues of the heathen "splendid vices," and in his greatest work, "The City of God," fell into a narrow and half-Manichean conception of the world as divided into two cities, owning allegiance to two distinct rulers, God and the devil, and ending, of course, in an eternal separation at the last day. Had Augustine only adopted from the Greek the distinction of Pneuma and Psyche, and bent the still living Latin tongue to the exact use of spiritus and anima, as geist and seele are distinguished in German, or as *esprit* and *âme**

* The study of words does not contain a more instructive chapter than that in which we trace through the columns of Littrè's Dictionary the decline and fall of the word *Esprit* from its primitive Biblical sense to its present conven-

originally were in French, or as spirit and soul might be even still in English—what clouds of controversy which have troubled the Church for the last fourteen centuries might be rolled away! Had Augustine but recognised the trichotomy, and taught that the *Ruach*, or pneuma or spiritus—*i.e.*, the inspired and Godlike part of man, was deadened by the fall, and that in that state of spiritual injury a propagation of soul and body from Adam to his posterity must *ex traduce* carry with it a defective, and hence a diseased constitution, his refutation of Pelagius would have been sufficiently convincing, without hurrying him into an exaggeration in the opposite extreme, in which moralists who oppose theology have not failed to see the weakness, and to profit by it.

This is only one instance of several which we shall

tional use as a synonym for wit or cleverness. In old French *esprit* is always contrasted with body as the divine and incorporeal part of man—that which he has in common with angels, and which elevates him above the brute. So Froissard uses the word. But by the time of Pascal and Bossuet it had acquired its present limited sense of the understanding as contrasted with the affections. Pascal so contrasts the two:—"Le cœur a son ordre; l'esprit a le sien, qui est par principes et demonstrations, le cœur en a un autre." Bossuet again actually identifies the intellectual and the spiritual, making the poverty of speech in French an excuse for poverty of thought:—"L' intellectuel et le spirituel c'est la même chose: notre langue s'est conformée a cette notion, Un esprit, selon nous est toutjours quelque chose d'intelligent, et nous n'avons point de mot plus propre pour expliquer celui de *νοῦς* et *mens* que celui d'esprit."—*Bossuet, Conn.* v. 13. He elsewhere identifies, as Grotius does, the Pneuma of 1 Cor. ii. with the intellect. He fails to see any deeper contrast between the flesh and the spirit than that between the rational and animal natures in man. Hence the *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, to writers of this school, is an unintelligible expression, and the *πρόνοια τῆς σαρκὸς* of Rom. xiii. is unmeaning.

"'What do you mean by the lords spiritual?' asked Madame de Stael: 'are they so because they are so *spirituel*?' How exactly do esprit and spirituel express what the French deem the highest power and glory of the human mind."—*See Hare's Guesses at Truth*, p. 7.

point out in the course of the following inquiry, of the solution which a sound psychology offers to a sound system of theology. *Error latet in generalibus.* Theology borrows its axioms or first laws of thought from the reigning school of philosophy, often quite unconscious that they are so borrowed, and then finds, to its dismay, errors in the conclusion which it did not suspect in the premises. It is not till the wedge of gold or the Babylonian garment has been found in the floor of the tent, that we acknowledge that the difficulties which emerge in theology are difficulties brought in by ourselves from philosophy. Even still, though systematic divinity is on the decline, divines are a great deal too facile in admitting as axioms certain philosophical theories, which have come down by tradition from heathen schools of thought. There is something in Tertullian's rough saying, *Quid philosophus ac Christianus*, though he was by no means consistent with his own principle. For instance, the prevailing dichotomy of body and soul rests on the old Protagorean system of couples of logical antitheses and opposites. Thus, mind and matter, finite and infinite, hot and cold, wet and dry, light and dark, &c., were supposed to be entities co-eternal with God. These co-eternal entities, out of which Plato's Trinity of God, matter, and ideas is constructed, was rejected, of course, by Christian divines. But a substratum of error remained untaken away. They still held by the old categories of matter and mind, and supposed man to be made up of two parts, the reasonable soul and human flesh. The division has come down unchallenged to our day, and

little modified even by those who recognise the trichotomy of Scripture. Divines, in general, if they assign any meaning at all to the Pneuma, describe it as a kind of sub-division of the Psyche, like Aristotle's division of the soul into the μέρος ἀλογόν, and that λόγον ἔχον κυρίως. If the Pneuma is only a class under the Psyche, not an original part by itself, we do not wonder that practical men should pass the subject by as a needless refinement, illustrative of Greek subtlety, but not of any use to explain certain obscure and apparently irreconcileable mysteries of the kingdom of grace. The Bible speaks of man as wholly corrupt, yet it recognises traces of natural goodness, and that among the heathen (Phil. iv. 8, Rom. ii. 14). The Bible again speaks of our being born from above, yet it speaks of putting off the old man and putting on the new, as if the new creature in Christ Jesus were not the creation of a new, but the restoration of the old. The Bible again speaks of death as a sleep, and that the dead praise not God, neither they that go down into silence. Yet it also teaches us that "blessed are the dead which die in the Lord; for they rest from their labours, and their works do follow them." And again, that though "absent from the body, we are present with the Lord." Now the popular dichotomy, as we shall see, is unavailing against those who maintain the sleep of the soul, and the only clue to this contradiction lies in the distinction between psychical and pneumatical life. So again the Bible tells us that at the last day we shall be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven, and which the apostle

elsewhere calls a pneumatical body. But if the pneuma is only a faculty of the soul, the spiritual soul, as contrasted with the merely intellectual soul, such an expression as the spiritual body is almost unmeaning, and divines are driven to hold a doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh which is nowhere taught in Scripture. If the mortal, *i.e.*, animal body, and the immortal or rational soul, are the two integral parts of human nature, then, as we shall see, the resurrection of the body is a doctrine not only difficult in itself, but also unworthy of the place which it holds in the Christian scheme. If at death the spirit rises to a higher state of being on quitting this trembling house of clay, is it after the analogy of God's other dealings that He should degrade it again by putting it, as He did once, and for a little time (βραχύ τι, Heb. ii. 9), in a tenement lower than that of angels?

These are some of the difficulties of belief of which the prevailing division of man into body and soul offers no solution, but which at once explain themselves on the other theory of the trichotomy. On these questions, we are at the present moment brought to the point where Copernicus stood when he found the difficulties of the Ptolemean theory insuperable, and was thus driven to conclude that these errors in detail implied an error somewhere of first principles. He threw out the hypothesis which has since won its way to general acceptance. In the present case, however, it may be said, *hypotheses non fingo.* Ours is only a return to the true and Scriptural account of man's nature, which later theories have obscured, and which

fell into undeserved reproach in early times, from its supposed connection with the Apollinarian error as to the person of our Lord.

"No difficulty emerges in theology which has not previously emerged in philosophy," such is Sir W. Hamilton's celebrated maxim. The difficulties of theology will, if traced to their source, be generally traced home to some conception current in the schools of philosophy. Thus it happens that the Bible is made responsible for difficulties which are not of its own making. Its doctrines are objected to, when in truth it is our point of view which is at fault. Change the point of view, and the objections will generally, if not in every case, disappear. So it is, we are sure, with the difficulties of belief relative to original sin and the new birth.* They are solved by a single text rightly understood (Jude 19). We thus appeal from the Bible as seen in the light of the schools to the Bible as seen in its own light. If we take one

* The author of The Difficulties of Belief, the Rev. T. R. Birks, has with great ability endeavoured to rectify some of these misconceptions by which the Bible is made accountable for the injudicious reasonings of some of its friends and apologists. Mr Birks controverts certain crude notions of God's omnipotence or sovereignty, and of His *permission* of evil when He might have *prevented* it. He also correctly marks the difference between sin in man and angels, on account of man being in the flesh. The one, therefore, entailed the sentence of temporal death only; the other of eternal. He rejects the notion of a covenant between God and Adam, in which Adam contracted with God on behalf of all his posterity; and thus sweeping away most of the figments of the seventeenth century theology, if he does not allay doubt, he alleviates, at least, some of the difficulties of belief. The line of inquiry that we shall pursue is along the same path as that traced by Mr Birks; and we take the sagacious hints which he has thrown out as finger-posts on the road to a higher theology, in which our differences shall disappear when truths are seen in the light of God, who is love.

part of God's Word without the other, we must expect to fall into error. But we must only blame ourselves for the result.

Thus the purpose of the following inquiry is practical and apologetic, not speculative and critical only. If the distinction of Psyche and Pneuma were merely verbal, it would be a nice refinement of language, but no more. Since it was regarded in this light by Tertullian,* he very naturally rejected it with that rough, practical good sense which distinguished the Latin mind from the Greek. In this he was followed by Augustine; and it is needless to add that the authority of Augustine decided the course of the western Church in rejecting the distinction as mystical, and tending to deprave the doctrine of man's fall and corruption. It must be admitted that Augustine and his followers have had some reason for their suspicions. With scarcely an exception, those who have followed Origen in his theory of the Pneuma as the divine element in man, have inclined to the notion that this divine and inner light is itself "impassive of evil."

* Tertullian, in his treatise *on the Soul* (De Anima, ch. x.), opposes the idea of any absolute division between the soul and spirit. Denique si separas spiritum et animam *separa et opera;* agant in discreto aliquid ambo, seorsum anima seorsum spiritus, * * Si enim duo sunt anima et spiritus *dividi possunt* ut divisione eorum alterius discedentis alterius immanentis mortis et vitæ concursus eveneat. Yet this latter supposition, which Tertullian excludes as absurd, is the very one on which Scripture founds the idea of spiritual death: "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth" (1 Tim. v. 6). Men are dead in trespasses and sins when the psychical life is there, but the pneumatical not yet awakened. It is only just to Tertullian, however, to admit that he afterwards compares the Psyche and the Pneuma to the female and the male, and adds, *O beatum connubium si non admiserit adulterium* (De Anima, 41).

They have thus failed to see the meaning either of original sin or of the capability of spiritual wickedness, which is the same as the sin against the Holy Ghost. The Cambridge school of Platonists of the 17th century, and the followers of Fox and Barclay, also caught the distinction of Psyche and Pneuma; but as their theories clearly tended in the direction of Origenism, their opinions led to no sound conclusions, and were rejected by the majority of their countrymen. The same may be said of the new school of Platonising divines, of whom Professor Maurice of Cambridge and the late Mr Robertson of Brighton are the foremost names. Those who, to uphold the distinct nature of the Pneuma or divine image in man, reject or obscure the doctrine of original sin, must not be surprised if an invincible prejudice is still felt against a theory which seems to lead to such conclusions. The image of God in man has been defaced in one part of our nature, the Psyche, and has been altogether effaced in the other, the Pneuma. All that remains of the Pneuma is that feeble flutter of conscience which witnesses for God, not so much by approving, but by accusing and excusing our thoughts. This is all that remains of that inner light of which so much has been written by the mystics and neo-Platonists of this and the 17th century. The Pneuma in fallen human nature is as a bruised reed and as smoking wick of a candle, which God will not quench, but which must be kindled by a flame from heaven if it is to give us any light. As soon as it can be seen that the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma, so far from making

void the doctrine of original sin, actually confirms and explains it, the objections to it will, we should hope, disappear, and the Scripture trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body be accepted as the only true one.

Thus the object of our present inquiry is practical and not speculative only. It is the test of the truth of a theory when it clears up difficulties which were before irreconcileable. Thus, when Galileo turned his glass to the skies, and pointed out the moons of Jupiter revolving round the planet, he set the question at rest between Copernicus and Ptolemy. The Copernican theory was no longer a hypothesis, but a truth. Difficulties which were inexplicable under the Ptolemean astronomy, vanished at once in the light of the new theory. It was a revolution, doubtless, in all the accustomed modes of thought; it required men to give up certain traditional views, which rested, as they supposed, on the authority of the Bible. But as soon as this sacrifice to truth was made, the rest was easy. It is difficult to find truth in the first instance, not because she loves to conceal herself, but because we look for her in the wrong direction.* But when found, she is always seen to be self-consistent, simple, and easy of comprehension. In buying truth, as in the case of other less precious commodities, the first cost is the greatest; when that is paid, truth is her own reward, and repays the purchaser many times over.

So it is when we apply one Scripture truth to solve

* It is a fine remark of Turgot that—"Ce n'est pas l'erreur qui s'oppose aux progrès de la vérité. Ce sont la mollesse l'entêtement l'esprit de routine, tout ce qui porte à l'inaction."—*Pensees.*

another. Looked at apart, the doctrines of original sin and the new birth seem the hardest, if not the most repulsive, of dogmas. No truths are more undeniably part of God's word, and yet no truths have been more often rejected and explained away than these. How comes this? It is easy to set it down to the hardness of the natural heart; and certainly we are far from excusing men's rejection of these dogmas. But may there not be a fault in our part? May they not be so irrationally explained as to provoke this revolt of reason? If orthodoxy has not thus often produced heterodoxy, Church history has been written to very little purpose. Divines should begin to suspect that it is the point of view at which they put the inquirer which leads him to reject salvation. Like Balak, they lead Balaam only to "see the utmost part of them, and not to see them all;" and, instead of cursing our enemies, the freethinker ends in blessing them altogether. Let us take him up to the top of the high mountain, let him see not a part only, but the whole of God's plan spread out before him, and it will be strange if he does not end in blessing those whom God has blessed, and cursing those whom God has cursed, and not the contrary, as at present.

Our purpose will be gained in this treatise, if we can induce our reader to change his point of view, and adopt the Scripture account of man's tripartite nature, instead of the dual conception still common. Original sin will then be seen in a new light, not as a hard and forbidding dogma, but as the simple and only way of accounting for the fact of sin abounding that grace may

much more abound. If the first Adam was by his constitution psychical only, with a capacity, however, for becoming spiritual, then it is self-evident that when he fell he forfeited that capacity, and tended to become, first, earthly, then psychical, and finally, devilish, or devil-inspired, since the Pneuma, if it is no longer led of God, must be given over to the inspiration of the wicked one, James iii. 15. Now, since like produces like, fallen man could only transmit to his posterity the nature which he had. Being psychical himself, and having not the spirit, (Jude 19), how could the child rise above the level of the parent? Indeed, if we can speak of any tendency in human nature, it is, when left to itself, a tendency to degenerate, not to improve.

Thus from this point of view, original sin, or the transmission of evil *ex traduce*, so far from being a terrible decree, or an inscrutable mystery, which led the orthodox in the sixth century* to think that celibacy was the blessed state, as not continuing the propagation of evil, is seen to be the fault and corruption of our nature. It is a fault and corruption arising entirely from the privation of the Pneuma, not from the transmission by propagation of some peculiar and positive germ and principle of evil. The crude and contradictory theories of Traducianism and Creationism, between which Augustine wavered so long, inclining only to the latter doubtfully, and as a choice of difficulties, would never have been heard of. The

* For illustrations see Milman's History of Latin Christianity, particularly the epithalamium of Gregory the Great on the marriage of a noble Roman pair.

birth of a soul is a mystery, and so is the birth of an insect. Till we can solve the mystery of life in its lowest form, we need not contend about the mode in which its higher forms come into being. The simple truth with regard to all birth from man to the worm is this, that although God has entered into his Sabbath of creation (Heb. vi. 4), it is not a Sabbath of inactivity, but of active care and Providence (John v. 17), "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," *i.e.*, on the Sabbath-day, and in the way that God works during the Sabbath of creation.

Thus the question on which Creationists and Traducianists have disputed so long, disappears from the point of view of the trichotomy. The question really turned not on the physiological question whether the soul is born, which none would deny who did not take the Hindu theory of pre-existence, but on the question of the transmission of evil. Thus the dispute about Creationism and Traducianism was really a dispute on the nature of original or birth sin. It was a corollary from the doctrine of original sin, that the soul was transmitted with the body. It is a proof indeed of Augustine's candour that although Traducianism told directly in favour of his argument, and notwithstanding that Pelagius was a decided Creationist, yet he rejected the Traducianist theory on account of its seeming to lead to conclusions even more objectionable than Pelagianism. We shall afterwards see that neither hypothesis is necessary on that view of original sin which the distinction between Pneuma and Psyche opens up to us. It is not the least merit of this, the

account of the tripartite nature of man, that it allays those controversies which the other theory only created.

Lastly, there is a practical use of a sound system of Christian Psychology, which our preachers and apologists would do well not to overlook. All evangelical Christians turn to the 3d of St. John as the proof passage of the doctrine of the new birth. They maintain, and rightly as we think, that such words as these are not to be explained away into duly receiving any external rite, however solemn. Experimental religion is either a delusion all through, or there are some of the baptized who are born again of the Spirit, and others who are not. We are not here showing reasons for believing the interpretation of the new birth commonly held by Evangelical Christians to be the correct one. We here accept these reasons as sufficient, and express our hearty agreement with them. We believe that a change must pass over men before they can enter the kingdom of heaven—that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.

But what the evangelical argument wants, is a psychological ground on which to rest this theological truth. Evangelical divines rightly maintain that we must be born again, but this does not meet Nicodemus' difficulty. What is that part of our composite nature which is born again or born from above? Clearly not the body; that view carries absurdity with it; can a man enter his mother's womb a *second time* and be born? Is it then the soul or Psyche? But the soul cannot be born a second time any more than the

body, Hence they conclude that the second birth means a new *direction* to the affections, desires, and tastes, or a new will or power to turn to God. The new birth is thus rather a renovation of the old, than the birth of something new. The new man is nothing but the old man renewed in the spirit of his mind. That there is a renewal of the old we do most readily admit, but that this is *equivalent* to the new birth, and not the effect of it, we never can allow. Regeneration by itself is one thing, the effects of it is another. It is very true, that it is not necessary to know the laws of the wind, whence it cometh or whither it goeth, in order to know its force, or to judge of it by its effects. So the Lord does not give Nicodemus a psychological account of the difference between psyche and pneuma, which Nicodemus in all probability would not have understood, but passes on to a description of the new birth, instead of defining it by itself. It is the same with the majority of our evangelical teachers, they describe the results of the new birth correctly, and well. Newton's Cardiphonia, Romaine's Letters, Wesley, and Toplady's Sermons are instances of this. But what is the logical differentia between a converted and an unconverted man, that they fail to tell us. They are like Meno in Plato's dialogue, who when asked to define what virtue is in itself, described instead a list of particular virtues. It is then, at this point, that a correct *i.e.*, a Scriptural Psychology comes to help out a correct, *i.e.* a Scriptural Theology. Our preachers, to use an illustration from physiology, seem to understand the *function* of spiritual-mindedness, but

not to have discovered the *organ* which discharges that function. Now, what should we think of a physiologist who, after discovering a new function in the human body, never took the trouble to describe its proper and peculiar organ? Function and organ are co-relative terms in physiology; they must be also in psychology. It is consistent enough in those who have no sense of a personal God, to deny a peculiar organ of God-consciousness in man. Thus an Aristotle summing up his account of the Psyche as the entelechy, or sum total of human activity, is consistent enough. He had no consciousness of a peculiar function, and therefore may be excused for not suspecting that there was any such organ as the Pneuma in man. It is our knowledge of the function that sets us on the track to discover its peculiar organ; and here let us remark, that it is the glory of the Scriptures to have revealed both to us. Had the mental analysis of Aristotle pierced so deep as to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, had he then discovered the spirit lying in embryo underneath the psyche, as Schwammerdamm dissected the cocoon to find the butterfly, it would have been a barren discovery. Knowing nothing of the mind of God, what would such a discovery of an organ of God-consciousness have led him on to? He might have fallen into a vein of mysticism like the later Platonists, but the discovery would have been of as little use as a telescope to a blind man, or a trumpet to one born deaf.

On the other hand, had the Scriptures, which describe the function of spiritual-mindedness, not told us

also of its appropriate organ the Pneuma, we might have been fairly puzzled. It is true that if we go to the Old Testament to look for proof passages on the subject we are disappointed. But we forget that the knowledge of ourselves, and of the nature of God, go on proportionately together in the Scriptures. When the function was but feebly exercised, the organ itself was only slightly mentioned. There are rudimentary organs, for instance, in the body of a child, which come into use only when he attains manhood. So with the Spirit. It is in proportion as men, by attaining to spiritual manhood, and having their senses exercised by reason of use, to discern good and evil, that they learn what is the organ which discharges that function of spiritual mindedness. We see only half the glory of God's word if we suppose that the same organ can discharge two different functions, serve, *i.e.*, as the intellectual instrument of the unawakened psyche, and also as the instrument of religious consciousness when the spirit is awakened and turned to God. Conversion is a truth, but is only fully understood in all its bearings when we see that it is the wakening up of what was previously dormant, the divine part in man now turned to its proper use to witness for Him, to worship Him in the beauty of holiness (not the holiness of beauty, as Laud misread the text), and to delight in him at all times. It is one thing, for instance, to know the functions of the hand, another thing to describe the organ itself, by the light of comparative anatomy, as Sir C. Bell has done. For all purposes of saving knowledge it is enough to experience the

spiritual mind as contrasted with the carnal. But if knowledge is excellent at all, it is surely desirable that those who, as spiritual anatomists, describe the functions of the new nature, should go on to understand and observe the organ by itself. A smith or a carpenter know very well what they can do with their thumb and fore-finger, but a knowledge of the anatomy of the hand greatly enlarges our conceptions of the wisdom of the great Contriver, and enables us to refer each of these many functions to its proper and peculiar organ. Adaptation is seen in the fitting of every instrument to its own work. Now we only half admire the work of God in conversion if we do not see the organ out of which the quickening Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, draws such wonderful functions. It is not the psyche that prays, though we cannot, it is true, pray without a certain discharge of intellectual force, which is psychical only. Just in the same way it is not the brain that thinks, though we cannot think without the healthy exercise of the brain. In all God's works, the bringing in of the higher form of life does not suspend the action of the lower—the lower still co-operates with it. Thus the body serves the soul or psyche, and the soul the spirit. But as we do not confound body and soul, so we must not confound soul and spirit, as if they were all one, because their union is essential to life. Like the woman and the man, the one is not without the other "in the Lord."

These are some of the reasons for which we think the application of Scripture Pyschology to illustrate

Theology both practicable and profitable. If the distinction of spirit, soul, and body, help to set forth and to simplify the doctrines of original sin, the new birth, the immediate state and the spiritual body we shall not have pursued our inquiry in vain.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION CONTRASTED.

THERE are three postulates, the Being of a God, our accountability to Him, and the immortality of the soul, on the certainty of which every other doctrine of religion is assumed to rest. These three postulates extended and applied make up what is generally called Natural Religion. It would be beside our purpose here to dispute the justice of the term Natural Religion, or to inquire how far, and to what extent since the fall man of himself can turn to God, can fear and serve Him here, and hope to see Him hereafter. We must however, *in limine*, protest against the so-called *system* of natural religion. Though man may, by his unaided reason, spell out one or even two of these truths singly, yet he certainly cannot put them together, he certainly cannot reach even that elementary stage of faith spoken of in Heb. xi. 6, "For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him." Even though he may rise above and reject the idols of the theatre and the tribe, he certainly cannot break away from the idols of the den: those false conceptions of God which we must form to ourselves in our own fallen and corrupt hearts. The philosopher may have purified his mind from the corrupting conceptions of the popular idolatry, but "unless above himself he can exalt himself," an attempt

which carries a contradiction on its very face, he must still fashion a God to himself after his likeness and after his image. There must be moral likeness between the worshipper and the Being worshipped. Man's powers of abstraction are very great, but he is wholly unable to choose all the good and refuse all the evil in his own heart, to draw out the precious from the vile, and rejecting all baser metal, cast the pure gold only into the furnace, that thereout may come a God worthy to be loved with all our mind, and heart, and soul, and strength. To test how far man's powers of abstraction go in this direction, we must transport ourselves outside the pale of Christendom altogether; we must not take account of what so called Theists have taught, who have borrowed without acknowledgment the light of the knowledge of God revealed in the Old and New Testament Scripture. It is from the philosophers of Greece, Rome, and China, the only teachers of whose wisdom we have any authentic account, that we shall learn how far man's unassisted powers can attain to the knowledge of God. The result of a careful comparison appears to be this, that the wiser heathen could see the folly of the popular religion, and there stood still, rejecting superstition, but having nothing to put in its stead. Or if they advanced beyond this they draw out their conceptions of the divine so far as to personify a Great Intelligence, who was either the soul of the world, or the great over-soul, according as their views leaned to Pantheism or not. Thus they either contentedly adopted Atheism, or worshipped an abstraction, an idol of the den, called the Supreme mind.

Thus, as the first postulate of Natural Religion, the Being of God, was never distinctly understood, it is not likely that the second or third were so apprehended that men could put the three together and act upon them. As the knowledge of God never rose beyond an abstraction formed out of a single attribute, so the sense of duty to Him was vague and indefinite, and vaguest of all, the sense of a hereafter, in which he should live unto Him. It is on this point that we wish to inquire what the heathen really thought, and how far the popular view of the evidence from natural religion of the immortality of the soul is supported by fact.

The traditions of all nations agree in this, that the expectations of man are not bounded by the grave. It would be almost superfluous to quote authorities on such a well-worn subject. The Sheol of the Hebrews, the Amenthes of the Egyptians, the Hades, Erebus, and Tartarus of the Greeks, the Patala of the Hindus, the Dowzank of the Persians, all point to the same truth, that man does not wholly die. Not to speak of such word-quibbles as the immortality of the race, which is only what man has in common with all organic life, the immortality of the individual was the point of conjecture which they wrestled with, like Jacob with the angel till the breaking of the day, unwilling to let it go, yet unable to wring from it a definite meaning. They sat before the grave, like the women who watched at the holy sepulchre, unable to roll away the stone, for it was very great, yet unwilling to think that behind the stone lay only dust and corruption. Christ,

it is true, has brought life and immortality to light by the gospel, but there were watchers before the dawn, those who wished for the world's Easter-day before the day had fully come. Now men cannot look for a thing without forming some conception as to how it is to be brought about. Hope will have its forecasts, though they often prove fallacious. But as even a mistaken hope is better than none at all, we must think with respect even of the Indian's dream of heaven in some happy hunting ground, or the Egyptian hope of the resurrection of mummies, after a general conflagration at the end of a great cycle.

In early and simple times, before the distinction between matter and spirit had been sharply marked off, the notion was that the ghost of the man, his spirit or glassy essence, survived the death of the body, or the animal part. But the nature of soul and body was not contrasted as in later times. Just as the latest conjecture of advanced thinkers in Germany is to a theory of their unity, so the starting point of all speculation appears to have been this. So true is it that speculation runs the great circle round, only, like the ancient mariner of Coleridge, to see the kirk upon the hill from which he set out.*

* See the Psychological theory of Fichte, the younger, translated and edited by Mr Morrell, under the title of "Contributions to Mental Philosophy, by Immanuel Hermann Fichte," London, Longman, 1860. Klenke has also built up a theory of correspondence between mind and body, on what may be called a system of organic psychology. Bacon seems to have thrown out a hint in that direction, when he says in the *De Aug.* "that unto all this knowledge of concordance between the mind and the body, that part of the inquiry is the most necessary which considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties do take and occupy."

In Homer, the soul goes to Hades whether the body is cast to the dogs or honourably interred. So far there is separation between the two; but the non-mortal part is only a shadow of the mortal. Life in the shades is only a cold and colourless copy of the picture of life upon earth. Ghosts are little else than bloodless bodies: their time is spent in useless reveries upon the past. "The blessed" is a phrase which we are so accustomed to apply to the dead, that it is well to remember that the thought of death being a state of blessedness was one which a heathen could not conceive. Even Achilles in the Elysian Fields declares that the life of the meanest drudge on earth is preferable to the very highest of the unsubstantial rewards of the under world.

The late Archbishop Whately has, we think, gone too far in inferring, that because the conceptions of the heathen of the soul's separate existence were thus vague and unsubstantial, that therefore they had little or no belief in the doctrine at all.* We think this is inferring too much. They knew nothing of the modus by which the soul could exist separate from the body, and therefore used vague and contradictory language on the subject. Just as a modern divine might speak of angels as incorporeal substances, and then inconsistently speak of a dead child as laid upon the lap of an angel. It would not be fair to infer from this that he

Novalis says, "that we touch heaven when we lay our hand on a human body." Alas, sometimes the converse is nearer the mark. Sometimes our bodies are the temples of the Holy Ghost, but more often the house where the unclean spirit enters in to dwell there.

* Whately's Essays on Peculiarities of Christian Religion, Essay I.

did not believe in the existence of angels, but only that his notions of their nature were obscure, and that from the poverty of language he was obliged to use expressions which we know to be inapplicable. In the same way we ought to infer, not that the heathen assigned to the souls of the deceased a kind of shadowy existence corresponding to their own indistinct conceptions —a sort of intermediate condition between being and not being, resembling our recollections of a dream or a fancy, an intermediate state between the vivid impression produced by a real present object and no impression at all. We should rather say that they held, as we do, the soul to be the man, the centre of personality, but that they were at a greater loss even than we are to conceive of the man acting and thinking without the proper organs of thought and action— brain, blood, pulse, and nerve. We are no better off in this respect than they are, as every reader of Bishop Butler's first chapter of the Analogy knows already —and they are no worse off than we. When a Christian poet, such as Dante or Milton, has to describe the under world and its inhabitants, he has only the tongues of men with which to describe the operations of angels. He may excel, as Milton does, in idealising the subject, or come short in this, as Dante, but what he gains in one direction he loses in another. Milton's under world is less fabulous than that of Dante, but it is not near so vivid. What Milton imagined Dante imaged forth—the first was a cartoon, but the other a statue hewed from the living stone.

We should say then that in the age of Homer the

existence of the soul after death, was believed in as firmly as in later times; but as language had not attained the same philosophical precision, the mode of its existence was spoken of under certain corporeal emblems, which gave a confused impression as to its existence at all. The picture was blurred, and the light crossed; but as far as it went, it was a true expression of one of our deepest convictions, that man does not wholly die when the body dies. Those who infer, as Archbishop Whately does, that the obscurity of the notions of the heathen with regard to the life hereafter implies their unbelief of the fact itself, forget the distinction between faith and knowledge. Knowledge is of things we see. The conviction even of an apostle in the truth of a life to come must stop short of positive knowledge. There is a "great gulf fixed" for us as well as for them; so that we too, as well as the heathen, must walk by faith, and not by sight. Our faith, it is true, is grounded on a fact—the resurrection of Christ from the dead; consequently it is a good hope which maketh not ashamed. Nevertheless, it is faith, not certainty; hope, not sight; for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for?

Existence after death is the postulate, then, of natural religion, which has never been quite effaced from the mind of man, notwithstanding his fall and lapse into idolatry. This is that innate truth, as some would call it—the spiritual instinct, as we prefer to describe it—which has never been killed, but which gropes for its end as bees do to build cells and make honey, whatever the obstacles we may put in their

way. All theories among the heathen as to the nature of the life to come fall under two divisions, according as they date before or after the rise of philosophy. Before the age of speculation, men believed in a future life, but described it under the fables of the poets. They described the soul, as we have seen before, as a kind of bloodless body, a ghost that flitted bat-like through the shades of sunny memories, and lived on in the Elysian fields as old pensioners do with us, shouldering their crutches, and showing how fields were won. But with the age of speculation, the belief in a future state was moulded by the distinction which now obtained between mind and matter. Man's nature was made up of two parts—one animal, the other spiritual; one obeying instinct, and the other reason; one earthly, and the other God-like; one mortal, and the other immortal. The immortality of the soul was accepted as an axiom as undeniable as the mortality of the body. Either man perishes altogether with the brutes that perish (for the Budhist theory of transmigrations or incarnations never really took hold of the western mind), or he lives beyond the grave in that part of his nature which is inherently immortal. Speculation had no sooner forged this distinction between mind and matter than the whole theory of the immortality of the soul was hammered out at once and on the same anvil. Modern metaphysicians have added nothing to the argument for the immortality of the soul. As a principle of unity, it was indiscerptible and indestructible; as a principle of motion, it was incapable of rest; as a vital principle, it was incapable

of annihilation; as a self-conscious principle, it was incapable of oblivion. Descartes, Addison, Mendelssohn, and Bishop Butler have dressed up these *à priori* proofs in their own words, but they are already as well expressed in the Phædo of Plato. It is singular that a theory which has received such universal assent has been so little improved by the ages of speculation which have turned it over and over. In the pages of a popular manual like Dick's "Philosophy of the Future State," it comes out substantially the same argument as when hammered for the first time on the anvil of the Socratic dialogue. Kant was certainly not the first to point out the fallacy of the popular Platonic argument; but since Kant's celebrated Critique, it is now admitted by all who think on the subject that between the belief of the non-mortality of the soul and the philosophical proof of its immortality, there is a wide gulf which the *à priori* arguments of the Phædo fail to bridge over. Augustine's distinction between the holiness of the creature and that of the Creator may be applied to these arguments for our immortality. Of the creature we say that it may attain to the state *posse non peccare*, so it may attain to *posse non mori;* but to God alone does it inherently belong both *non posse peccare* and *non posse mori.* The God that cannot lie is the God that cannot die; for all others, from the angel of the presence down to the babe born to-day, God is their life, and God is their light. He alone is the fountain of life as well as of holiness.

Thus, as the instinct or moral sense of existence

after death took one shape when handled by the poets, so it took another from the philosophers. Superstition encrusted it with fables, and speculation set it up on the treacherous foundations of certain *à priori* principles. The modern world has outgrown these superstitious fables. With the exception of those who cling to the old pagan notion of purgatory, in which Virgil, not Paul, is fitly chosen as Dante's guide, our age believes in a life to come on different grounds from those on which the ancients supposed that the hollow parts of the earth were full of the ghosts of men, as the graves were of their bodies. But the religious and spiritual instinct has not discharged itself of the speculative element in the same way that it has of the superstitious. To this day the majority of divines, consciously or not, underprop their argument for existence after death (the instinct of which we admit) by a scholastic argument of the soul's immortality. The first chapter of Bishop Butler's great work might be cut out as we conceive, leaving the rest of the Analogy only stronger for the rejection of this its weakest point. Yet to this day divines commend this attempt to lay the foundations of revealed religion deep in the solid rock of first truths and self-evident principles. "For," they say, "if the foundations be removed, what shall the righteous do?" If men doubt the immortality of the soul, there is nothing before us but materialism, nihilism, or what not. So divines reason, forgetting that the dilemma is of their own making. They have made natural religion the base of revealed, and the superstructure must stand

or fall with its foundations. But the fault is not in the Bible, but in its advocates. They have assumed two philosophical antinomies, spiritualism and materialism, and challenged every believer in the Bible to take his side for the one and against the other. Undoubtedly, as St Paul before the council took sides with the Pharisees against the Sadducees, so the Scripture doctrine of the life to come is nearer to the spiritualist than to the materialist side of the controversy. But, strictly speaking, the Bible sides with neither, but takes a line of its own, in which existence after death depends not on our possessing any inherently immortal principle, but on God being a living God, and on the truth that all who live (as God said of Abraham to Moses in the bush, four hundred years after his body had seen corruption), live unto God. Our blessed Lord, in refuting the Sadducees, would have used the common argument of Plato and Butler if He had countenanced its truth. It was both readier and more obvious to common apprehension than the other, which is grounded on a verbal criticism of the expression "I am" in the Book of Exodus. But he passed it by as inconclusive, as either proving too much or nothing at all, and took his stand on the ground which is everywhere appealed too in the Bible, that God is life, and the promise, As I live, ye shall live also.

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul grows, as we have seen, out of the instinct of its non-mortality. The latter statement by no means sustains the weight of the former. It is one thing to deny materialism, another thing to affirm spiritualism; it is one thing to

stand on the instinct *non omnis moriar*, another thing to say, that the part which does not die possesses a principle of unity, life, and consciousness, and is thus inherently immortal. In the case of Plato such an argument was not only allowable, it was virtuous and praiseworthy. Reasoning in the night of nature, being, as other Gentiles without God and without hope, it was noble to choose the better part; to say of man, "He thinks he was not born to die." It was heroic to look death in the face and say, "Oh, death, thou art but a birth, the second birth of the immortal soul." Plato knew not, as we do, that death is the wages of sin. Dissolution must either be a law or a penalty; and those who saw the law of dissolution obtaining everywhere else, could not help conceiving of it as a law in the case of man.

"Omnia mors poscit, lex est, non pœna perire."

But we are taught differently. We know that death is a penalty, and *not* a law, in the case of man, and therefore the arguments which Plato used to prove the natural immortality of the soul cannot be used by us, who view death and life in a different light. We have no right, moreover, to take just so much of Plato's argument as suits our purpose, and reject the rest. We cannot say that it is a self-evident truth that there is a deathless principle in man, but that we learn from the Bible that this deathless principle is separated from the body as the wages of sin. This is the "one foot on land one foot on sea" kind of argument which is popularised in tracts, sermons, and bodies of divinity too numerous to mention. It is this

amalgam of Plato and Paul which passes for Christian spiritualism, and is the received and so-called orthodox psychology of the age. Before we can lay the foundations of a true scriptural psychology, this pretended spiritualism must be cleared away. The confusion in the popular mind between the instinct for a future life grounded on the great spiritual truth that "it is appointed unto men once to die, and after death the judgment," and the argument for the soul one and indivisible, must be cleared up. The only first truths or axioms we recognise are these, that there is a God, that there is a judgment to come, and that the need of this judgment to come is a moral instinct as real and deep as the need of righteousness, temperance, or any other instinct of our moral nature.

We are not, then, to look for the foundations of a sound and Scriptural system of psychology in the dogma of the soul's natural immortality as taught in the schools of philosophy. Superstition and speculation have both, out of the instinct of a future life, constructed a theory of their own of the hereafter. It is an airy superstructure on a slender basis of fact, that basis being the truth of conscience, that "it is appointed unto man once to die, and after death the judgment." We find no more support for Christian psychology in the reasonings of the philosopher than in the fancies of the poet. Not knowing that the sting of death is sin, how could Plato understand either the true significance of death, or wherein eternal life really consists? Yet the Platonic theory of the immortality of the soul is regarded as a foundation truth

essential to Christianity itself by those who would reject with horror the Platonic theory of pre-existence, or the Platonic dogma of the inherent evil of matter, out of which most of the errors of the Alexandrian school arise. As with the idea of God the philosopher only exchanged the idols of the theatre for the idols of the cave, and rejecting Polytheism fell into Pantheism; so with regard to the soul, in rejecting the materialism of earlier times, he fell into a spiritualism quite as wide of the mark. In Homer's age, the ghost of a man was the breath which went out of his body, and so was little more than a material emanation from the same. But philosophy in later times went into the other extreme,—the soul was the man, the body was only the house of clay that contained it. The metaphors from a house to its inhabitants, or from a ship to its crew, or a pitcher to the water in it, were marked out with such detail by the Neo-Platonists in particular, that by some it was taught to be a misfortune that man had a body at all. The fall consisted in being clothed upon with flesh. Redemption was nothing else than the shaking off this mortal coil. So far were these spiritualist notions carried, that the early Church looked upon Platonism, not as a useful ally, but as a dreaded rival, the fountain-head of all the Gnostic heresies which arose to vex the Church. The natural immortality of the soul, so far from being accepted as an outwork to Scripture truth, was opposed as a rival theory to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body. In Augustine's time the reconciliation between the two began to appear.

But the writers of the first four centuries, with hardly an exception, regard the two theories as antagonistic, and sought not to reconcile, but to replace the Platonic doctrine of the soul's natural immortality with the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

But with a change of times there came a change of opinions. The prevalent tendency of modern error, at least until our own day, was towards a blank and dreary materialism. Hence it was that Christian advocates were glad to furbish up weapons that had once been used against themselves. The immortality of the soul was the strong point of spiritualism which the Church now thought she could turn in her favour. We see this alliance between spiritualism and Christianity consummated and carried to its highest point in Bishop Butler, not only in his theory of the supremacy of conscience, but especially in his argument for the existence of an indestructible principle in man. We see what services spiritualism could render to the cause of truth. Let us not be ungenerous, or deny that in routing materialism out of the field, we are thankful for help from the opposite quarter. But all such alliances are dangerous, and the price which the Christian advocate has to pay is to find himself held responsible for a philosophy in addition to his creed. He is not as free as before to go direct to the lively oracles, and seek truth at first hand, from the fountain-head. He must search the Scriptures for proof texts, rather than bring his mind to read text and context together. These are some of the many evils which alliances of this kind bring with them. What tradition

is to the Church of Rome, that natural religion is to many of our reformed divines, a top load enough to sink itself and Scripture. Christian Psychology will never deserve its name until it cuts itself off from entangling alliances with the schools, as Christian ethics have done. Wardlaw and Chalmers have done much to clear up the confusion between natural virtue and Christian holiness, as if they were only different names for the same thing. Following up their line of thought, we wish to point out that the Psychology of the Bible is something distinct from that of the schools, and that if it has some points in common with spiritualism, it has points in common no less with materialism, and is in fact, when rightly understood, a third theory of human nature distinct from both, and with as little real affinity with the one as with the other.

THE ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION OF MAN.

It has been often remarked that Scripture does not teach us either the nature of God or of ourselves, as books of systematic divinity do. As its teaching on other truths is at "sundry times and divers manners," so with regard to this truth. It is for the divine to collect these intimations, and put them together into some system or other. According as he does this faithfully or not does he acquit himself of the task which he has taken in hand.

We have only another caution to make before entering on our task: it is that revelation being a progressive manifestation of the truth of God, the discovery of man's nature must be also progressive. In the same way that the plurality of Persons in the Godhead, and their relation to each other, was only gradually unfolded in Scripture, so we may expect it to be with the trichotomy of man's nature, spirit, soul and body. As in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity, it was not fully understood until the Spirit was given, so the distinction of Psyche and Pneuma is implied rather than taught when the race was still in its spiritual infancy. As the distinct personality of the Holy

Spirit is implied but not expressed in the Old Testament, so the distinction between the Psyche and Pneuma is latent there also. It would be out of harmony with the "analogy of the faith," if the tripartite nature of man were fully described in those books of the Bible which only contain implied hints of the plurality of persons in the Godhead. All we shall see of the subject will confirm this view of the harmonious way in which doctrines and duties, the nature of God and the nature of man, are unfolded together.

Consistent with the foregoing remark the account of the creation of man (Gen. ii. 7) rather implies than asserts the trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body. It is by the light of later Scriptures that we see that the breath of lives there inbreathed into man refers not to the animal and psychical part only, but to a pneumatical as well. Passing over the account of man in Gen. i. 26, which rather describes what man was intended to be, than what he actually is, his office more than his nature, his place in the cosmos rather than the elements out of which he was formed, we turn to the second of the two narratives. We would further premise that the second in order is the first in human interest. Chapter i. refers indeed rather to man's dignity as the headstone of the temple of Creation—chapter ii. to the nature of man, and the mode of his creation. Chapter i. is theological; chapter ii. anthropological,—for the psychology of man we must address ourselves therefore to the second of the two accounts of his formation.

We read Gen. ii. 7. "And the Lord God formed

man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, and man became a living soul." The narrative here points out two distinct sources from whence man was taken. 1. Of the dust of the ground, fashioned by the hand of God, as the potter fashions the clay (יָצַר). 2. Of the breath of lives breathed into his nostrils by the creative spirit of God. Three points here arrest our attention, and suggest the true key to the threefold nature of man.

A. The material cause. The Lord God took of the dust of the ground.

B. The formal cause. He breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives.

C. The final cause. And so man became a living soul.

A. As to the material cause there can be little dispute. Man is made of the dust of the ground—this is the base or ultimate elements of his animal nature. Hence in all probability the name given to man, Adam from Adamah, to indicate that the first man was of the earth earthy. The other derivations of אָדָם. 1. On account of the red colour of his skin, (comp. Joseph. Antiq. i. 1, 5), in the same way as the Chinese represent man as kneaded of yellow earth, and the red Indians of red clay; and 2. Adam as if for דָּם equivalent to דְּמוּת, with a reference to his being made in the image of God; or 3. for דָּם blood, are all fanciful and far-fetched. The inspired historian has pledged us to one derivation, and to that we must adhere. Adam is עָפָר מִן הָאֲדָמָה dust of the earth. Hence the penalty of death is this, that dust he is, and unto dust he must return.

He had chosen to indulge the animal part of his nature, to hearken to the voice of his wife, and through her to follow instinct and not reason, hence he is condemned to share the fate of the animal. Dust he is, and unto dust he must return. Dissolution is the law of all organic being. We have no reason to suppose the animal world before the fall to have been any exception to this law. The exception only began with man. He would have been translated had he continued sinless. He would not have seen death, but have been changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, even as Eve was taken from his side during the deep sleep into which he was cast by God. He would have passed away in a trance, in which there would have been neither pain nor penalty; mortality would have been swallowed up of life, and the corruptible would have put on incorruption. But with his transgression Adam had to take the physical as well as the spiritual consequences of sin. His animal nature was degraded to the condition of the rest of the animal world, and from the day that he ate of the forbidden fruit, dying, he began to die, until he returned to the earth out of which he was first taken. So much for the first or material part of man.

B. Next we read of the formal and efficient cause of man. The Lord God breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives. We speak of the formal and efficient cause as one, not because we wish to confound the agent with the instrument, but because the instrument is in this case of the same nature as the agent. The Lord God is the efficient cause—doubtless the Holy

Spirit, the Lord and giver of life. But the instrument He uses is the breath of lives. It is clear that the breath is here of the same nature as the Being who breathes it. Holy Scripture is everywhere careful not to confound creation with emanation. Unlike all other cosmogonies, in the Mosaic the heavens and the earth are made by the word of the Lord. He spake and they were made; He commanded, and they stood fast. When we speak of creation out of nothing, we use a verbal contradiction to express a mystery which is only to be understood by faith. It is better expressed in the words of the apostle (Heb. xi. 3) that "the things which are seen, are not made of the things which do appear." So when we read of the formation of the animal part of man, no expression is used which would countenance the thought of any community of nature between the creature and the Creator. But when we are told of that part of man's nature in which he is the image and likeness of God, as there is a higher nature communicated, so it is conveyed in a different way. The spirit of man is not a mere act of creation, but rather an act of pro-creation. "For we are also his offspring." It is not as in the Chaldean myth that a drop of the Divine blood is mixed with clay of the ground, but the breath of God breathes into man that rational and moral nature which makes us in a sense partakers of the very nature of God himself. The plural form, "breath of lives," may or may not refer to the twofold division into the intellectual and active powers, or the natural and moral as generally adopted by psychol-

ogists. Some consider it not only the *pluralis dignitatis*, as the tree of life is also called the *etz chayim*, and there are several instances in which the plural form is used where we should use the singular. Or the plural form may refer to the truth that the spiritual life which was breathed into man's nostrils was a life which he had in common with God, and which is the life of God in the soul. The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord. Bishop Sanderson* explains *conscientia* as the knowledge of good and evil which we have in common with God. In this sense the breath of lives may be used in the plural to convey the deep truth that the spirit's life never can be solitary. While with regard to all other created spirits we can lead a self-contained life, we cannot live out of God's presence. He is ever present to the spirit, even as the world of nature lives in Him. He is the Father of spirits, and more than this, our spirits, individual though they be, and immortal as they may become, live unto Him. In a much deeper and more intimate sense than in the case of our animal life, He is the spring and support of all spiritual life. Our spirits live, and move, and have their being *in* Him: our bodies rather live and move *through* Him. To our spirits He is eternally present. As the Psalmist says, we cannot flee from His presence, even if we take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the earth. But more than this, if we go into the depths of our own self-consciousness, if we say, peradventure there the darkness shall cover me, still we

* See "Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiae," Whewell's edit.

shall find that the darkness is no darkness to Him. He sees us from within, not from without, as others do. Man looks upon the outward appearance, and judges of the thoughts by the words and actions. Nor is he always unjust in this kind of judgment. But God sees from within. He tries the reins, and understands our thoughts long ago. He foresees, as we cannot, what our conduct will be, for he sees the germ of murder in hatred, or of adultery in a lascivious eye. Thus the life of our spirit is a double life in a sense which would abundantly justify the plural form.

We pass by as frivolous the explanation that the breath of lives refers to the fact, that as man has two nostrils, it was a divided or a double breath. It is nothing to the point through which of the organs of sense the first inspiring breath of God passed. The nostrils are referred to as the organs through which we draw in natural breath, and therefore in man "a being breathing thoughtful breath," the breath of God's Spirit, which is the higher life of man, passed in at the same channel, and doubtless at the same moment, as the natural breath. Had God made man with an animal life only, there would have been some Divine afflatus, doubtless, to animate the clay, for even of the lower world, it is said, "Thou takest away their breath, and they die." But since man, though veiled in flesh, was made a spiritual being, a higher or spiritual life was conveyed at the same time as the lower and through the same channel, the nostrils; but lest we should ever confound the two together, it is

said that "the Lord God breathed into man's nostrils." We gather from this expression of dignity that the creation of his spirit was not some new transformation of matter, as when the earth brought forth abundantly cattle and creeping things, but was an emanation direct from God Himself.

C. And man became a *living soul.* This is the third and final cause of man's nature. God having given him an animal life out of the dust of the ground, and a spiritual life by emanation from Himself, the soul, or *tertium quid* of body and spirit, is next referred to. "So man became a living soul."* He awoke, as Moses was said to have died on Pisgah, beneath the kiss of God. The general expression, *Nephesh Chayáh*, a living soul, which is applied to the animal creation as well as to man, well expresses the nature of man's soul at present, midway between matter and spirit—a little lower than the angels, a little higher than the brute. The popular view of this expression, man became a living soul, is clearly incorrect. It is an instance of the loose and unsatisfactory views of psychology for which our popular commentators are mainly responsible. So far from the expression *Nephesh Chayah* indicating any difference between man and the brutes, it would rather, taken by itself, suggest a community of nature. Of the lower creation spoken of

* Και ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν—So the LXX. and so St Paul 1 Cor. xv. 45. The force of *εἰς* is local. The LXX. rightly rendering the Heb. ל—*εἰς*, which implies that the soul is the meeting point of two opposite natures, the flesh and the spirit. Here also remark the contrast between the first and second Adam—the soul is the *terminus ad quem* in the one case, the spirit in the other.

in chap. i., it is said that they became living souls, and the Hebrew Nephesh, instead of suggesting any idea of immateriality, much less immortality, is the general expression used for all animal life. It is used indifferently of man and beast, each after its kind. The one after death going upward, and the other downward; but taken by itself Nephesh is perfectly general; it is the *anima*, not the *animus* of the Latins, the individual, as contrasted with the species, whether that individual possess a reasonable soul or a soul capable of instinct only.*

It is in this indeterminateness of the expression, a living soul, that we see the accuracy of Bible Psychology, and get a clue for all our after inquiries. The soul, which we may here provisionally describe as the *ego*, or the *nexus* between matter and mind—is the meeting point between the higher and the lower natures in man. It is referred to in Gen. ii. 7, in such terms that we cannot fail to see that an exact system of psychology is here alluded to. Whatever allowance may be made for the loose and popular expressions of the Bible with regard to astronomy and the positive sciences generally, we neither expect nor desire such indulgence to be extended to its use of psychological terms. For the Bible does profess to teach us, if not the details, at least the main outlines

* Individual and person are very often loosely used as synonyms, whereas individual is opposed to species, person to nature. Each animal per se is an ens individuum, and has an identity as such—but it has not personality. Man alone is "person and nature," as the Germans say—person as to his higher—nature as to his lower or animal life. Inattention to this distinction lies at the root of the old controversy as to the nature of man between the spiritualists and the sensualists.

of a true psychology. It lays down for our instruction the two natures of man—the animal and the spiritual, and then describes Nephesh as the union point between the two. Man became a living soul, in the sense that his Nephesh or self is the meeting point, or *tertium quid* of these two natures, body and spirit.

Thus the narrative in Genesis stands out distinct and contrasted, as well from spiritualist as from materialist theories of human nature. Considering the temptation that there is to adopt one of the two conflicting psychological theories, and to take sides either with the idealists or the sensualists, it deserves to rank with other proofs of the inspiration of Scripture, that it should have described the constitution of man in a way which all our later investigations tend to confirm the truth of. We may amplify and illustrate the psychology of Gen. ii. 7, but here is substantially, and in the fewest possible words, all that we know of the sources of man's nature and their union-point, the soul. To write the history of the soul would be to write a history of philosophy. For this word is the standard around which the battle has raged from the dawn of speculation down to our day. From Confucius to Comte, and from the Elean school of Zeno to Hegel, the controversy has been waged, and is no nearer a settlement, as far as physicians and metaphysicians are concerned, in our day, than when it first broke out. But those who have no wish to take a side, and who only search for truth, no matter where it comes from, are drawing nearer every day to the

settlement which Moses pointed out centuries before the schools began to dispute. They see that in the soul of man the animal and the spirit meet and combine in a union so intimate, that after their union their separate existence may be said to be destroyed. Just as oxygen and hydrogen gas, when uniting in certain fixed proportions, lose all the properties of gas and become water, a substance which seems to have little or nothing in common with its two constituent elements, so the animal and the spirit, combined in certain proportions, as definite as those of oxygen and hydrogen, though not as easily described by numerical ratios, produce a third, and apparently distinct nature, which we call the soul.*

* Goschel sets out, in his short and most suggestive treatise on Psychology, by setting forth this unity of two natures in one person—body and spirit merging in the personal soul, as the true idea of man. It is sin, therefore, which in this sense has created the dualism in human nature by which we speak of the flesh and the spirit as contrary the one to the other. This view is undeniably true.—See Goschel *Zur Lehre von dem Menschen.*

THE RELATION OF BODY TO SOUL IN SCRIPTURE.

THE relation between body and soul, and spirit, is implied rather than asserted in Scripture. We are not told in the language of the schools that reason is the governing principle, and sense the subject, or that the will as the middle point between the two is bound to follow reason, and to resist the motions of appetite. The scholastic method is not the scriptural, but the two are not therefore opposed. It is possible to draw out a right theory of the relation of the animal to the spiritual and rational nature in man, from the teaching of Scripture, and to throw it into a scheme like that of Aristotle, if desirable.

The first point to be ascertained is the connection which Scripture points out between soul and body. What light does the physiology of the Bible throw upon its psychology? We set out with disclaiming to find any intimation of a knowledge of the truths of modern physiology in the Bible. It is not necessary to suppose that Moses and Solomon were inspired to anticipate the discoveries of Harvey and Bell, any more than of Newton or Lyell. The three great discoveries which have rewarded modern anatomy, are the circulation of the blood; that the brain, not the heart, is the

true centre of thought; and that the nervous system is the special organ of feeling and motion. There is no trace of any of these three fixed truths of modern physiology to be found in the Hebrew Scriptures, as there is certainly none in the writings of Aristotle, or of any physiologist of his school. The truth so obvious to us, that the brain is the centre of sentient and rational life, was not even suspected until the age of the Ptolemies.* Plato, it is true, has a conjecture in the right direction, but it was only a lucky guess, and does not deserve to be accredited as a fact of discovery. He considers that God and matter are the archetypes, and that the first form which matter assumes is triangular. Out of these triangles are composed four elements, and from these four elements, with an addition of a quintessence, the soul of man is formed. He considers the spinal marrow to be the part first formed, that the marrow then covers itself with bones, and these bones with flesh. The soul he lodges in the brain, which he calls the continuation of the spinal marrow, and the ligaments by which the latter is held in its place, he looks on as the bonds connecting mind with matter. But this theory of the brain as the seat of the soul was only a guess unsupported by a single experiment, and so physiologists

* This statement requires some qualification. Pythagoras, strictly speaking, was the first who isolated the νοῦς in the brain. Alcmæon, his pupil, considered the brain as the organ as well of perception as of thought. In like manner the younger Hippocratic school and most of the Alexandrian physicians. It is somewhat remarkable that the book of Daniel (v. ii., 28 iv., 2, 7, 10, vii., 1, 15) considers the head as the seat of visions. Delitzsch rightly notices that in this book is the only trace of the reference of spiritual-psychical events to the head.

returned to the old opinion that the heart was the centre of life, that the nerves conducted to it, and that by the heart we felt, perceived, and reasoned. Aristotle clung to the opinion that the brain is a mere excrescence of the spinal marrow, adapted by its usual coldness and moisture to allay the fire at the heart. This was the reigning opinion until the Alexandrian physicians, Erasistratus and Herophilus, by dissecting the bodies of criminals given for examination in the medical schools, overturned the old theory that the heart was the seat of the soul. But language does not advance with the advance of scientific ideas. To this day the heart is popularly supposed to be the centre of feeling, though not of thought. We speak of a large heart and a feeling heart, of the heart bleeding and so on. The head and the heart are indeed contrasted to this day, as if the one were the seat of intelligence, the other of feeling. By and bye we shall give up the absurdity of "bleeding hearts" with its accompanying jingle of "cupid's darts," but our language at present is in the transition state, and although the transfer of the capital of Mansoul from the middle of the body to the crown is not complete, it is at least going on. We know that it is an accommodation to prejudice to speak of the heart as in any sense the organ of perception and feeling.

As the heart, then, and not the brain was supposed to be the centre of thought and feeling, we find in Scripture expressions used of the heart which we should apply now to the head. Not only do we read of a broken and a contrite heart, of a clean heart, of an

honest and a good heart, an evil and a hard heart, a gross and a fat heart, expressions in which the heart is spoken of as the seat of the moral affections: it is also spoken of as the seat of the intellectual acts as well. God opens a man's eyes, not as we should say to pour knowledge into his head, but into his heart. Solomon is given wisdom and largeness of heart, the disciples are fools and slow of heart. When we should speak of sluggish brains, the Hebrews spoke of a slow heart, when we should speak of a man taking a thing into his head, they spoke of laying it to heart. It is needless to multiply instances of this, which any English reader can do for himself, but it is worthy of notice that while there are hundreds of passages in which the heart is said to be the seat of certain internal and mental acts of thought and feeling, we have not been able to find a single instance of the head being more than the summit of the body in the external sense only.* In Scripture the head is thus contrasted with the feet, but not with the heart. From the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, the whole body is diseased according to Isaiah, but the fountain of the disease is in the heart, from whence, as our Lord teaches, proceed evil thoughts, &c. Blessings rest, it is true, upon the head of the just, but this is because the blessings come down from above, and fall first on the head. It is like the anointing oil which descends from the head

* Eichhorn, quoted by Delitzsch, rightly remarks on the distinction between the use of the head and the heart in the Old Testament. "The head is to the external appearance what the heart is to the internal agency of the soul, and only on this view is a prominent position given to it in the biblical point of view."

even to the skirts of Aaron's clothing. The head is the summit of man's external and bodily form, but it is not the capital or seat of empire. Nothing goes into the head and nothing comes out of it. The inference so obvious to us, that as the chief senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, are all clustered round the brain, and in close communication with it, the brain and not the heart must be the centre of thought, does not seem to have occurred to the ancients. Misled by a false analogy between warmth and intelligence, they assumed that the cold white and grey matter of the brain could not be the instrument of thought, and they therefore placed the seat of the soul, and the centre of the nervous system, at the fountain-head of the blood, for the blood was the life, and where the life was warmest, there the seat of the soul undoubtedly must be.

But while the Hebrews thus made a twofold error with regard to the heart, not assigning to it its true function, and assigning to it others which do not belong to it, it would be wrong to suppose that they materialised the soul as the modern phrenological school do. The soul inhabited the heart, but it was not a function of the heart, as intellect and feeling are functions of the brain among modern physiologists, whose views incline to materialism. The inhabitant of the house was not confounded with the house itself. While not going as far as the later Platonists, who not only distinguished soul from body, but spoke of the union of spirit with flesh as an imprisonment, a disgrace, and the punishment of sins perhaps committed in a pre-

existent state, they certainly did not localise the soul so exclusively in the heart, as the new school of physiology do in the brain. The heart was the chief, but not the only centre. Generally the reins and the bowels are referred to, the one as the seat of moral reflection, or as we should say, of conscience, the other of affection. Bowels of mercies is a Hebraism found in the New Testament, and exactly corresponding to βάρος δοξῆς weight of glory, or χάρις καὶ εἰρήνη. As in the two latter expressions the East and West combine their form of expression, and pile up weight upon glory, peace upon grace—so in the phrase, bowels of mercies, the feeling of mercy and the organ whose function it is to express that feeling, are both included in the one expression in order to show how entire and deep the affection was. It was a mercy which went through and through a man's nature, an affection which indeed affected not the mind only, but as all deep affections do, the body as well, of him who felt it.

The reins or kidneys, in the same way, are spoken of as the seat of reflection, as the bowels are of affection. God tries the reins, chastens the reins, sends his arrows of conviction into the reins (Lam. iii. 13). The reins are coupled with the heart as the seat of secret thoughts, which God is entreated to examine and try. To sum all up, as the physiology of the Bible is that of the age when it was written, in all these passages in which psychology touches upon physiology, we find that those organs of the body are spoken of as the organs of thought and feeling which are directly sympathetic with thought and feeling.

The heart, the liver, and the diaphragm are organs so sympathetic with our emotions that it requires more knowledge of anatomy than the ancients possessed, not to go a step farther, and make them the very centres from which these affections flowed. When a tale of shame and suffering causes the heart to beat and the colour in consequence to mount up into the cheek, it is difficult to resist the impression that the heart is bleeding, because the soul is causing it to beat thus in quickened pulsations. The fancy of Shakespeare, that the blood of Julius, when the dagger of Brutus was lifted against him, rushed out of doors, to see if Brutus so unkindly knocked or no, is only a poetic way of expressing the general fact that the heart is the fountain and the blood the river of life, and that, "like the ebb and flow of the Euripus," the tides of feeling flow to and from the heart.

Thus, while Scripture assumes the connection between mind and body, it is everywhere silent as to the nature of that connection. It distinguishes certain chief organs which the soul plays upon, as a musician on a harp, lute, or lyre; but it nowhere touches the question which of these is the chief instrument, or whether the soul could discourse music without any instrument at all. The Hebrews probably inclined to the opinion that the soul was diffused through the body, and that the whole body was an organ of intelligence, and was not localised in some one organ, as modern physiologists too much incline to think.* There is a

* This is expressed in the language of the old dogmatists "Anima in toto corpore tota et in singulis simul corporis partibus tota."

sense in which the whole body may be said to be employed, although it may conduct its principal operations through one or two particular organs, just as the entire temple was holy, although the Deity was supposed to manifest his immediate presence in the Holy of Holies. That our bodies are to be the temples of the Holy Ghost is the argument used by the Apostle in urging sanctification of our entire nature. But such an argument would be inapplicable unless in a sense the soul inhabited the whole body, and that the outward form was penetrated through and through by the inward essence. The doctrine of correspondence, which has been pressed by certain mystics to an unwarrantable length, has at least this measure of truth, that the outward is more than a veil or covering for the inward. There is a harmony between body and mind which was felt long before phrenology, cheiromancy, and other pretended explanations of it were ever thought of. The rudest tribes, as well as children, and even animals, are physiognomists to this extent at least, that they can judge very well who are their friends. The play of the involuntary muscles, which betray our secret sympathies and antipathies, can be read by those who have very little power of observation. The connection, indeed, between mind and body is deeper than we have yet been able to trace. It is marked out in the well-known lines of Hamlet:—

> "For nature, crescent, does not grow alone
> In thews and bulk; but, as the temple waxes,
> The inward service of the mind and soul
> Grows wide withal."

This harmony between the outer and the inner man, the interdependence of sense on thought, and thought on sense, is the point to which our soundest physiologists are advancing every day. Discarding the old materialism which made thought a secretion of the brain or blood, and the old spiritualism which taught that the spirit of man was probably that of some fallen dæmon imprisoned for a while in flesh, we are advancing in the right direction when we maintain the separate existence of the mind and body, and yet regard the former as perfectly pervading the latter, nay, as being the formative principle by which it is constructed and adapted to our nature and use.*

The goal to which modern research is tending is the point where the old dualism between mind and body will not disappear, but combine instead under some higher law of unity which we have not as yet grasped. Physiology and psychology will not stand contrasted then as they do now, but rather appear as the two sides of the same thing seen in its outward and inward aspect. The resurrection of the body, which at present is a stumbling-block to the spiritualists and foolishness to materialists, will then be found to be the wisdom of God, as well as the power of God, and so the Scripture intimations of the unity of man's true nature in one person will be abundantly vindicated.

According to Scripture, the body is neither the slave of the soul, nor its prison-house, as philosophy,

* For the theory of the soul as the formative principle of the body, *vide* Contributions to Mental Philosophy, by Immanuel Hermann Fichte; Preface by J. D. Morell.

with its dualistic views of body and mind, has constantly taught. The relation of the two may be described as sacramental; the body is the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual mind. The mind is not seated in one part of the body, but in the whole; it does not employ one class of organs only, but all. Hence the well-known Hebraism, "All my bones shall praise thee;" and the other expression, Naphshi, which we render as My soul, but which might be better expressed Myself. The entire nature of the mind breathing through the entire body.* Thus the Nephesh, which is exactly equivalent to Aristotle's use of ψυχή, is not the *mind*, or soul, or spirit; but the man who thinks, wills, and acts. It was as foreign to Hebrew psychology as it is to modern views to suppose the mind thinking or willing without the body. Hence it was that all who clung to the belief in an existence after death, as they could not conceive of a pure dis-

* Whether under Aristotle's ψυχή is included what we call the thinking principle, or the soul, properly so called, does not admit of a doubt. He distinguishes, indeed, thinking from sensation, and assigns it as a mark peculiar to the highest class of animals, man. He further argues that the reflective faculty is not the sensitive faculty in a state of repose. He says that the νους, or intellect, is that part of the soul by which it both knows and reflects. But whether this νους exists after separation from the body, he nowhere decides. Respecting mind and the speculative faculty, he says that nothing as yet is evident (οὐδέν πω φανερὸν); but it seems to be another kind of soul, and is alone capable of separation, as the imperishable from the corruptible.—*De Anima*, II. 2.

Galen argued that the mind was mortal, *because it was part of the soul*, or vital principle. According to him there were three souls—one inhabiting the liver; a second, the heart; and the third, (a rational soul), the brain. Now, if the intellectual part in man be of the nature of the soul, or vital principle, it must perish with the brain, of which it is the function. Function, as all physiologists would say, becomes extinct with the organ to which it was fitted.—*See Lewes' Aristotle.*

embodied spirit, supposed that death only destroyed the outer frame-work of flesh, and that there was an inner and ethereal body by which the soul continued to live after death.* On this subject Scripture was silent. The whole question of man's immortality was the mystery which was hid in Christ from the beginning of the world. As in all things he was to have the pre-eminence, so in this that he was to be the first begotten of the dead. Pharisees and Sadducees disputed on this point. Of the two sects the Pharisees came far nearest the truth. They were right in what they affirmed, wrong in the way they maintained it; whereas the Sadducees were wrong as well in their denial of the resurrection, as in grounding it on the silence of Scripture. Both sides (as is commonly the case in disputes) forgot that they were reasoning on imperfect data, and that it is one thing to believe that God will not leave one soul in Sheol, or suffer his holy One to see corruption, another thing to turn this spiritual instinct into a proof of man's natural immortality, and of the native power of the soul to resist corruption in the dis-

* Tertullian held that the soul was not only in a body, and held a human form, but that in its disembodied state it was still a filmy, shadowy body. He even went so far as to say that God had a body, and that nothing which exists is bodiless. Augustine, while he finds fault with Tertullian for this notion, which he calls materialism, by no means rejects it. Theodoret says ἀλλα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ σωμα—"even the soul is a body: for," he adds, "the apostle says it is sown." Methodius, also, in his treatise on the resurrection, says that the souls created by the Father of all are intelligent bodies; σῶματα νοερὰ. Bacon and Cudworth, too, inclined to the view that the soul is a kind of ethereal body, a body within our body of flesh; and in modern times, Geoffrey St Hilaire, J. Garth Wilkinson, Dr Moore, and others have held this theory of correspondence, and that the soul was a body within the body, as the body was a kind of outer soul.—*See Anastasia of Professor Bush, and Rendell's Peculiarities of the Bible.*

embodied state, clothing itself again with a new body, as nature throws up a new nail or a tooth when the old one is broken or impaired.

"It is dangerous to shew man how much he resembles the beasts, without at the same time pointing out to him his own greatness. It is also dangerous to shew him his greatness without pointing out his baseness. It is more dangerous still to leave him in ignorance of both. But it is greatly for his advantage to have both set before him." In these words of Pascal we have the true *rationale* of the relation of the lower to the higher nature in man. Scripture assumes this throughout. Man is treated all through as being made for a little while lower than the angels, and clothed with a body of flesh, in order that, by a discipline of the will, the flesh might be subdued to the spirit, so that by and bye he may be admitted to a higher state of being, equal with the angels, and clothed upon with a body which is from heaven.

OF THE RELATION OF SOUL AND SPIRIT IN SCRIPTURE.

WHEN we pass from the relation of the body and soul to the relation of soul and spirit in Scripture, we come upon more certain ground, because we come within that which it is the province of Scripture to teach. The relation of body to soul is a question as much of physiology as of psychology, and therefore to a great extent beside the class of truths for which a revelation has been given. Not so with the relation of soul to spirit. Here it is that the candle of science has almost gone out, and the candle of inspiration burns all the more brightly.

The passage to which we turn for a decisive testimony, as well of the distinction between soul and spirit, as of their relation to each other, is Hebrews iv. 12.

It is said of the word of God, that it pierces sharper than any two-edged sword: the proof of its power of piercing is this, that "it divides and discerns between soul and spirit," "as if," (for the latter is not a fresh instance of its penetrating power, but a comparison by which we may judge of it), "of joint and marrow." This two-edged sword, unlike other

swords which only cleave the flesh as far as the bone, divides the bone as well, and enters into the marrow. That which the marrow is to the joints, that the spirit is to the soul. As marrow is flesh within flesh, so the spirit is a soul within the soul. The comparison of Justin Martyr,* that the body is the house of the soul, and the soul the house of the spirit, is another illustration to the same effect; it points to the same thought that the spirit lies encased within the soul, as the soul within the body. But the comparison of the apostle is even more striking and just. There is a wall of bone between the marrow and the flesh, and thus it is far easier to reach the soul through the body than it is the spirit through the soul. Any sword will pierce the soul, but it is only the sword of the Spirit that can pierce and divide between soul and spirit. To make Justin Martyr's comparison at all as forcible as that of the apostle, we should say that the soul dwells in a house pierced with windows, but the spirit is a walled dungeon, with only a skylight in the roof. It is easy to reach the soul through the senses, but to reach the spirit through the soul requires a power far above any sword of flesh. It is only the Divine Spirit who can penetrate into and reach the spirit itself.

* Οἶκος γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς πνεύματος δε ψυχὴ οἶκος. Justin Mart. Fragmenta. So Aug. Conf. x. 19. Vivit enim corpus meum de anima, mea et vivit anima mea de te. Tertullian again says, anima corpus spiritus, caro corpus animæ. See Schultz, "Die Voraussetzungen der Christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit," p. 82. Beck "Umriss der Biblischen Seelenlehre," says, "The spirit is not beside nor upon the soul, but in it." Compare with this the Cabbalistic view of the five souls, one within the other, and the outer the vehicle of the inner, and corresponding to it, the Nephesh, Ruach, Neshamah, Chajah, Jechidah, v. Beck, p. 208.

But the sword of the Spirit not only pierces through to the spirit, it *divides between* soul and spirit. Here we come to the important truth that the trichotomy of man's nature, body, soul, and spirit, is only discovered under the Spirit's convincing power. This is why the true trichotomy of man was not so much as suspected by the ancients. It is true that Plato, like St. Paul, divided man into three parts, but there the resemblance ends, the parts do not mutually correspond, and that which is the master faculty in Plato is a subordinate faculty in the Apostle's scheme. To understand the tripartite division of Plato, viz., the appetitive, the irascible, and the intellectual natures as situated in the stomach, the heart, and the head respectively, we must bear in mind that the location of intellect, or the νοῦς in the head, was only a lucky guess, and not grounded on any sound physiological views of the functions which the brain discharges as the instrument of thought. Plato, as an intellectualist, assigned to reason or νοῦς the sovereign place; but in this his trichotomy is contrasted with that of Scripture. In Scripture psychology the intellect holds the *second* place not the *first*. To harmonise Plato and St. Paul together is impossible. The appetitive nature of Plato corresponds, we admit, to the body or animal nature of St. Paul (1 Th. v. 23). But the psyche of St. Paul is distributed by Plato between the emotional and intellectual natures seated in the heart and head respectively, while the pneuma of St. Paul is unknown to Plato. How could it be otherwise? Till the function of spiritual-mindedness was known, the organ

which discharges that function lay undiscovered. It was part of that mystery hid from generations and ages, which eye had not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived. The early apologists, forgetting this, and too ready to catch at corroborations of the truth from heathen sources, saw, or fancied they saw, a correspondence between the Platonic trichotomy and the Pauline, thus confounding Logos and Pneuma, pure intellect and the spirit. What this led to in the case of Apollinaris we have already seen, but the worst result of all was that it led to a rejection of the trichotomy itself, from its suspected affinity to Platonism. It is another instance of the danger of making alliances between Christian and heathen modes of thought.

A preference for the number three may have inclined Plato, with many modern psychologists, to speak of three distinct lives, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the rational; but the same reasoning would lead us with Bryant and the old school of mythologists, to see traces of the primitive doctrine of the Trinity in the Hindoo, Greek, and Egyptian Triads. Reasoning on such straws of resemblance as these, Fluellen compared Macedon and Monmouth together, but analogy, which is the resemblance of reason, rejects external points of comparison to seize on those that are internal and essential. Plato and the Greek philosophers, speaking strictly, were dichotomists. According to Plato, man consisted of two parts, a mortal body, and an immortal soul: their separation is what we call death. Of the soul he said, there are two primitive and com-

ponent parts, a mortal and immortal—the one made by the created gods, and the other by the supreme—that for the purpose of uniting these parts together, it is necessary there should be a demoniac portion or spirit. But this spirit (Θυμὸς not πνεῦμα) of Plato means something essentially different from the pneuma of Scripture. The spirit is the vehicle of the soul in Plato, whereas in Scripture the soul may be said to be the vehicle of the spirit. We must put the second first, and the first second, if we would harmonize Plato and St Paul. *Incende quod adorasti, adora quod incendisti* is the only terms on which the Intellectualism of Plato can be reconciled with the spiritualism of St Paul (2 Cor. x. 5). The spirit or irascible part in Plato has been too long confounded with the pneuma, or religious consciousness of St Paul. For the views of the later Platonists Cudworth's intellectual System may be consulted, but with caution, for, like all his school, he is more given to trace resemblances than differences between Greek philosophy and Christian truth.

For the same reason the true trichotomy of human nature is not to be sought, at least in any explicit form, in the Old Testament. It is implied as we have seen in the account of man's creation, Gen. ii. 7. But we cannot agree with those who would give the words רוּחַ Ruach, and נֶפֶשׁ Nephesh a precise psychological meaning throughout the Old Testament. The Ruach and the Nephesh are certainly distinguished from each other, as the animus and the anima of the Latins, the πνεῦμα, and the ψυχὴ of the Greeks. But the distinc-

tion was rather between the lower and the middle, than between the middle and the higher kind of life. Nephesh and Psyche are used in the Old Testament to distinguish the animal from the intellectual, not the intellectual from the spiritual, properly so called. The Nephesh of the Old Testament is a general term, expressive of life. Every living thing has a soul; whether it has conscious personality or not it has a soul in so far as it is an individual. Let the earth bring forth the living creature is in the Hebrew the living soul, whether of beasts, of reptiles, or of birds. Nephesh is a term convertible with life, see in Lev. xvii. 14. The life or the soul of the flesh is in the blood. Not only do we read of a Nephesh Chayah, but also of a Nephesh Meth, a dead soul, used as a synonym for a dead body, Num. vi. 6. Nephesh, in fact, is equivalent to bodies in such an expression as this, "Abram took Sarai his wife, and Lot his brother's wife, and all their substance that they had gathered, and the *souls* that they had gotten in Haran." So in the account of the fall of Tyre, Ezek. xxvii. 13, the merchants traded in the persons (Heb. souls) of men, and vessels of brass in thy market. With reference to this obvious Hebraism, we read in the fall of Babylon of sheep, and horses, and chariots, and slaves, and souls of men, Rev. xviii. 13. The distinction here drawn by some interpreters between σωμάτα and ψυχὰς ἀνθρωπων as if the one referred to the body, and the other to the soul, is uncritical. The distinction, if any, is that which we use in modern English, when we speak of hands and persons, in the one case referring

to the labour done, in the other, to the labourer who does it. The σωμάτα are the hands we should say, the slaves who tended the chariots and horses, and the ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων are the slaves in general.*

Thus the Hebrew Nephesh has a lower meaning than the English soul. The contrast that we express between soul and body, they expressed by spirit and soul. Ruach and Nephesh had each a lower meaning than we now attach to them, Ruach referring to what we should now call the soul, and Nephesh to what we should now call the body. This is only what we might expect from the nature of the case. As the doctrine of a life to come waited for the coming of Him who brought life and immortality to light by the gospel, so those deeper views of the Spirit as the soul of the soul were not disclosed under a carnal dispensation, and while as yet the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost had not been taught. It would have been contrary to the proportion of faith that there should have been a complete psychology before there was a complete Theology. The Holy Ghost was not given, for Jesus was not yet glorified, and as the sphere of the Spirit's operation is in the pneuma, witnessing to our spirits that we are the sons of God, it is only what we might expect that the intimations of the existence of the one should be as enigmatic as those of the other. Till the person of the Holy Ghost was explicitly taught, his sphere of operation was not disclosed. That it is implied we admit, but the doctrine itself waited to be disclosed in the only way man can receive such a

* See Dean Alford *in loco*.

mystery, by the progressive unfolding of the Redemptive work of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If this be so, then we are prepared to expect the same reticence of the Old Testament with regard to the spirit of man, as with regard to the personality of the blessed Spirit of God. The psychology of the Old Testament is incomplete, even as its theology is, and in the same degree. The deeper insight given in our dispensation into the operations of the Godhead correspond to and prepare the way for a deeper insight into the operations of our own inner nature.

With the teaching of our blessed Lord, the true psychology of Scripture begins to emerge from the mists and shadows of a carnal dispensation. We find the contrast between the worth of the soul and the body brought out by our Lord for the first time. The dimness that hung over the mental vision of Moses, David, Hezekiah is gone. We see now into the spirit world; and instead of vague laments for the dead, or complaints at the inequality of the distribution of the good things of this life, we find the awakening statement, "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Such language as this, "Fear not them that kill the body, and after that can do no more, but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell," Matt. x. 28. The parable of Dives and Lazarus, and those in Matt. xxv., which speak of a judgment to come and a resurrection to life or to damnation,—the assertion that He is to be the judge of quick and dead,—all these eschatological truths which make up so large a part of the Lord's ministry when on earth,

may be supposed to have deepened proportionately the psychology of those who were at the Old Testament point of view. Men could no longer confound the Nephesh with the animal life. Body and soul fall into their right place and relation to each other, the one as mortal, the other as non-mortal; the one perishing with our last breath, the other passing out into the world of spirits, and there prolonging a conscious existence either of happiness or misery.

It is worthy of remark that our blessed Lord's psychology advances just as far as his teaching of theology; where He drew the curtain over the one, He also maintained a reserve about the other. "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth." The contrast between the psychical and the pneumatical man, and between the state of the Pneuma before and after conversion, is not taught by our Lord: it was one of that class of truths which they could not bear as yet. We need a spiritual mind to discover our own spirits to ourselves. It is only those who have felt the Spirit's work who ever care to penetrate into and explore their own spiritual being. This is distinctly taught in that passage where St. Paul contrasts the psychical and the pneumatical in this respect, that the one knows itself because it knows God, while the other knows neither itself nor God. "For what man knows the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." "But God," he

adds, "has revealed them to us by his Spirit." (1 Cor. xi. 10, 11).

Thus the deeper meaning which our Lord gave to the soul or Nephesh in contrast with the body led the way for that true and complete trichotomy of man which could only be taught after that Jesus was glorified and the Holy Ghost given. The first step was to make the contrast clear between soul and body, and to distinguish the Nephesh or Psyche from the mere animal life, with which it is often confounded in the Old Testament. This distinction between soul and body being made good, the Apostles were able to take a further step in advance, and to unfold the distinction between soul and spirit, which lay in the Old Testament like the petals of a flower that is only in bud. The doctrine of the new birth, as disclosed by our Lord in his discourse to Nicodemus, seemed to assume the existence of a third or inner life, enfolded within the rational, as the rational lay within the animal. Without this distinction between the soul and spirit, as we shall see by and by, the doctrine of the new birth is incomplete. It lacks that which alone can make it complete in itself, and consistent with what we know of the Divine operations elsewhere. Thus a new truth in theology, the new birth from above, seemed to point to some latent truth in psychology which would be its complementary.* The exact nature of that new birth was not,

* Those who object to the trichotomy generally rest their case on our Lord's use of the contrast of body and soul without any reference to the spirit whatever. Compare such passages as Matt. x. 28, Luke xii. 5. But they over-

of course, intelligible to Nicodemus, or indeed to any who are unable to divide between the soul and the spirit. It must have seemed to him, as indeed it always has to the unspiritual ever since, either a monstrous absurdity, or a very metaphorical way of expressing a change from one external religion to another. Our Lord did not clear up the mystery by giving him an insight into another mystery, the existence of a latent pneuma underneath the active, living psyche. This would have been to anticipate the teaching of the Holy Ghost, and to put the doctrine of the new birth out of its right order. Our Lord breaks off, therefore, at this point, and instead of heavenly things, which Nicodemus could not understand, glances at earthly things, which he could, and, through the type of the brazen serpent, points on to his own approaching death on the cross. But this wonderful discourse, so carefully recorded by the latest evangelist, was doubtless one of those "many things" the meaning of which the abiding Comforter was sent to clear up. It might not of itself have suggested the distinction between soul and spirit, but it certainly presupposed it, and lay an unexplained problem on the disciples' memories till the Holy Ghost was given. It was a gordian knot which nothing could cut but the

look these two considerations thrown out in the text, and which accounts, as we think, satisfactorily for our Lord's silence as to the spiritual part of man's nature—first, that the Holy Spirit not being yet given, the organ through which the Spirit acts on human nature was intentionally passed by—and, secondly, that our Lord prepared the way for that teaching by laying down the necessity of a new birth, which was unintelligible until the Spirit was given.

two-edged sword which pierces to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit.

But with the gift of the Divine Pneuma, the existence of a third or pneumatical part in man became as distinct as it was before obscure. The dying Stephen commends not his soul, or the rational and moral life, to God; but the spirit, the divine and regenerate nature, quickened by the Holy Ghost, and created in the image of Him that formed it. So it is that the πνεῦμα begins to appear in the page of the apostle's epistles, not as contrasted with the σάρξ, or flesh only, but also with the rational life or psyche. However dichotomists may twist those passages which contrast flesh and spirit together, as ordinary moralists would soul and body, and infer therefrom that spirit is only another name for soul, as flesh is for body, there are certain passages which are simply inexplicable on the dichotomist hypothesis, and, therefore, which either mean nothing at all, or must be allowed to prove the tripartite nature of man.

We will notice a few of these in order.

1. As the most explicit of all, and occurring in the earliest written epistle of the Apostle Paul, we read the words, "I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ," 1 Thes. v. 23. The apostle had desired that the very God of peace should sanctify them wholly, ὁλοτελεῖς. The word ὁλοτελής, which occurs nowhere else in the New Testament, is clearly contrasted with the following ὁλόκληρον, and the contrast is that between *totus* and *integer*,

complete and entire. In the one case the apostle prays that their salvation may be *complete* as a whole (*totus*), in the other *entire* (*integer*) in every part. The complete sanctification of the believer thus suggests those parts of man's nature that the Divine Spirit is to enter and entirely (*entièrement*, *i.e.*, inwardly,) sanctify by His indwelling Power. If sanctification is to be complete as to the *end*, so it must be as to the *means*, if of the *whole*, so of the *parts*. The τελος in the first compound suggests the end, which is our whole sanctification; the ολοκληρος, of the second, suggests the means, that we may be sanctified in every part. Sanctification thus rests on these two conditions, that the Holy Spirit shall possess each of the three parts of our nature, and possess them entirely. If sanctification, as the work of God the Holy Ghost, is to reach its proper τελος, or end, He must first enter in and occupy each several part of man's nature, and then sanctify that several part thoroughly. This passage has thus a practical as well as a speculative import. It teaches us, in the first place, that there are three parts in man, and not two only, thus setting at rest the controversy whether the dichotomist or trichotomist view of human nature be that of Scripture: but it also confirms those other passages of Scripture which speak of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost as not being confined to the human spirit, but extending as well to the *soul* and *body*. Our *souls* and our *bodies* are the temples of the Holy Ghost, as well as our spirit. They are not the temples or shrines it is true, in the same eminent and

peculiar sense, but in the same way as even the outer courts of the Jewish temple were holy,* as well as the priest's court, or the innermost court of all, in which the Shekinah immediately dwelt: so it is with our body and our soul. If sanctification is entire it must enter everywhere. It must sanctify man as a whole by wholly occupying every part. When Christ drove the money-changers out of the Court of the Gentiles, he pointed to this solemn, but often slighted truth, "Make not my *Father's House* an house of merchandise." God's presence was to be felt to the very outer precincts of the sacred enclosure. There was to be nothing common or unclean; these degrees of sacredness were as abhorrent to a God of holiness as degrees of obedience. The same Rabbis who began by dividing God's commandments into great and little, ended by slighting the weighty commandments in their ceremonial zeal for the lighter. So it ever will be

* The analogy from the temple, with its three courts, to the temple of the body, is a lively illustration of the trichotomy of man. Luther in his exposition of the Magnificat, has very well opened up the analogy, and applied it in its details. The passage is quoted at length by Delitzsch, and Goschel, and other writers. Luther also correctly seizes the Scriptural distinction between *spirit* and *flesh*, not as favouring dichotomy, as some suppose, but as rather suggesting the good and evil direction, in which all three, spirit, soul, and body, are drawn, when the spirit of God, or the spirit of the wicked one, acts upon. Flesh and spirit are not thus the factors of human nature, as dichotomists think, but the pole to which these factors incline according as they are inspired from above or from beneath.

Scripture, Luther says, divides man into three parts, and he quotes 1 Thess. v. 23. *Each of these three parts*, together with the whole man, is also divided in two spheres which we call spirit and flesh. Which division is one not of *nature, but of quality only, i.e.*, human nature has three parts, spirit, soul, and body, and these must each and all be good or bad.—See the passage quoted at length in Delitzsch's *Psychologie*, Appendix, p. 372. 2d Auflage.

with our sense of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. If He does not reign "the Lord of every motion there," then we shall find even our spirits at last not right with God, and we shall grieve Him away even from His proper home, the inner spirit of man, made in the image of God. As in Bunyan's allegory, the Diabolonians, when their master was deposed, and his images broken in the streets of Mansoul, retire to the caves and cellars of the city, and there plot mischief, so it is if there is any part of man's nature which is allowed to rest unsanctified. God is a jealous God, and therefore He will have all or none.

The *order*, moreover, in which the apostle mentions *spirit*, *soul*, and *body*, seems to point to the work being a *progressive*, as well as an entire work. The Divine Spirit enters and dwells in our spirits first. From thence he gets the mastery over the desires of the mind, and lastly over the desires of the flesh. We have reached the state of *entire* sanctification, the perfection (though never sinless) which is attainable on this side of the grave, when, with the apostle, we keep our body under and bring it into subjection, deal it blows in the face, as the conquering gladiator did, and grapple it with a hook to drag it off dead from the arena.—1 Cor. ix. 27.

11. The next decisive passage is that in Heb. iv. 12, on which we have already remarked at the beginning of this chapter. The word of God is compared, from its penetrating power, to a sharp two-edged sword,—a sword with two mouths, which is the Hebrew meta-

phor for the blade. In the Revelation Christ is represented with a sharp two-edged sword proceeding out of his mouth, and these edges pierce to the penetration (ἄχρι μερισμοῦ) through soul and spirit. The word μερισμός does not mean the dividing between soul and spirit, as if they were separate substances. Thus we see Tertullian's objection to the trichotomy of human nature falls to the ground, if we understand the soul and spirit as ideally, not as actually separable. We *distinguish* rather than *divide*, when we speak of the three parts of man's nature. Whether either by itself is capable of a separate entity, is more than doubtful. Body when separate from psyche, falls back under the laws of matter, and becomes, not merely an animal body, but a corpse, and soon a handful of dust and a few bones. So pneuma may not be able to maintain a separate existence when divided from the psyche. Without the personal soul with which the individuality is bound up, it might merge its existence into the ocean of universal Spirit, as the Buddhists think of Nirwana. Appearances seem to point to this state of the three parts of man's nature, either that the first and second can maintain an existence separate from the third, or that the second and third can consciously exist separate from the first; but that the psyche, the middle term of the three, must be united with the body on the one hand, to give it animal life and animal consciousness, or with the spirit on the other hand, to enable it to maintain spiritual life and spiritual consciousness. Thus, in our analytical chemistry of man's nature we reach three ultimate atoms, three primary

elements, but while the presence of the third may be detected in that compound of the first two which we call man, we are unable to catch and retain it in its simple state. Like oxygen, which may be detected, but cannot be liberated from the compounds with which it has the greatest affinity, spirit is only found in its composite form, and defies our attempts to extract it pure.

The sword of the Spirit does not separate, then, soul *from* spirit, but it separates *between*. The difference is important, and is explained by the following metaphor of the joints and marrow. Till the first dissector put his knife through or up a bone, he might have supposed the tibia to be a hollow tube for conducting air, as the arteries were once thought to be. But the first inspection of a fresh bone taught the observer that this hollow tube was lined with marrow; as its outer side was cased in flesh. Without the bone to support it, the flesh fell away to corruption; so without the same *nidus* to rest in, the marrow would waste away and dissolve. In separating the joints from the marrow, he would never ask himself whether either marrow or joint could maintain a separate existence. So in our mental dissection. When we reach the spirit lying within the soul, and speak of it as separable from the soul, Tertullian's challenge, *divide et opera*, seems as inept as to request the dissector to tell you the use of the marrow *apart from* the bone. The anatomist is quite content to find the use of the members of the body when in their place, without requiring to know how

they work out of their place. Now as death is an abnormal state, the wages of sin, it is an unfair challenge to ask in what way, if soul and spirit were divided, each could exist separately, and to infer that because their separate existence is to us inconceivable, that our distinction is only a verbal one, and that soul and spirit are, after all, only different names for the same thing.

Yet this is the way in which this and other passages of Scripture that bear a trichotomist meaning are treated by many interpreters. To rescue these passages from these misinterpretations, we must guard the meaning carefully from those exaggerations which tend to its rejection. All that ἄχρι μερισμοῦ implies is that the sword of the Spirit pierces through the soul of man into his spirit. As the soldier's lance pierced our Lord's side till it reached the pericardium, where the blood had coagulated, and the serum became separated from the blood, so with the Divine sword. We can only know how deep the soldier pierced by the water and the blood. Had he not reached the heart, we should not have that record of the water and the blood which flowed from the Lord's side, and which, together with the spirit, make up the three witnesses which agree in one. But penetration is not dissection. Christ's heart was never separated from his body; so our spirit is not separated from our soul, but it is reached, and that through the soul, underneath which it lies, as the marrow lies underneath the joints.

The piercing through the soul and penetrating into

the spirit, seems to imply this, that when Divine things are realised, and the quickening spirit has begun His convincing, converting work, not only does He discern the impulses of the soul, but also the thoughts and intents of the heart. The ἐνθυμήσεων and ἐννοιῶν are thus contrasted, the one as the affective and emotional, the other as the directive and rational faculties. The one lie entirely within the sphere of the psyche, the other principally* of the pneuma. Multitudes hear the gospel, and it reaches only the outer psyche; it is sown either on the high way or on the stony or thorny ground. Some, however, receive it more deeply. It does not affect them merely for a time, but it effects the work it is intended to do. That work can only be judged of by and by. The seed must germinate, bud, blossom, and finally fruit before we can say that it has fallen on good ground. But even before the harvest, which is the end of the world, we may so far judge favourably if it produces convictions, and not mere passive emotions only; if a man is distressed at the discovery of indwelling sin; if he longs for holiness, and is brought into a state of condemnation, because he can neither overcome the one

* We say principally, as the "intents of the heart" are partly psychical, partly pneumatical. We must ever remember that, in a mixed nature like ours, while the lower can act without the higher, the higher requires the co-operation of the lower; the body is the vehicle of the soul, the soul of the spirit. Thus, as the soul or intellect cannot work without some activity of the brain, so the spirit, or devotional part, requires the service and help of the intellect. Mystics who dream of a state of ecstacy, in which the spirit sees God by its own light, apart from the logical intellect, transcend the laws of human nature. As there is no act of pure intellect without the co-operation of the brain, so the spirit cannot act without the *Nous* or reason. It is a *consortium*, or rather a *connubium*, of two inseparable factors.

nor attain to the other, we may then speak of convictions of sin, righteousness, and of judgment, which are the unerring mark of the Holy Spirit's work. When we begin to discern between mere desires after good, and the steady self-discipline which the pursuit of it implies, we have begun to reach the proper sphere of the pneuma. Every treatise of vital and experimental religion will give us instances of this dividing between soul and spirit. Many divines correctly describe the life of God in the Spirit, though they do not give the right psychological explanation of the theological truth which they are maintaining. Our purpose is here not to write a treatise on conversion or spiritual-mindedness, which has been often done before; but to refer to such treatises as practical illustrations, though not expositions, of this important text.

III. The next instances from Scripture of the distinction between the Psyche and the Pneuma are these four passages, which we shall group together, in which the Psyche is spoken of as the characteristic faculty of unregenerate human nature, while the activity of the Pneuma is characteristic of the regenerate. Thus Scripture not only treats of the distinction between the ψυχή and the πνεῦμα, but teaches us farther that the case of the one or the other being the governing faculty, is that which distinguishes those who are not from those who are born again.

In 1 Cor. ii. 11, the apostle lays down this principle, that man needs a corresponding divine faculty in order to understand divine truth; that as the eye

is the organ for seeing and the ear for hearing, so the pneuma is the organ or faculty by which we know God. It is on this that he grounds the assertion that the hidden wisdom which he preached could not be understood by the princes of this world. They did not understand it when the Lord took flesh and dwelt among us, neither do they understand it now that it is preached by us his messengers.

This, then, is the conclusion to which the apostle comes, that the psychical man (v. 14) "receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The *animalis homo* of the Vulgate is quite unobjectionable, and corresponds exactly enough to the ψυχικός of the Greeks, as the Anima of the Latins is nearly equivalent to the Psyche or vital principle of the Greek. In our version, as in Luther's, the psychical is translated as the natural man. This is not a bad translation, if we ever bear in mind the equivocal use of the word nature, that it either may mean the course of things as they are, or the course of things as they ought to be. It is in the former sense only that man is natural, or in a state of nature (*i.e.* fallen nature), and unable to discover divine truth of himself, or to discern it when discovered. Luther, in rendering ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος by Der Natürliche Mensch, adds this description of what the natural man is:* "He is one who is without grace, although fully endowed with understanding, sense, and taste,

* See his Introduction to the Epistle to the Romans, an abridged translation of which has been published by the Religious Tract Society.

and apprehension." If the expression, The natural man, be taken with this qualification, it is the best rendering of ψυχικός that we can find. Agreeing with Dean Alford (*v.* Jude ver. 19) that if the word were not so ill-looking in our language,* psychic would be a great gain, we do not see any corresponding advantage to be gained by unsettling the English version. Every translation of the Scriptures into a language gives a fulness and depth of meaning to it which it had not before; so that while the English word Natural by itself falls far short of being the equivalent of the Greek ψυχικός, it may be deepened, as the channels of rivers are when great cities have sprung up at a point a little above where they are navigable. Language is the river of human thought. The city of God, rising by the banks of that river, deepens it in proportion to the wants of that city. It brings, in one way or other, either the ships to the city, or the city to the ships. If it find expressions suitable in the language, it uses them; if not, it adapts them from the Greek or Hebrew, careful at the same time to naturalise them at once. But when a choice occurs between borrowing a foreign word, or adapting the

* We may carry our reluctance to coining new words too far. Thus, selfish, now so thoroughly naturalised in English, was a thorough barbarism two centuries ago. Talented, first used by Lady Morgan, is another instance of a word adopted in spite of the purists, and within our memory. When Mr H. Dundas used the word starvation in the House of Commons, it was received with a roar of derision as a north country barbarism. We see no reason why soulish should not be used as a contrast with spiritual, as *seelisch* is in German. Selfish was used by the Scotch covenanters for self-seeking, as contrasted with seeking God. It is now used in a limited sense as a *form* of immoral conduct, otherwise the *selfish* nature is quite equivalent with the soulish or psychical man.

vernacular term, giving it, at the same time, a suitable extension of meaning, all would admit that the latter is the right course. For this reason, we prefer to retain our English word Natural as the equivalent for the Greek ψυχικός, as well because it is a true English word, as because it suggests the thought that nature, or that which is born of the flesh, is inferior to the spirit or that which is born of God, and that a generation from beneath is not enough without a regeneration from above.

The psychic and pneumatic natures in man are next contrasted by the apostle, as supplying the one the centre of our present body of humiliation, the other, the centre of the glorified resurrection body. As there is, he says, 1 Cor. xv. 45, a natural body, so there is also a spiritual body. The εἰ implies that as surely as there is a body whose centre is the psyche (for that is the force of the σωμα ψυχικόν) so surely will there be a body whose centre is the pneuma. That the first nature is a psychical nature only, he proves by the text in Gen. ii. 7, which is the ground text on which all Scripture psychology rests. The first Adam was made a living soul,* the second Adam was made a life-giving spirit. Thus we have the text and its interpretation, and on the authority of the inspired apostle all question is set at rest as to the meaning of Gen. ii. 7. Adam,

* εἰς ψυχην ζῶσαν implies more than that man became a living soul. The force of the εἰς, as of the Hebrew ל, to a, towards, suggests that *out of* two compounds of distinct essence, the earth and the divine breath, there resulted a third or the soul as the *tertium quid* of matter and spirit. Man attained *to* a psychical nature as the resultant of two opposite forces, the one flesh, the other spirit.

however he may have received the breath of lives, and became capable thus of becoming a spiritual being was only at first a living soul or creature. The Nephesh of the Hebrew, as we have seen, suggesting no higher thought than that he was a creature like others, albeit "breathing thoughtful breath." He was of the earth, earthy, and hence his name Adam.* In his case the soul, and not the spirit, was the centre of his personality. In the order of advance upward from the lower to the higher life, the apostle shows, by comparison of divers kinds of bodies, 1 Cor. xv. 39, that this condition of Adam was necessary. Had he not been made of the earth earthy, endowed with a living soul, but not yet given the quickening spirit as the centre of his personality, there would have been a gap in creation, such a gap as man's present nature, midway between the angel and the brute, exactly fills up. As the astronomer, by observing a disturbance in the motions of Neptune, was led to infer the existence of another planet, and to point out its orbit, so an observer of another world might have inferred the necessity for such a creature as man from observing the differences between the animal soul of the brute and the spiritual body of the angel. Reasoning from the principle that *natura nil fit per saltum*, he would conclude that something between the angel and the brute was necessary to fill up the blank, and bridge over the gulf between

* So homo, from humus; Mensch, a man, from Aryan root *Mén*, to measure—Mind and Moon are derivatives—implies the other conception. Plato derives *ανθρωπος* from his looking up (*v.* Cratylus). See Max Müller's *Lectures on Language*.

the animal soul and the spiritual body. The apostle reasons in this way when he says that the natural body of Adam must precede and prepare the way for the spiritual. Howbeit that was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterward that which is spiritual. Man, as originally created, was made at the midway point between the angel and the brute, a little lower than the one, a little higher than the other. He was made, moreover, not perfect, but capable of perfection; not immortal, but capable of immortality. He was given a psychical body, a body the centre and spring of which was the psyche, the "animula vagula blandula" of the ancients, poised between matter and spirit, and drawn upward and downward by alternate and opposite impulses. It is futile to inquire what would have occurred, had Adam's psychical nature withstood temptation and resisted the devil. That it did not resist, by no means implies that it could not, or lessens the guilt of our first parent. But,* on the other hand, we should not describe his guilt as greater than it really was. How far the higher or pneumatical nature was in our first parent, whether as a germ only, or as so far grown as to give his transgression the character of a sin against light—a spiritual sin, as well as a sin of lust, such as St. John classifies these sins—it is impossible for us to say. For our part, we incline to the view that Adam's sin is contrasted with that of angels in this, that the one sinned in the lower part

* On this subject, see Birk's "Difficulties of Belief," p. 108.

of his nature, and the other in the higher. Whether Satan's was exclusively and entirely spiritual wickedness, and whether he is incapable of carnal wickedness, is more than we dare affirm, till the interpretation generally given to Jude 6 is set at rest. But of this we may be sure, that as Adam's was a psychical nature, and angels' who kept not their first estate a pneumatical, so the sin of Adam was psychical, and that of angels pneumatical. Hence we see the nature of the retribution which fell on our first parent. It was partly punitive, and partly privative. The punitive part consisted in the toil and pain in which man was to eat bread and woman to bear children; the privative part, in the forfeiture of that immortality to which he would have been advanced if, by obedience, he had obtained a right to the tree of life which is in the Paradise of God.

Thus, as in the scale of creation, all advance is from the lower to the higher form of life, that was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural. Adam, unlike the angels, was given a psychical nature; and, as he fell in that psychical nature, he forfeited for himself and his posterity all right or power to attain to the pneumatical. This is the contrast which the apostle points out in 1 Cor. xv., between the two natures corresponding to the two covenant heads, the first and second Adam. As is the earthy (or the first Adam), such are they that are earthy; and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. This pneumatical nature, therefore, must come by spiritual birth from our spiritual head, just as the psychical nature comes

by natural birth from our natural head. This distinction, as we shall by and by see, throws great light on the old controversy of Traducianism and Creationism. For the present, it is enough to have grasped the apostle's teaching in 1 Cor. xv., that as there are two distinct natures, one psychical and the other pneumatical, as we have seen in chap. ii. ver. 14; so these natures are derived, not the one from the other, as we might suppose, and some erroneously teach, but are each a distinct birth (creation would assume the point in dispute) of God, the one coming to us naturally, as the offspring of Adam; the other supernaturally, as the offspring of the second Adam: *τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.* Acts xvii. 28.

Two more texts only remain to complete our list of proof passages of the distinction in Scripture between the Psyche and the Pneuma. In St. James iii. 15, the wisdom that is from beneath is described as *ἐπίγειος ψυχικὴ δαιμονιώδης*; and in St. Jude ver. 19, the scoffers of the last days are described as *ψυχικοὶ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες.* We will class these two passages together as throwing light on the contrast between the natural and the spiritual man of 1 Cor. ii. 14. In the first case, St. James says of the wisdom that is from beneath, that it is earthly, *ἐπιγειός*, and the two next predicates are thrown in to strengthen this affirmation, as well as to advance a climax. This earthly wisdom, unlike that which comes down from above, has its seat in the psychical nature only. As there is nothing heavenly about it, so it does not spring from the *πνεῦμα*, but only from the soul, the seat of his affections and im-

pulses. If it has any source of inspiration (and here is the fearful climax which the passage leads up to), it is from beneath, and not from above. Satan, not the Holy Spirit, is the inspirer of this kind of wisdom; it is devilish, not godlike. In St. Jude, we read of the scoffers that they separate themselves, being psychical only, and having not the Spirit. The German here marks a distinction which we fail to reproduce in the English. Luther renders it "Fleischliche die da *Keinen* Geist haben." But the Berlenburgh Bible, with De Wette and Stolz, render it more accurately still, "Sinnliche menschen die Keinen Geist haben," men, that is, who act on psychic principles only, because they lack the pneumatical faculty. There are men whose very conscience is defiled, and who by long indulgence in known sin have so deadened the pneuma, that it is the same as if it never existed. We gather from this passage in St. Jude this decisive truth, that the spirit is that part which is dead in the unregenerate man. The commission of sin does not kill the psychical nature; for though there are certain brutal acts which refinement forbids, and which the intellectual man, as such, is incapable of, yet these are not the worst acts of sin. Refined sensuality, in which vice has only increased its malignity by losing all its grossness, so far from deadening the psychical nature, rather awakens it to a higher activity. When Savonarola lifted up his voice against the demoralization of Florence, what were the objects of his attack, and against what did he stir up the citizens of Florence? It was art which had entered into a league with vice, so close and intimate that

there was no reaching vice except over the prostrate body of art. The longing of the awakened spirit for purity took the form of Puritanism. The world, of course, see only the extravagance, and cannot see, for it knows not and feels not, the need of inner and heart purity. But so it was, and so it ever will be. The psychical nature is disgusted at some of the grossest forms of vice, and tries to keep up the appearance of virtue; but this is all. These indulgences are not instant death to it as they are to the pneumatical nature. Fleshly lusts war against the soul, it is true, as St. Peter says (1 Pet. ii. 11), so that the end of these things is death. We know that they who sow to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but the first deadening effect of these things is felt in the *pneuma*, not in the *psyche*. It is conceivable that a licentious scoffer should have the psychical nature in its highest perfection; it is not conceivable that he could exercise the pneuma. This is the truth which this verse in St. Jude teaches, and we have seen how exactly it confirms the word of St. James with regard to earthly wisdom.

To sum up our remarks, then, on the contrast between psyche and pneuma, in the five passages of the New Testament which we have considered at length, we gather the following distinction from Scripture. The psyche is the life of man in its widest and most inclusive sense, embracing not only the animal, but also the intellectual and moral faculties, in so far as their exercise has not been depraved by the fall. In this sense Aristotle's generalization of the psyche is

not wide of the Scriptural meaning. The soul, he says,* is that by which we live, feel, or perceive, will, move, and understand. The soul thus includes all the energies which are natural to man, and necessary to complete a definition of human nature, including on the one hand certain functions, as of growth and motion, which are generally now left to the physiologist, and on the other hand those special faculties of mind which the modern psychologist devotes himself to. The psyche is thus the entelechy of a body having potential life, the sum-total that is of human activity in all directions, whether conscious or preconscious, voluntary or involuntary. This would very well accord with what Scripture says of man's psyche. It is the formative principle (Aristotle's entelechy), of one body and mind.† Just as the light of the body is the eye, so the life of the body is the soul. The division of the soul into vegetative, animal or sentient, and rational, is foreign to the simplicity of Scripture, and even in Aristotle it is only a logical division, grounded on no essential distinction between the higher and lower parts of man's nature. It is for this reason that Aristotle has been charged with materialism by some, because he does not fall in with the prevailing dichotomy, which under the name of spiritualism has reigned almost without dispute in the schools of Christian philosophy. But be this as it may, it is no

* See de Anima, II., ch. 2.

† On this subject see Sir A. Grant's Dissertations, prefixed to his Edition of the Ethics of Aristotle: see also the Psychologie d' Aristote, by Barthelemy St. Hilaire.

purpose of ours to clear Aristotle from the charge of materialism. It is enough if we point out a general agreement between his account of the psyche and that of Scripture. Were man made up of body and soul only, then the pyschology of Scripture would be identical with that of Aristotle, and a controversy of long standing might be set at rest at once and for ever. But it is exactly where Aristotle leaves off that Scripture begins to treat of human nature, and tells us of a faculty—let us call it God-consciousness—which is dead or dormant in a great degree since the fall, and which it is the office and work of the Holy Ghost first to quicken, and then to direct, sanctify, and govern. This faculty, to which Scripture gives the name of Ruach or Pneuma, is altogether ignored by Aristotle, and by Plato is confounded with the intellectual Nous. As in these matters confusion is worse than ignorance, we confess that Aristotle's psychology harmonises better with the psychology of Scripture than that of Plato. The dichotomy of the one, which is right as far as it goes, misleads less than the trichotomy of the other, which under a certain outward resemblance conceals most essential and irreconcileable differences. The fathers of the early Church would have acted wisely if they had kept clear of that entangling alliance with Platonism which seemed to offer at first such advantages. The intellectualism (for such it fairly may be described) of Aristotle was in truth a much safer propœdeutic to the truth than the vain and vaulting spiritualism of Plato. There was no doctrine of sin in either of the two schools of philosophy;

but for this very reason the spiritualism of Plato misleads more, because it is a spiritualism which neither recognises the fall, nor man's inability to turn to God by his own powers. Admitting that Plato approached nearer to the truth than Aristotle, he was for this reason all the more likely to mislead. The inner light which his disciples set up as their guide may be a sparkle of the true light of light; but not knowing of the fall, and misunderstanding the source of man's natural inability to know God, Platonism fell in with the Pelagianism of the natural mind, and thus the word of our Lord to the Pharisees may be applied to the rival schools of the Greeks. "If ye were blind then ye should have no sin, but now ye say we see, therefore your sin remaineth."

Thus the psyche of Scripture is the sum total of man's natural powers; the life as born into the world, and all that it contains or can attain to. But the pneuma is not only that which lies behind the psyche, as the psyche does underneath the bodily organism, it is that part of man which is unable to expand of itself, or to attain to its proper end in consequence of the fall. We need no other instance than Aristotle himself of the contrast between psyche and pneuma. That a mind like his, that took in all knowledge as his department, and whose curiosity knew no bounds but its own powers, should pass by in entire silence the inner sanctuary of the spirit and its exercises upon things unseen and eternal, implies something more than inattention or a wholesome dread of mysticism. The excuse, what-

ever it is worth, has been put forth in the case of Gœthe, but it is wholly inapplicable to such a case as that of Aristotle. There was no false shame in his case; no dislike to Christian duty and doctrine to repel him for piercing within the psyche to analyse the operations of his own pneuma. He was profoundly, and, we believe, sincerely unconscious of the divine faculty in man, for the reason given by the apostle that the psychical man perceives not the things of the Spirit of God. He knew not of the Spirit's work, because he was "dead," as all men by nature are, to divine things. In his case there was no mock spiritualism to deceive the unwary, and on which to ground a doctrine of natural illumination, and which mystics describe as the inner light. Aristotle's case may be taken as a palmary instance of the shallowness of their theory. Is it likely that such an analyst, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, could have passed by such a fact in human nature as they describe it to be? The silence of Aristotle is a negative evidence for the truth of Scripture which cannot be gainsaid. The Bible tells us that there is a faculty called the pneuma, but that in consequence of the fall it is as if it did not exist. Now, had Aristotle not passed it by we should be led to conclude—either that it operates still in spite of the fall, which Scripture plainly contradicts; or that Scripture itself is wrong in what it asserts of the natural man and its powers. We have thus a case of an objection turned into an argument. At first sight Aristotle's omission of all

reference to a faculty of God-consciousness seems a fatal objection to the psychology of Scripture which distinctly asserts its existence. Hence the mistaken way in which early apologists caught at Platonism as more friendly to revealed truth than the peripatetic philosophy. Intuition affirmed what induction ignored: can we wonder if intuition was enthroned in Alexandria, and reigned almost supreme so long as the knowledge of Greek survived in the West? But truth in the end is the only weapon which will serve the truth. While the intuitive school is one of the antichrists of the age with which the truth is engaged in a death grapple, the school of induction leaves revelation to its own department, on condition that revelation does not interfere with it. The two paths of Scripture and science diverge, and it is only unbelieving divines and dogmatic philosophers who ever cause a collision between such opposite interests.

The silence, then, of Aristotle is the very evidence which we should desire to prove the existence of the pneuma. The force of positive testimony may be explained away, that of negative cannot. When we know why Aristotle omits all mention of the pneuma, we see that the omission is itself an evidence that Scripture is right in the account it gives of the condition of man since the fall. If man could know his own spiritual powers, or even know how lamentably he has lost their use by the fall he would not be as fallen as he is. The root of his disease lies in this that he knows not that he is diseased.

The physician who takes him in hand has to disclose to him the function whose healthy exercise he never enjoyed, and therefore the loss of which he hardly suspects. *Ignoti nulla cupido.* As easily might we imagine Aristotle inditing the 42d Psalm, as inserting in his treatise on the Soul a chapter on the functions, end, and use of the pneuma. Scripture which teaches us what it is to be athirst for God, yea, even the living God, alone describes that part of man's nature from whence this thirst arises, the immortal pneuma made in the image of God, and which nothing but the living God can satisfy.

PSYCHE AND PNEUMA, IN THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.

God is spirit. God is love. In the one expression we have his nature, in the other his character. His being and perfections are thus summed up in two short epithets. Unlike other beings who partake of the nature of spirits, God is a pure essential spirit, without body, parts, or passions. Unlike other characters whose nature it is to love and be loved, God is love, love essential, eternal, unchangeable, love that does not depend upon any other love, the love which, whether reciprocated or not, is still itself the same, and flows forth from Him, because his very nature and property is always to have mercy and pity.

We shall fail to grasp the distinction between soul and spirit laid down in Scripture, unless we see that the spirit is the only part in man which fully images forth the inner nature of God. God is spirit: but man is a spirit in a soul, and is a soul in a body. Thus we have to penetrate through the two outer courts, and to enter into the shrine of man's being before we come to that which is properly and truly divine, and by which we see God. The animal nature in man does not reflect God at all, while the rational and intellectual nature reflects Him only partially. It is impossible to

think of God as merely a reasoning being. The steps by which we ascend from particulars to generals, the powers by which we abstract and associate ideas, eliminate error, and discover truth, are not acts which we can attribute to an infinite mind. For aught we know to the contrary angels may acquire knowledge as we do, though the steps of reasoning may be as much greater than ours, as the steps of a pyramid are than an ordinary flight of stairs. But between the infinite mind and all other finite minds there must be not only disparity, but difference. The controversies which Mr. Mansel's Bampton lecture stirred up a few years ago arose from not attending to the distinction between the intellectual and spiritual natures in man. In so far as man is only a rational being, he is not the *offspring* of God, but the *creature*. God is said to be the "Father of spirits" (Heb. xii. 9), not of intellects. We cannot make an abstraction, as Plato did, of the universal Νους or reason, and say that man is divine because his reason is a spark kindled from the universal mind. Thus far, then, Professor Mansell was right in saying, with Archbishop King, that there was analogy only, not a likeness of nature, between God and man. The modern form of the controversy arose out of an essay of Sir William Hamilton on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned, which ought to have set at rest, if anything could, the absurdity, not to say impiety, of the Hegelian method, which pretended to deduce the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and so forth, out of his own logical intuitions. The laws of thought were certainly stretched

very far by the Jena professor, who thought he could find out the Almighty to perfection by evolving the facts of his own consciousness. To this extent Professor Mansel, following in the wake of Sir William Hamilton, was incontestibly right. It is by faith, and not by reason, that we learn the ways of God. Reason not being that part of our nature in which we are like God, we cannot by discourse of reason know God.

But, on the other hand, there was a truth in the replies of Mr. Maurice and others, to the Bampton Lecturer. They denied that we know God only by inference. They asserted that faith is something more than a blind submission of reason to what is logically inconceivable. They were right as well in what they denied as in what they affirmed. But from disregard of this distinction between soul and spirit they failed to make this point clear, that the physical man can only know what God is not, he never can discover what God is. The spiritual man, however, rises to a higher consciousness both that God is and of what He is (Heb. xii. 6). This spirit-consciousness we cannot clothe in words; for what are words but the reflection which things make upon thought, the record of our experiences of the outer world?

"Multæ terricolis linguæ."

There are many tongues and many voices, each a vibration of that Æolian harp of many strings, the soul of man, when played upon by the external world. But the spirit would have to make a language to itself

to record rightly its intercourse with God. This it cannot do, and fain must use the vocabulary of the logical understanding. Now all translation is difficult, and the more so if the exact equivalent does not exist in the language into which we translate. This helps us to see how vain it is to try to render the facts of the spirit-consciousness in modes of speech framed only to express the facts of sense or of self-consciousness. Mystics like Jacob Böhmen, Swedenborg, and Fox, from ignorance of this, have only fallen into absurdities to which the Arabian Nights are sober and probable. But their extravagance must not discredit a truth, which is this that there is in man a faculty of God-consciousness which we call the spirit. In prayer, as distinguished from merely saying our prayers, we catch the sense of our nearness to Him who is not only the Over-soul, the Master Intellect, the Architect of the universe, but also the Father of our spirits, the being whose Presence we feel, when we really go down into ourselves. When we say our prayers, we are thinking about God—a very pious and profitable exercise no doubt, and without which our spirits will never rise into the state of silent and spiritual worship —but this is not prayer itself, but only the preparation for it. We must first lay the wood in order, and then light the dry sticks of logical conceptions, if the fire is to be kindled in our spirits, and we are to feel the presence of God there.

Thus those who say that we may know God, who is a Spirit, by our spirits, which are Godlike, only say what is both a simple and scriptural truth. If Mr.

Maurice, in his reply to Mr. Mansel, had confined himself to this, he would have escaped the charge of mysticism so often brought against him. The root of all modern mysticism lies in the vain attempt to draw a distinction between the reason and the understanding, the *vernunft* and *verstand* of the German. Plato's trichotomy is radically opposed to that of Scripture, in that he makes the pure intellect, the faculty which has intuition of ideas or first truths, to be the divine part in man's nature. With Aristotle, Locke, and Sir William Hamilton, we say that man has these intuitional powers of pure truth to a very limited extent, and that even admitting their existence this is not the same thing as the πνῦμα as taught by our Lord and His apostles. Coleridge spent his life in endeavouring to impress this distinction between reason and understanding on a few initiated disciples. The great world outside the grove of Plato has ever refused to draw the line between the lower and higher intellectual powers in man. Reason, to all but our modern Platonists, is understanding exercised on first truths; and the understanding is only reason turned to those which come in by sense-perception. But with this distinction between understanding and reason, the whole superstructure of a mystical God-consciousness falls to the ground. There is no rational intuition of God whatever. God is spirit, and can be only known and worshipped through our spirits. Reason is a reflection of God in us. Man's reasonable soul, we freely admit, is more after God's likeness than his animal frame. But neither the animal nor intellectual nature is the express image of God within us. It

is by the Spirit only that we see and know God. Reason (to apply Sir William Hamilton's distinction from sense-perception to spirit) has a representative sense of God. Spirit alone has a presentative.

But our modern mystics not only fail to distinguish between reason and spirit, and so look in the wrong direction to see traces of the divine in man. They fail also to grasp the effects of the fall on man's spirit. Instead of teaching that the spirit is dead or dormant in man as now born into the world, they speak of the God-consciousness as active in all men, even of those born in heathen lands. Their idea of missions is therefore rather to uncover what is within, though buried under sensuality and sloth, than to recover what is lost, or to discover what is unknown. They speak of the indwelling spirit in language which even regenerate Christians at times do not always realize. This is plainly unscriptural. Man is not born with a depraved, but a dormant spirit. This makes the saving difference between his case and that of devils. But he is a fallen man, with a depraved sense-consciousness, a darkened self-consciousness, and a dead or dormant God-consciousness. In this state, till awakened by God's Holy Spirit, he cannot of himself turn to God. He sometimes seeks after Him, if haply he may find Him. But though God is not far from every one of us, yet for want of purity of spirit we cannot see God within. As colour-blindness disables a man from discerning some of the secondary qualities of matter, while he is fully sensible of the primary, so the defect of the

pneuma in man disables him from seeing God in everything as he would if he had the full use of his powers. We cannot be too explicit as to the work that regeneration effects in fallen human nature. It controls the animal, and it purifies the intellectual and moral nature; but its especial and primary work is to quicken the spiritual. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

As God is spirit, so the spirit in man is that which, in an eminent and peculiar sense, comes from God. God, as we shall see in discussing the question of creationism, is the Creator *ex traduce* of the animal and intellectual part of every man naturally born into the world. Not so with the spirit, it comes from God, and is of God. Let us not shrink from using the expression that it proceeds from God, not by creation, but by emanation. Mere creationism fails to bring out the meaning of that expression, "God breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives." It were Pantheism to speak of nature as substantial with God. The creature is only His handy-work. He spake and they were made, He commanded and they stood fast. God the Father willed, God the Son spake, and God the Holy Ghost moved or brooded over the abyss out of which creation came at a word. But the spirit in man is divine, consubstantial with God, who is the Father of spirits, as our bodies of flesh are consubstantial with those of the parents of our flesh. This is, doubtless, a great mystery, second only to that which it leads up to,

that he which is joined to the Lord is one spirit, and that we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. But any view short of this fails to bring out the contrast between psyche and pneuma which we have seen to be scriptural, and which we are therefore bound to trace in detail. The pneuma is, we admit, very closely joined to the psyche; but so is the psyche to the animal frame. If we can distinguish between soul and body, as all psychologists who are not materialists do; are we not bound equally to distinguish between soul and spirit? Consciousness is the common term which unites the three natures of man together. Sense, self, and God-consciousness are the three aspects or sides of the one *ens individuum* man. But the third is as clearly marked off from the second as the second is from the first. It is not, as dichotomists would say, that the spirit is only the reasonable soul exercised upon the inner world of spirit, instead of upon the outer world of sense. Is the same faculty capable of two such different acts; or must we suppose a distinct faculty for the distinct act? We are loath to put up partitions, however thin, between one part of man's intellectual nature and another. The old psychology, which ascribed the different mental acts to so many distinct faculties, has been carried by the phrenologists to the length of absurdity, and has been generally discarded. But this is no reason why, if we distinguish at all between the animal powers in man and those which are intellectual, we should not go on to distinguish between the intellectual and

the spiritual. For in truth the spiritual in man differs from the intellectual more even than the intellectual from the animal. The dichotomist assumes the point in question when he says, that we are conscious of God by an act of the reasonable soul turned to a distinct object, the infinite God. So far from this being the case, our intellectual powers do not present God to us, but only represent Him. We may cognize God, it is true, as the theologian does; but then we only cognize certain notions about God, the idols of the den or the market. The awful Presence, the Eternal God with whom Jacob wrestled in spirit all night, is not to be understood as a Noumenon any more than He is to be apprehended as a phenomenon. So far Professor Mansel is right in overturning the Philosophy of the unconditioned, the metaphysical Rationalism of the school of Hegel, as offensive to piety as the old positive Rationalism of Paulus. But we are not to lose the sense of God, because self-consciousness or the nous cannot apprehend Him. Here is the defect in Dr. Mansell's book, which his opponents have not failed to point out. There is a God-consciousness in man, and a faculty by which God makes his presence felt in prayer. He talks with man then as with Adam in the cool of the day. He witnesses against him, strives with him, and till the Spirit is quenched, he leads him on to repentance. It is true, God does not at first make His presence felt in any other way than by awakening in man a fear of God, a sense of His holiness and of the strictness of the law's demands. But

to his awakened and believing children He manifests Himself as He does not unto the world; they walk with Him as Enoch did, they are treated as His friends as Abraham was; they meditate on Him or delight in Him as Isaac, they wrestle with Him as Jacob, they behold His glory as Moses, like David they are athirst for God, yea, even the living God, and, in fine, through the awakened pneuma, they realize the same evidence of things unseen that they have through the senses of the reality of the external world. It is as inconceivable to them to doubt this inner-witness to God, as it is to doubt the testimony of their own senses. In a noble passage* in Dr. Newman's Apologia (oh si sic omnia), he speaks of this sense of the presence of the eternal, and feels that he should doubt much sooner the testimony of the senses, which may become diseased, than that of the inner spirit by which a sense of God is brought presently and constantly home to him. Not to respond to this experience is to proclaim oneself unspiritual; to have only the psychical nature which cannot receive the things of God, because they are spiritually apprehended. To deride this experience as mystical, betrays what is worse than ignorance; for it betrays Aristotle's ignorance of the pneuma without Aristotle's excuse. How God will deal with such men as Aristotle or Confucius, who, surrounded with super-

* "The whole world seems to give the lie to the great truth of the being of a God, and of that great truth my whole being is full; so that were it not for the voice speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, I should be an atheist, pantheist, or polytheist when I looked into the world." "Looking into the world," he adds, "and seeing no reflection of God, is as if a man looked into a glass and did not see his face."—*Dr. Newman's Apologia.*

stitions one more corrupt than another, turned the blind eye to the glass of faith, and reported that they saw nothing, and that there was nothing to see, we cannot tell. But their excuse will not avail us if we continue to live of the earth earthy, if we end life as we began it, "psychical, having not the spirit."

The religious consciousness, or pneuma in man, has been well described by Professor Mansel* as composed of these two factors, the sense of dependence and the sense of moral obligation. He shows, in opposition to Schleiermacher's theory, that the blind sense of dependence would not be sufficient to describe man as a spiritual being; for then the dog would also be a religious animal. The appeal that the ox knows his owner, and the ass his master's crib, would lose all its pathos if it were grounded on the theory that there is no higher relationship and no deeper dependence between us and God than between the ox and his owner. Moral obligation and dependence taken together complete our idea of the religious consciousness. Schleiermacher's theory is one-half only, not the whole account of the spiritual in man. These elements, *taken by themselves*, we admit are psychical only, and not pneumatical. As the elements out of which water is formed are gases while apart, so in their separation or state of intellectual analysis, the sense of dependence and the sense of moral obligation are data of the intellect. Just as the old schoolmen said, that there was nothing in the intellect that did not come in through the

* Mansel's Bampton Lectures—Lecture iv.

sense; yet as Leibnitz added, *præter intellectum*, so we say of the pneuma. The words and thoughts on which the religious consciousness works, come in from the psyche, yet the result is not psychical. We may apply the very words of Leibnitz to describe our position—*Nihil est in spiritu quod non prius in intellectu, præter spiritum.*

God being such as He is—the Great I am—the final and chief good—the Alpha and Omega—the beginning of all creation and the end to which it leads up, it is surely consistent with such a conception, that there should be a distinct centre of our being in which spiritual impressions take their rise, and are carried into action. As we generalize all our animal functions under the head of body, and our intellectual acts under the head of soul, so the devotional and dutiful seem to require a distinct centre. Let those who have only an intellectual consciousness of God (as, alas! too many only have) include this under those other acts of reason which discourses, *de omni scibili*. But is this classification adequate to the wants and desires of the awakened and spiritual man? If prayer be an unfrequent exercise, or only a form of words without a motion of heartfelt desire; if the fear of God be a dim and scarcely felt emotion, kept in the background of consciousness; if the love of God be an experience to which our hearts have never responded, is it strange that we deny the existence of a faculty of whose operations we are unaware? The rule *de non apparentibus* applies to onr case; we deny the pneuma, because we do not know its proper object, God. The

subjective faculty stands in such a relation to its proper object (in this differing nothing from the lower functions in man) that the organ disappears when the function ceases. Like the eyeless fish in the mammoth cave of Kentucky, we lose the spiritual faculty in proportion as we disuse it. But this, so far from disproving its reality in the case of those who are truly awakened by God's Spirit, rather proves the contrary. It only proves that men are born spiritually blind, but that when couched by the Heavenly Physician, they learn to see: first, they learn that there is a light, and then that the organ by which we see that light is the spirit. Communion with God is thus the function of which the human pneuma is the special organ. On the healthiness of the organ the right exercise of the function depends, and reciprocally the distinct nature of the functions seems to require the existence of a distinct organ. The more spiritual we are, the greater our sense of God; conversely, the greater our sense of God, the more spiritual we become. Thus the distinct consciousness of God, apart from a mere knowledge of His mere attributes, or our intellectual consciousness of His existence, is the point in dispute between us and dichotomists. They would call this an *abstract* idea, as difficult to reach as that of a Lord Mayor of Martinus Scriblerus, without his glass coach, his gold chain, and his fur ruff. So it is, we admit it, when we try the intellectual method of knowing God. Job thus wrestled within himself to know God, and we learn that the universe when marshalled in array only told him *about*

God. "Behold I go forward, but He is not there, and backward, but I cannot perceive Him." (Job xxii. 8.)

So it will always be in approaching God in our present fallen state.

> "I stumble where I firmly trod,
> And falling with my weight of cares
> Upon the world's great altar stairs,
> That lead through darkness up to God."

But these are only the approaches to God's presence. Clouds and darkness are round about Him—righteousness and truth are the habitation of His dwelling. So long as we remain in the outer court of the intellect, we have no open vision, no sense of His presence and nearness. We are dealing with notions about God, but His own being we do not feel until the thought is lost in wonder, love, and praise. Hence the importance of continuing in prayer, waiting in the outer court of the intellect till God calls us in for an audience. Time spent on our knees is not time lost, if after one hour of meditation about God we are given even one moment of the estatic sense of His presence. Of this the psychical man knows nothing, he does not even desire it. He says his prayers as a kind of blind duty. He believes it will in some way do him good, either that God will directly give him the thing that he prays for, or give him a more submissive mind to make God's will his own. These are the two theories of prayer when looked at in the light of the intellect. They are true as far as they go,

only they do not go deep enough to the root of the matter. There are three kinds of prayer corresponding to the three parts of our nature. There is lip prayer, notional prayer, and the prayer of devotion, properly so called, when the spirit rises into communion with the Father of spirits, when we do not merely desire good things from Him but that he would reveal Himself to us.

Thus the consciousness of God and the sense of our own spiritual being vary in exactly the same proportion.

Where there is little sense of God's presence, there the Pneuma is scarcely, if at all, developed. The child and the savage cannot rise to a higher conception of God than as a great being who dwells in a palace above in the skies. The philosopher again rejects this crude idea of a God dwelling in one fixed place, and rises to the notion of omnipotence and omnipresence. But these are intellectual notions only: they do not bring God nigh us, and make Him dwell in us. That heaven is His throne and earth His footstool is a deeper and truer conception of Deity than that He dwelleth in a house of stones and cedar. But there is a higher and purer notion again than this. It is that he dwells in the humble and contrite heart. But to realise this indwelling of God in man, it is clear that we must know what that part of man is which alone is worthy to receive Him. To suppose God indwelling in the human intellect falls as far short of the whole truth as that He should dwell in our bodies, in the coarse sense that Swift caricatured the

mystery of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. Our bodies are the temples of the Holy Ghost in the sense that even the precincts or outer court of the Gentiles were holy in the temple of Jerusalem. He who defiles the outer court despises already the presence of Him who sanctifies the innermost court of all. Him will God destroy. But the true presence chamber of God is the Pneuma: there He meets with man. We pass through the outer court of the senses and even through the inner court of reason to reach this sanctuary where God makes himself known in silence and in stillness. Hence it is, that those who fail to grasp the distinction between Pneuma and Psyche fail also to grasp the deep meaning of the personal indwelling of God the Holy Spirit in the breast of a regenerated believer. They speak of the influences of the Holy Spirit — an expression which would be adequate if the office of the Holy Spirit were only to enlighten our understandings and to purify our wills. But they do not understand, or at least fail to make clear to others, these deeper operations of the Spirit by which the Pneuma, or diviner part in man, is occupied and possessed by the Holy Spirit of God.

Our not being conscious of this immediate presence of God's Spirit with our spirit is no proof against it, as those who deny or explain away the doctrine of the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost suppose. Consciousness, or the power of turning over at will our internal experiences, is not always co-extensive with those experiences. There are some thoughts too

deep to be subjected to this kind of test.* Besides, we are directly taught not to expect a consciousness of the Spirit's presence, but of Christ, of whom the Spirit testifies. "He shall not speak of himself," John xvi. 13.

Thus Christ dwells in the believer mediately, the Holy Spirit on the other hand dwells immediately. The believer has the mind of Christ, and is led by the Spirit of God; but he is directly conscious not of the Spirit's presence, but of that of which the Spirit testifies, viz., the person and work of Christ. We must be explicit on this as our safeguard against that extravagant error of all mystics, from the monks of Mount Athos to the disciples of Swedenborg, that we can cast ourselves into a state of magnetic sleep or trance, and there enjoy the beatific vision. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be," and it is not given to us in our present state to enjoy a foretaste of that higher sense of God's presence which awaits us after death. "We who are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened. We could desire to be unclothed, if so be that, being absent from the body, we might be present with the Lord." But meanwhile the Spirit, which is the earnest of our inheritance, dwells in us in a way of which we are distinctly conscious,

* Psychology has not yet worked itself clear of the Cartesian confusion between thought and our consciousness of thought. According to Descartes an idea and our clear conception of that idea are one and inseparable. So far from this there are pre-conscious states of thought. As memory and recollection differ, so thought and consciousness. The later psychologists, especially Hamilton, are on the right tract on this subject, but it has yet to be fully worked out.

though we cannot make that consciousness clear to others. The Spirit is there, but his presence is only felt by his effects. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit."

Thus, to sum up our foregoing argument, the deep things of God correspond to and suggest something proportionably deep in the receptive faculties of man. Were notions about God all that we could ever attain to, then man's psychical nature would be sufficient; we should have no need to suppose the existence of a third nature. But as man is made in the image of God, we are bound to suppose that there is a special organ of God-consciousness, since we can trace a distinct function called spiritual-mindedness. And conversely, the existence of such functions obliges us to assert a distinct organ on which they centre. Such is the Pneuma. It is immortal because divine, not divine because immortal. Did man only know about God, we see nothing on which he could rest his hopes of immortality. But loving Him, trusting Him, delighting in Him, man feels that he cannot altogether die, that God would be untrue to himself to thrust such a being back into nothingness. Hence David exclaims, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." There is that in the Pneuma which we do not find in the Psyche, viz., that it is made for God, and meant to enjoy Him for ever and ever.

THE UNITY UNDER DIVERSITY OF THE THREE PARTS OF MAN'S NATURE.

We have seen from Scripture that the distinction between body, soul, and spirit is real, and not verbal only. But like all distinctions, it must not be pressed too far. Man is, indeed, a tripartite person—τριμερὴς ὑπόστασις—made up of three parts, which we can ideally distinguish. But this does not imply that we can actually divide them, much less that any one of these three natures in one person can maintain an existence apart from the other two. Body without soul or spirit becomes a corpse, and, as such, is quickly resolved into its ultimate atoms. Soul, again, without spirit or body would pass into the universal soul or reason, if we may personify a mere abstraction; and spirit again, being "the likest God within the soul," would, when the tie of life is broken, return to God that gave it, in the sense that it would be reabsorbed in the Deity.

This is, as far as we can infer from reason, what would occur at death, did not revelation tell us that God has arrested death in the act of completing his triumph, and has said by the bier on which the body is laid, Thus far shalt thou go, but no further. In

prospect of a resurrection of the body, procured in and by the meritorious work of Christ, our death is not entire dissolution. It is only suspended animation. When the Lord said, "The maid is not dead, but sleepeth," they laughed him to scorn; so the Stoics and Epicureans of our age may meet this truth with derision; the one asserting that death is an eternal sleep, and the other that it is only a second birth,

> "Eternal process moving on;
> From state to state the spirit walks;
> And these are but the shattered stalks,
> The ruined chrysalis of woe."

Midway between materialism and spiritualism, and having little in common with either, Scripture treats of man as a unit, the fractions of which never can be treated as integers. We may distinguish in idea, as we shall presently see Scripture does, between the body, the soul, and the spirit; but to suppose that either can act without the other, or to suppose, for instance, that the unsouled body, or the disembodied soul, or lastly, the pure unsouled spirit, can act by itself, is to assume something which neither reason nor revelation warrants. Death, to be entire, must imply not separation of soul and body only, as we commonly describe it, but the dissolution of the link which binds the three parts together. In that case, all consciousness and being must cease with the disruption of the tie which unites the higher and lower natures together. Were the first death of Adam at all equivalent to this (as it is conceivable it would have been but that man

was redeemed in idea, before even he fell, by the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world), then all our conjectures about the future state would have been equally idle; man would indeed walk in a vain show, and disquiet himself in vain. Buddhism would then be of all creeds the most consistent, and, instead of four hundred millions of professors, should claim the whole human family as proselytes to its dreary dream of ultimate annihilation. To our mind, there is no middle point to choose between Gaudama Buddha, and the Lord Christ. Either all life is evil, and non-being, or apathy (for Nirwana may equally mean either) is the supreme God, or on the other hand Christ is "the resurrection and the life," and "whosoever believeth in him shall never die." Between these two poles of thought philosophy ranges itself with as many degrees and zones as there are on the globe's surface. But they all lead up to or down from one of two theories, which, like logical contradictories, exclude each the other. Ranging between the two, philosophic religionists try to combine a little more or a little less of the one or the other, but they all really tend to the rejection of the one and the acceptance of the other. At any given moment the philosophic standpoint may seem neutral; it is in reality a tendency toward, or a turning away from, the truth as it is in Jesus. No man can serve two masters, either in speculation or in practice.

Philosophy and revelation are thus at issue on this primary question, whether death in man is a natural or a penal process, and consequently whether the

higher functions of man can continue to act when separated from the lower. We do not here deny that they will continue to act after death, but this we attribute, not to any necessity of the case or any fitness of things that the higher should survive the lower, but solely to the will of God arresting death in the act of asserting his entire dominion over men. This being the case we can ideally divide body, soul, and spirit from each other, and set them apart, as we do the cornea, lens, or lacrymal humour of the eye, for separate consideration. Together they make up only one organum or instrument, and the loss of one part would imply, not the incompleteness only, but the utter uselessness of the other two.

The trichotomy of Scripture does not then imply the union of three separable and distinct natures in man. This would be to repeat and even exaggerate the error of the old school of dichotomists. The ground error of the dichotomist system is this, that man is made up of two parts, body and soul, and that these parts are not only separated in death, but capable, the higher at least, of surviving that separation. What would it be but to make confusion worse confounded if we were to assert the existence of a third nature, distinct from the former two, and equally with the soul capable of continuing its existence in the disembodied state? The only difference, in that case, between the dichotomist and the trichotomist view of man would be, that whereas the dichotomist described man as the union of two natures, the one mortal and the other immortal; the trichotomist described him as

the union of three such natures, one mortal and two of them immortal. Such a scheme would only complicate what is obscure enough already and build up one unproved assertion on another. The doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul labours under difficulties enough already* without laying on the additional burden of proving the immortality of spirit as well.

The only trichotomy which will stand the test of our advanced school of physiologists is this, that the bodily organism, the intellectual faculties, and that higher spiritual consciousness by which we know and serve God, are not separable natures, but separate manifestations of the one nature. That relation of the Persons of the Trinity which is called Sabellianism is the best expression of that which we hold with regard to the nature of man. However defective such a theory may be to express the relation of the Persons of the Triune Jehovah, it is not unobjectionable to speak of the three manifestations of one nature in man. The will or personality, the original monad or centre of force,

* Olshausen says, "Hoc tamen patribus dandum est, nusquam legi in libris sacris animam esse immortalem, de Deo potius prædicatur, eum tenere solum immortalitatem (1 Tim. vi. 16), et de Christo (John xi. 15)." The grounds on which some of the ante-Nicene fathers spoke of the soul as mortal and the spirit as immortal, Olshausen gives in his treatise on the trichotomy, see his Opuscula, p. 167. The theology of any age can only be understood by reference to the current opinions of that age. The Platonic trichotomy was a ψυχὴ λογικὴ or rational soul, which was immortal, the irrational or sensitive soul and the body. The Scripture trichotomy brought in a new conception of a pneuma superior to the psyche. Hence the first stress of the early apologist was to prove the mortality of the psyche as opposed to Plato, on which to base the true source of man's immortality in the pneuma. When the church became dichotomist, this distinction was disregarded, and divines fell back on the old statement of the immortality of the soul.

has three forms of consciousness, that of sense, of self, and of God-consciousness. Man has not three lives, but one life; he is not three persons, but one person. The will or the ego is at one moment more present to sense-consciousness, and then again it passes into self-consciousness, or into God-consciousness, passing thus through the outer court of the holy place into the holiest of all; but it is always one and the same will. Our personality is the same, whether the will acts through the body, the soul, or the spirit. This is the difference, therefore, between the trinity and the trichotomy, that in the one case the person is distinct as well as the work, in the other case not. The Trinity is three persons in one nature or substance—the trichotomy is three natures in one person. Man is the *fibula duarum naturarum,* the clasp which unites the sensual and the spiritual together. This expression of the old dichotomist is perfectly unobjectionable; but to go further, and to press analogies from the mystery of the blessed Trinity, analogies faulty in their very form (for what has the mystery of the three persons in one nature to say to the fact of three natures in one person) is to go beyond the bound, both of scripture and reason.

The facts of consciousness are all against such a trichotomy as would divide as well as distinguish the natures in man. In every mental operation we feel that the whole man works, and that through every part of his nature. Physiology teaches us that there is not a single mental act which does not depend upon the circulation of the blood through the brain vessels,

and that upon the quantity or quality of that blood will depend the soundness of the conclusion. A torpid liver or a disordered stomach, by either diminishing the volume of blood in the brain vessels, or disturbing its purity, will produce such aberrations of intellect, that the reasoning powers shall either altogether cease, or beat wildly like the pendulum of a clock released from its weight. When we speak of the pure reason, we speak of an abstraction which does not exist in human nature. On the data brought in by sense-perception, the judgment acts, and it can so far recal or modify these data as to seem to create the grounds of its own judgment, and so far to carry on a train of pure reasoning. But this is simply because we forget whence these data originally came. Lost in a train of abstruse reasoning, and oblivious even of the sheet of paper which he is covering with his symbols, the mathematician may seem to be in the region of pure thought, and using pure reason only. But this is only because we are forgetful of the physiological fact, that on the supply of blood to the brain depends that very exercise of the pure reason, and the psychological fact, that the data of reasoning are nothing else than transformed sensations, perceptions accumulated during many years' observation, and now by abstraction defecated from those associations with which they first entered the mind through the senses. None of us can remember the original apples or abaci by which we first learned that two and two make four; but none would dispute that, without such aids to reflection, even Newton or Pascal could not have

developed the mathematical genius for which they were afterwards so distinguished.

In truth, in every act of the mind, from the simplest to the most abstract, we put forth our entire faculties, though in a very different degree. Suggestions from without, and association of ideas from within, are the instruments, so to speak, which the judgment cannot do without. Thus, without the aid and suggestion of the senses, it is difficult to see on what thought could occupy itself. Man, as far as we know at present, is as incapable of pure thought as he is of pure animalism. Even the sensualist idealizes his indulgences, lest he should turn from them in utter disgust and loathing. There is the προνοια της σαρκος, the provision for the flesh, else the epicure would loathe his own delicacies. He must toil after his gastronomic proficiency (to use Charles Lamb's quaint account of his taste for strong tobacco) as some men toil after virtue. But the converse is equally true. If, in living to the flesh, men must still exercise judgment, taste, imagintion, wit, and that thus the elder is made to serve the younger, it is equally true that in a life of the highest mental abstractedness, of a Kant at Konigsberg, or a Newton in the quadrangle of Trinity—nihil est in intellectu quod non prius *per sensum.* Through the wicket gate of sense have passed those trooping fancies, those soaring thoughts, those long-drawn deductions of reason which mark the higher forms of mind, whether in a poet "of imagination all compact," like Shakespeare, or a reasoner and analyst like Newton or Kant.

Thus, as of the sexes, the man is not without the woman, nor the woman without the man in the Lord, so of the senses and intellect. Mind enters into all our animal functions, except those which are purely unconscious, and so are out of the control of the will, as the functions of the heart and the stomach. The senses, on the other hand, are constantly ministering to the mind, even when in her most creative and unearthly mood. She may take the pabulum of thought with the same unthoughtfulness of her need of it that Newton eat the baked apples which his housekeeper took care to lay on his table before him. But still the ministering hand is there, and we are utterly at a loss to conceive a state of being in which a lower nature shall not thus minister to, and subserve a higher. Idealism loses sight of the connection of the mind with the body, just as materialism declares that mind is nothing else than a subtle and rare secretion of body. True, research is leading on to the conclusion which Scripture has long ago laid down, that man is the integer of two, or rather three, factors or fractions —the mysterious unity of sense-consciousness, which we call the body; self-consciousness, which we call the soul or reason; and God-consciousness, which we call the spirit.

This view of the essential unity of man reconciles us to what would otherwise appear an anomaly in a spiritual religion like that of Christ—the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The Christian doctrine is no less offensive to spiritualism than to materialism. Nay, of the two, the spiritualist philosophy takes most

offence at the doctrine of the resurrection. The materialist may think the doctrine incredible, but it will never seem to him a thing impossible that God should raise the dead. Nay, rather, like Priestley, whatever other objections he may find to the supernatural element in Christianity, he will readily admit the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, as confirming his theory of the dependence of the intellect upon the senses. But to the spiritualist school such a doctrine is utterly repulsive. Plotinus resented being asked about his bodily health, considering his present condition as a degradation, an incarceration in the flesh for spiritual sins committed in some former state of being. To one accustomed to this view of the independence of mind on matter, the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body must have seemed utterly repulsive. Hence we find that when the apostle came to Greece, the resurrection of Jesus was foolishness, even as the Messiahship of Jesus was a stumbling-block to the Jew. The expressions applied to each (a stumbling-block to the one and foolishness to the other), exactly express the nature of the offence in each case. The Messiahship of Jesus was to the Jews a scandal, because they would admit *the idea* of Messiahship, but were offended at the meanness of the birth, life, and death of Jesus of Nazareth, who claimed to be their Messiah. But with the Greek, the state of feeling was opposite. With him, the very *idea* of a resurrection was foolishness; a resurrection of rubbish—a reincarceration in the flesh—a second childishness, to end in mere oblivion. The one admitted the idea, but staggered only

at the fact which embodied it. But the Greek rejected even the idea of a return to the body. It was more than a particular and single scandal, which might be got out of the way: this preaching of the resurrection of the body was much more than a single folly, it was foolishness itself; so that the Greek philosophy, which taught the immortality of the soul *in opposition* to the resurrection of the body, must be swept out of the way, before men, who call themselves spiritualists, can receive Christianity, as it is taught by the Lord and his apostles.

Harless has well remarked that there is less now for Christian truth to fear from so-called materialism, with its inductive method applied to psychological questions, than from that vague and misty spiritualism, of which Carus' "Psyche," and Ennemoser's "Spirit of man in Nature," are the most striking instances.* To the spiritualism which has strangely enough imbedded itself in our popular theology, like a fly in the amber, or a toad in a rock, mortal body and immortal soul, are favourite and oft-repeated antitheses. Out of this assumed dichotomy of man into two distinct and separable parts, is built up a scheme of natural religion, which one class of writers, the Deists of last century, appealed to as a substitute for revealed, and another, the orthodox apologists, appealed to as the schoolmaster to bring us to Christ. It is not generally perceived, that if this antithesis of mortal body and immortal soul, which is certainly not Pauline but Platonic, is worth anything at all, it cuts at the

* See Harless Chrisliche Ethik, quoted by Delitzsch.

roots of the Christian doctrine of a resurrection of the body. Hence it is that the doctrine of the resurrection of the last day seems to some to be an encumbrance to the Christian scheme. If the body be the mortal, and the soul the immortal part *ex naturâ rerum*, why degrade the soul again by clothing it upon even with a glorious body? The spirits of just men are said to be made perfect when out of the body; why imprison them again, even in a house which is from heaven? So the Egyptian notion of the παλιγγενεσία, or the revivification of the flesh at the end of the *annus Magnus* seems to have dropped into the stream of Christian truth, like an overhanging pine tree into the torrent below, and dammed up its current rather than bridged over its difficulties. If man be only a soul in a body; if the true Ego be an immortal νοῦς in a perishable σῶμα, as Plato and the philosophers thought, it is a strange *advance* to raise man from the disembodied state of being after death, to that of the resurrection body. The inconsistency of the two doctrines is not felt by the majority of divines, because of their artificial and arbitrary distinction between natural and revealed religion, and because they half Christianise Plato, and make him the "Moses of Attica," as he was said to be by Clement and others of the Alexandrian school.

But the contradiction, though not always apparent, is none the less real. The difficulty (for such it is) of the resurrection of the body is got over by many divines, on the principle that rewards and punishments could not be justly awarded at the last day, if the

body which had been a partaker of the sin were not raised again to share the retribution. There is a Rabbinical tale which Sherlock and other divines have urged as an argument for the resurrection of the body: In the day of judgment the body will say, the soul alone is to blame; since it has left me I have lain still in the grave: The soul will retort, the body alone is sinful; since released from it, I fly through the air like a bird: The judge will interpose with this myth —A king once had a beautiful garden full of early fruits. A lame man and a blind man were in it. Said the lame man to the blind man, let me mount upon your shoulders and pluck the fruit, and we will divide it. The king accused them of theft: but they severally replied—the lame man, how could I reach it?—the blind man, how could I see it? The king ordered the lame man to be placed on the back of the blind man, and in this position had them both scourged. So God in the day of judgment will replace the soul in the body, and hurl them both into hell together.

Now, allowing this allegory all the worth it claims as an argument, and admitting that for a perfect retribution to the wicked, their bodies must be quickened and immortalised as well as their souls; how does this apply to the righteous? If their souls are in full fruition of blessedness, what farther need have they of organs of sense-perception, similar to, if not quite the same, as those which we now possess? The truth is, that the resurrection of the body is a difficulty which cannot be got over by the philosophy of spiritualism. Divines may uphold it as a point of orthodoxy, but

laymen who care less for orthodoxy than consistency, will not scruple to explain it away, when they see how irreconcileable it is with their philosophical dogma of the immateriality and immortality of the soul. As early as the apostles' days, we find some who said with Hymenæus and Philetus, that the resurrection was past already, because it seemed to them not only incredible, but unworthy of God, to reinvest man in a garment of matter. The Manicheans very consistently denied a bodily resurrection. Matter seemed to them to proceed from the evil principle, and redemption consisted rather in deliverance from the body by death, than that the temple of the body should be destroyed only to be reared again by Christ at the last day. Locke, in the third letter of his controversy with the Bishop of Worcester, seems to fall in with those who take a figurative view of the resurrection of the body, and in the paraphrase and notes to the Epistles, commenting on the expression "it is sown in corruption," he maintains "that the time that man is in this world, affixed to this earth, is his being sown, and not when being dead he is put in the grave, as is evident from St Paul's own words—For dead things are not sown; seeds are sown, being alive; and die not till after they are sown." It is evident that Locke here mistakes the apostle's meaning, and twists the sense so as to explain away the resurrection of the body. The apostle *does* compare the corpse put into the grave to a seed of corn, and the comparison is as just as striking. In both cases there is outward death. A seed is a dead thing *till* it is quickened in the bosom of the earth;

and a body is but a corpse until it is quickened at the resurrection morning. The comparison, moreover, becomes more reasonable the more it is pursued in details. With *what* body shall they come, the philosophers asked in Corinth, as they do to this day. Men did not want the light of modern science to learn that the body wholly decomposes in the grave, and that not one particle remains at the end of a few years or centuries, as the case may be; the whole of the atoms pass off in gas or dust, to form the constituent elements of fresh bodies. Modern chemistry has taught us a little more of the *modus operandi;* but the fact itself was as well-known in Corinth two thousand years ago as in London or Paris to-day. Yet the apostle's answer is short and decisive. "Thou fool, that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain; but God *giveth it a body* as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." Those who protest against the absurdity of the resurrection of relics are answered at once. Do we find in nature a resurrection of relics? Does the grain of wheat give back its particles to the new stalk and ear? Undoubtedly not. "Thou fool, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain." "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone." It is by his death, *i.e.*, by its dissolution and decomposition, that it obtains a new life. The seed rots in the earth, with this difference, however, from other cases of mere decomposition, that in dying it strikes a radicle into the earth, and in this radicle there is life; it has the power of assimilating *fresh* particles of mat-

ter; and so God gives it a body as it hath pleased Him. The point of identity thus between the old and the new plant, between the present and our resurrection bodies, is not an identity of *atoms*, but an identity of *nature*. "To every seed his own body." As the oat seed only produces the oat plant, barley barley, and wheat wheat, so each individual corpse is the germ, and nothing more, of a resurrection body, whose identity with the old is an identity of reason and idea, not of matter and sense.

We admit that this is not the mediæval doctrine of the resurrection; it is, nevertheless, the Pauline, and is as reasonable, and after the analogies of nature, as the other view is wildly absurd and improbable. The resurrection of the body was complicated with difficulties which did not belong to it, because divines did not understand the apostle's illustration, and failed to distinguish as they should between such an idea of resurrection as that of the dry bones of Ezekiel, which is only revivification, and the regeneration of a *new* plant from an old germ, which is the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. Thus the Jews had a tradition that there was one small almond-shaped bone which was indestructible, and would form the nucleus around which the rest of the body would gather at the time of the resurrection. Tertullian, not to be outdone in absurdity, fixed the germ of immortality in the teeth. The teeth, he says, are providentially made eternal, to serve as the seeds of the resurrection. Even Augustine gives in to this carnal mode of appre-

hending the resurrection. Every man's body, howsoever dispersed here, shall be restored perfect in the resurrection. Every body shall be complete in quantity and quality. As many hairs as have been shaved off, or nails cut, shall not return in such enormous quantities to deform their original places, but neither shall they perish; they shall return into the body, into that substance from which they grew. It is needless to accumulate instances. The Church fell into the way, not of studying what the apostle said, but what this or that father said about the apostle, and hence the schoolmen only repeat each other in piling up absurdities about the resurrection of relics. Thomas Aquinas gravely decides that no other substance would rise from the grave except that which belonged to the man in the moment of death.*

Thus the reputed orthodox view errs as wide of the mark in one extreme as that of the Sadducees in the other extreme, and for the same reason. Ye err, *knowing neither the Scriptures*, nor the *power of God.* Between the oat plant and the oat seed there is no external likeness whatever: it is a likeness of *kind.* It is to *reason's eye*, not to that of *sense-perception*, that we appeal in proof of the identity of the buried grain with the growing corn. So with our bodies. Inattention to this obvious distinction has made more infidelity than almost any other mistake of divines. It is not too much to say, with the author of a Restoration of Belief, that before all other replies to negative teach-

* Hagenbach's Hist. of Doctrines, Clark's Translation.

ing we want some clearing up of the positive meaning of Scripture. We have had quite enough dogma in our churches—what we want is a clearing up of some of the difficulties of the Bible arising from the dogmas which have been deduced from the Bible by divines who philosophized on what they called an orthodox sense.

Thus on account of certain difficulties connected with the resurrection of the body, which arose from our crude conceptions of the apostle's meaning, the doctrine itself has been more opposed than any other in revelation. Two theories are now put forward on the subject to get over the difficulty. The one theory is that of an inner body, which was first ingeniously worked out by Bonnet in his Palingenesie Philosophique; the other is the anti-atomistic theory of Leibnitz applied to souls. Each soul is a monad or centre of force, which is the organic identity of man, and which at his death passes out into the world of spirits, to die no more. These are the two counter-theories to the Christian doctrine of man's nature. Thus there are two irreconcileable schools of thought, each professing to tell us of the mystery of death and the grave—the one, the method of Scripture; the other, that of philosophy. Rejecting the latter, we conclude that man is a tripartite nature of body, soul, and spirit, made for immortality it is true, but that this immortality was contingent on his spiritual likeness to God through obedience and love. Man, when he fell, lost for himself and all his posterity that spiritual likeness to God in which alone his true immortality is

to be sought.* We are born dead in trespasses and sins, and cannot attain the right to the tree of life, that we may eat it and live for ever. The redemption of Christ has purchased back for man this right to the tree of life. Entering into our nature, He who alone has immortality gives it alone to those who are in like vital union with Him by spiritual regeneration, as those of Adam born are in union with the first Adam by natural birth. "As in Adam all die," or "as all that are of Adam die," so "all that are in Christ are made alive." Thus as the wages of sin is death, the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ. This gift of God is, as we might expect, not a partial gift. As redemption is free, so it is also full. God will immortalise not a part of our nature, but the whole. Were it the intention of God from the beginning (of which we do not gather a trace from Scripture) to set an immortal spirit in a mortal body, partners of a common life or soul for a little while, with a very different hereafter before them, then we should not have been told of the resurrection of the body. The resurrection of Christ's body might have taken place (though even this might have been dispensed with) to assure us that we do not die in death, but that rather death is our

* For a catena of testimonies from the early Fathers, that they held the opinion that the true immortality of man lay in his being made in the image of God, *i.e.*, that he was neither naturally mortal nor immortal, but δεκτικος δε εκατερων, capable of becoming one or the other by obedience.—See Schultz's *Voraussetzungen der Unsterblichkeit*, p. 67

See also a good Sermon by Sartorius on *Die Heilige Liebe*, p. 34:—"Die göttliche Ebenbildlichkeit des Menschen, ist auch der Grund seiner Unsterblichkeit, die nicht auf einer blos physichen oder metaphysichen, sondern auf religiösen oder heiligen Basis ruht."

second birth, and that the spirit, thus delivered from its partner and co-mate in exile, the body would at once pass into joy and felicity. Instead of this, Scripture teaches us that redemption is not complete till the resurrection of the body, and that even we who have the firstfruits of the Spirit groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body. Thus in Scripture death and sin, immortality and the redemption of Christ, are coupled together as we do not find them in the schools of philosophy. The resurrection of the body, not the existence of the soul after death, is the pledge of entire redemption from the curse and bondage of sin, to which Scripture invariably points our hopes.

The Eschatology of the schools is different from that of Scripture, and no ingenuity of divines pledged to connect and harmonise natural and revealed religion can weave the two into agreement. The schools of philosophy know neither the doctrine of original sin nor the penal character of death. Looking down at the grave, they say, *Mors est aut exitus aut interitus.* Startled, as indeed they may be, at the thought of annihilation; rejecting, as our better instincts always will, the alternative adopted by Lucretius—

> "Sic ubi non erimus quum corporis atque animi
> Discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti."
> *De Rerum, Nat.* III. 850.

when it comes to the question whether "to be or not to be" is the case of man after death, there will always be an inconsiderable minority only in favour of the

former. Any hypothesis will be invented rather than that man should lie down and die like the brute. Hence, if death be not the end of man's being, it must be a crisis; it must be the entrance into a new life, a higher life, as he is pleased to fancy, in which the higher or deathless principle shuffles off its mortal coil, as the snake sheds its skin, or the grub rises into a butterfly. Curiously enough, the penal character of death crosses his thoughts, but only to be brushed aside as an untenable theory.

"Omnia mors poscit, lex est *non pœna* periri."

Death, the philosopher argues, is common to man with the brute. Now, as the brute creation has not sinned, it cannot be that death has passed upon all in consequence of sin. But St Paul, Rom. v., has anticipated this very difficulty, and in the face of it reaffirms the truth that "Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression." At this point, then, of the penal character of death in the case of man only, and in consequence of Adam's transgression, we come to the cross-roads where philosophy and Scripture branch off; the two paths diverge, and every step we take on the one carries us farther from the other. No ingenuity can reconcile the penal character of death with its natural. "*Stipendia enim peccati mors*" is the verdict of St Paul; *Mors Janua vitæ* is the sentence of the schools from Plato to Fichte. Setting out with the latter interpretation of death, the schools have worked out a theory of im-

mortality, in which Plato's notion of the pre-existence of the impersonal νοῦς or universal reason, and Leibnitz's doctrine of monads, are the axioms on which it rests. The old doctrine of the immortality of the soul arising from its immateriality has passed through the fire of hostile criticism. Warburton rejected it; Kant put it into the crucible of his Critique, and reduced it to a mere play on words. Yet it lives on still in our systems of theology, for this most unanswerable reason, that what men continue to believe in, they will always find a reason for. But the only terms on which a lasting concordat between reason and faith can be drawn up must clearly be, that faith is not to borrow the weapons of a school philosophy with which to overturn philosophy. So long as we take the psychology of Scripture to illustrate its theology, and *vice versa*, we may expect some agreement; but when we take certain dicta of philosophy with regard to the nature of man, and try to piece these in with what the Bible tells us of God's dealings with man, is it to be wondered at that the result is confusion worse confounded? and a state of uncertainty as to any settled meaning in Scripture which tends to unbelief, if not to positive disbelief.

ANALOGIES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY TO THE TRICHOTOMY IN MAN CONSIDERED.

We know from Scripture that man is made in the image of God. Scripture, moreover, teaches us that there is in the Divine unity a plurality of persons —three persons in one substance. To put these two thoughts together, and to suggest an analogy from the trichotomy of man to the three persons of the Blessed Trinity, is such an obvious comparison that it is not strange if it has been pressed into the argument. We now proceed to test that analogy, and see whether it is as sound as it is specious.

That man was the microcosm was a fancy which long retarded the advance of sound views of physiology. Man, the miniature of the Trinity, may be the same misleading conception in psychology. So long as men thought that there were four elements in nature, and that out of these elements our bodily form was built up, and that the soul was a quintessence of the other four, no rational system of physiology was possible. The spirits, as they were called down to the time of Cullen, formed an important part of medical diagnosis of disease. What the spirits were no one

could exactly say, but the fiction that air, the fourth element, enters into the composition of the human frame, led to the conception of an entity called the spirit, which was as purely imaginary as the geography of Paradise, the situation of Limbus, or other questions on which the middle ages exercised their ingenuity to little or no purpose.

Analogies are of all arguments the most deceptive. That forward, forth-reaching faculty may land us on to the shore of truth, but it may as often mistake a sleeping whale for an island, and land us where there is not a foothold of certainty. Such has been the fate of all analogies from man to the universe, and such will the analogy prove, from the trichotomy to the Trinity. It will not bear the weight of solid reason.

Man is made in the image of God. It is but a single step from this to say with Augustine, "Man has three parts—spirit, soul, and body. Man, therefore, is an image of the sacred Trinity." "Homo habet tres partes, spiritum animum et corpus, itaque est imago Sacrosanctæ Trinitatis" (Aug. de Symbolo).* We may be tempted even to carry this into detail, as Augustine had the good sense not to do. We may say that such as is the inner nature of God, such will be the inner nature of man. God has three persons in one substance, man has three natures in

* He elsewhere compares the Three Persons of the Trinity with the memory, intellect, and will in man. He defines will, however, by a deeper word than love, by *dilectio caritas: Numquid est aliud caritas quam voluntas*, De Trin. xv. 21-2. Thus the idea of love seems to suggest a trinal relationship in God, *Amans Amatus mutuus Amor*. See also Sartorius *von der heil Liebe*, 1.

one person. God is will, word, and work; the purpose, its plan, and its performance; thought in idea, thought in execution, and thought as it has passed out into action.* In man we can trace, they say, the same idea of the Trinity. He is pure will or spirit; the will gathers itself into thought and becomes a soul, that thought again embodies itself in an outward form. This trinity in unity, moreover, is as indivisible in man as in God. There can be no soulless spirit, no spiritless soul. As in theology, such as the Father is, such is the Son, so in psychology. The will is immanent in thought, and thought emanent from the will, as the Son dwells in the bosom of the Father. The two are necessary to each other, co-existent and co-equal. Again, when thought is mixed with will, it must result in action. So the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The body in man, according to this new theosophy, is not the partner of the soul, much less its prison; it is itself the soul, the soul in act, as the soul is the body in idea. As the universe in this pantheistic conception is not the work of God, but a necessary process of evolution, by the which God comes to full consciousness, so the body is the

* See Rudloff (Lehre vom Menschen, p. 102), whose otherwise useful book is weakened by this analogy, compares the spirit, soul, and Nephesh, or, as he calls it, nerve-spirit, to the blessed Trinity respectively. Delitzsch, who very properly rejects these analogies, has one of his own which, though unobjectionable, is somewhat mystical and cabbalistic. He compares spirit, soul, and body to God, Doxa, or His glory and the world. Milton's description of light,

"Bright effluence of bright essence uncreate,"

is intelligible in comparison to this personification of an abstract conception such as the glory of God.—*See Delitzsch Psychologie*, p. 225.

idea of a life which has taken form, and built to itself a house of flesh by a process of internal self-evolution.

We might carry these analogies much farther, and yet fall short of the lengths to which Hegel has carried this dressing up of psychology in the terms of theology. In the case of Hegel and his school, the thought that man is the image of God has been carried to such lengths that at last it breaks down under its own load of analogies. Pushed beyond the point of analogy, *i.e.*, resemblance of ratio under difference of form, it has reached the point of identity. Man is not the representative only of the divine idea; he is the idea itself, as it proceeds into fact, and attains self-consciousness. When Pantheistic spiritualism has reached this stage, there remains only one more bold assertion to make—which it does not scruple to do—which is, that man is not merely the image of God, but rather that God is the impersonal idea of which man is the idea in fact. As pantheistic materialism is quite as logical as pantheistic spiritualism, it is as easy to set out from universal matter as from universal spirit; and to assert that matter attaining to self-consciousness in man has become a God, as to say conversely that spirit has become conscious, and taken form in man. Schopenhauer's theories, which are avowedly Buddhist, are but a farther development of Hegel's method of revolving the mysteries of the Godhead out of the facts of consciousness. When logic run mad takes its own laws of thought for the laws of things, and presumes to say what things must be in

themselves from analysing its own notions about things: when it has thus lost the power of distinguishing object from subject, notion from reality, it will of course apply this method to theology, and, spinning out its own logical cobwebs, pretend to see in these the mystery of God and the universe.

Thus the modern pantheistic theories of the relation of man to God are only varieties of the dogma of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things. We are not to expect that Christian psychology, properly so called, can make use of analogies so presumptuous as these. As the New Testament rests on the Old, and stands or falls with it, so any deduction from the New Testament which is irreconcilable with the fundamental truths of the Old Testament cannot be a true one. If the relation of the human to the divine in man is not to be reconciled with the great contrast between the creature and the Creator, which is the very back-bone of the whole Old Testament, it is clearly wrong. Two truths never can contradict each other, and since the contrast between the Creator and the creature is the foundation on which all religion rests, we must harmonise these truths, or reject them altogether. The first view we have of man is as the *work* of God, his creature, as much as the sun and moon are, as plants and animals are—created, it is true, on the sixth day, and on the eve of God's Sabbath, when he rested from all his works which he had made; but still his creature, and as such dependent on him for life, and breath, and all things.

We may go on from this thought of man's creature relationship to God to dwell on his sonship. The same narrative which distinctly teaches the one, also implies the other. Let us make man in our likeness, after our image. Creationism and filiation are here both combined in one paragraph, as they are in the second narrative in Gen. ii. 7; for where creationism is implied in the first clause, "God took of the dust of the ground," filiation is implied in the second, "God breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives." Man becomes a living soul as the identity of the two opposites, matter and spirit—the one of which is created by God, the other proceeds from Him.

Thus the true account of the trichotomy of man at once disposes of those vain and visionary analogies between the relation of persons in the Godhead and of natures in man. There is in the first place this contrast between the two, that there are three persons in one substance in God; three consubstantial persons, co-eternal and co-equal, in the divine unity; while in man's trichotomy there are only three natures or kinds of being in one person. Thus the very ground for the analogy is cut away from us, unless we adopted the Sabellian hypothesis (as Rudloff has done), which is only a rationalizing mode of explaining the mystery of the Trinity. In God there are three persons in one substance; in man three substances are fused into one person. Thus, looked at in this light, the analogy between the Trinity and the trichotomy absolutely dis-

appears. It is an analogy worse than useless; it is positively misleading and mischievous.*

In the image of God made he man—not in the sense assuredly that the relation of Father, Son, and Spirit are to each other as Spirit, Soul, and Body, or even, to avoid the grossness of this conception, as will, word, and work. This is to explain *obscurum per obscurius*, to fall back upon a deeper mystery to resolve the mystery of our own consciousness. We therefore reject such analogies, and keep the subject of Christian psychology clear of confusion by not embarrassing it by comparison with other mysteries of the Christian faith. If we cannot discern the meaning of the words, "man is made in the image of God," except by falling back on the mystery of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, we shall only throw confusion on psychology, without throwing any light on theology, properly so called.

Man is made in the image of God, and after his likeness, not in the sense that the three parts of every man reflect and shadow forth the three persons of the one God, but in the sense that one part in man is the image of God, and that he can become after his like-

* The Fathers, in comparing the Trichotomy and the Trinity together, probably meant little more than a fanciful and external play on the number three. As there were four evangelists, for the reason that there were four cardinal points. Clement indeed mentions a tenfold division of man analogous to the decalogue (Hagenbach i. 153). Augustin, in the expression quoted above, homo est imago Sacrosanctæ Trinitatis, certainly meant nothing more than a play on the number three, as he elsewhere shows that it is in the soul, not in the body, that we are to trace the image of God; and as a dichotomist, he was not likely to go far in these mystical, if not mischievous comparisons, with the persons of the Blessed Trinity.

ness in every part. He is God-like in his spirit, and is become Godly in his spirit, soul, and body. Consubstantial with God as to his spirit (if such an expression may be used of the creature without offence) the end of his being is to reflect or set forth God in all parts of his nature; whether he eats or drinks, or whatever he does, he is to do all to the glory of God. One part of his nature, the spirit, proceeds from God, but the whole man is of God, and through Him and to Him.

The conception of the human triad, being the pattern of the Eternal Trinity, must lead to such a notion as that of Tertullian,* that the body of man is created after the image of God. That God has a bodily form is a thought which has only to be stated in terms to be rejected. Spiritualize it as we may, the thought that a form or outward manifestation of any kind is essential to God, is one of the most dangerous errors into which we can fall. It lies at the root of all idolatry: it is that which Moses is cautioned against more than once, "ye saw no similitude in the mount." Even light, that form of matter which is likest to spirit, must not be thought of as the form or body of God. "Thou *deckest* thyself with light as with a garment," clearly implies, not that light reveals, but rather conceals Him; it covers Him as our clothing covers our body, but that which is behind the garment is not the form of God, but the substance.

"Then what I am beheld again
What is, but no man understands,

* Tertullian de Carne Christi, c. 6; Adv. Marci., c. 8; Adv. Prax., c. 12.

And out of darkness came the hands
That reach through nature moulding men."

The light which surrounds God, the δοξα as it was called by some; is thus a φῶς ἀπροσιτον, a light unapproachable, which no man hath seen or can see. Mystics like Böhmen and Baader speak of nature as grounded on God, not in the sense that all would admit, but as if there were in the being of God a blind instinct or impulse which lay at the basis of all existence,* and which, when overcome and possessed by the ideal or free principle, as we see it is in the case of man, advances to a higher state of spiritual existence. God is thus the pattern of all things. Nature lies unconscious in God; creation is its evolution out of Him, and it attains to a sense of separate consciousness and distinct personality in man, the crowning work of creation and the image of God. Such are the steps by which Mysticism passes into Pantheism, and a Scriptural truth that man is made in the image of God is degraded into the dangerous notion that God is the image of man. This pantheistic unification of God and man does not stop here. It goes on to confound God and nature together. Nature, as well as man, is the image of the invisible God. The prototype of all things that we see, its idea in the Platonic sense, exists in God, so that creation is only evolution, the emanation of what existed already immanently in God.

There is no safeguard against errors like these but in returning to sound and Scriptural views of Creation-

* See a letter of Jos. Fr. Molitor on Böhmen's notion of Nature in God, quoted by Delitszch, p. 53. Psychologie, 2d Ed.

ism. As the tap root of Pantheism lies in the relation of man to God, we can only destroy Pantheism by clearly distinguishing the creationist from the emanation conception in Genesis ii. 7. Man as to body and soul is but a *work* of God: it is only the spirit, or conscience towards God, which is a breath of God, an emanation from Him. We do not care to say with the Alexandrian school that man's body and soul have been created after the image, not of God himself, but after the image of the Logos,* and that man is thus an image after an image. We lose the significance of the incarnation (ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν, Phil. ii. 8) if we think of any likeness or oneness of nature between us and Christ before He took our nature upon Him at His birth. It is sounder and safer to speak both of the animal and intellectual natures in man as created by the word of God. But with man's spirit the case is different. Here we rise above the ordinary conception of creation, and think of it as a procession from God. Not as the pattern of one Person in particular of the blessed Trinity, but as coming from the Father, by the Son, through the Holy Spirit.

The conclusion, then, we come to is, that the mystery of the Trinity stands by itself, and is not to be brought in to explain either how man consists of three natures in one, or of the relation of those natures to each other. Theosophy, or the attempt to define the inner nature of God, from conceptions taken from the nature of man, is not so innocent as it seems. Anthropomorphism is idolatry in its earliest stages,—

* *Vide* Hagenbach, History of Dogmas.

Theosophy is idolatry in its more cultured stage. But idolatry is equally hateful to God whenever or however indulged in. The Supreme Being is God and not man, and however He may be pleased in creation to impart some of His nature to man by breathing into his nostrils the quickening spirit, and however in grace to take our nature upon Him, and to partake of flesh and blood, this, so far from countenancing presumptuous analogies from the trichotomy to the Trinity, directly forbids it—as teaching us that any community of nature which we have with Him is all of His own good will—who formed us to be his creatures and spiritual offspring, and who has redeemed us, that we might not fail of this end of our being.

ON THE PNEUMA AS THE FACULTY WHICH DISTINGUISHES MAN FROM THE BRUTE.

THE old psychology was content to rest the difference between man and the lower animals on his possessing a soul or thinking principle. That distinction can be maintained no longer. We must take higher ground, and seek elsewhere than in the distinction between reason and instinct for the secret of man's superiority to the brute, or we shall have to give it up altogether, and submit to the teaching of those who hold the development theory, and that man is an improved ape.

The distinction between reason and instinct was the starting-point of the Cartesian philosophy. On the assumed validity of this distinction, modern psychology has built its house on what, we fear, must turn out to be a foundation of sand.

If, on closer inquiry, psychologists are now prepared to admit that many of those processes that we call reasonable in man are really instinctive, and that many of the so-called instinctive acts of the lower creation are based on processes undistinguishable from reason, we shall be forced to choose some other

ground on which to rest man's acknowledged supremacy.

Science is effacing some of the old landmarks between reason and instinct on which the Cartesian school relied, and the rest are held on very doubtful authority. Spiritual philosophy has hitherto thought herself safe behind the outwork of reason. She will have to retreat to her citadel if she would hold out against the assault of naturalism. It is here, therefore, that Christian spiritualism comes to reinforce psychology, by pointing out a difference, not of degree only, but of kind, between animal and human intelligences. The Pneuma, or conscience toward God, is the *differentia* of man, his title to immortality, his distinguishing mark from all the lower creation.

Not only are the anatomical differences between man and the ape disappearing under modern research, but even the differences between the volume and structure of the brain, on which Professor Owen took his stand a few years ago, are not substantiated by modern physiologists. It is only by difference in degree that Professor Owen is able to establish the existence of his sub-class of Archencephala, to which position he assigns man. It will be admitted that these differences in degree, when many and various, are tantamount to a difference in kind. But if the intellectual nature of man admits of almost infinite degrees, from the genius of Pascal and Newton to the mind of an idiot who suns himself under the wall of the asylum which shelters him, it is impossible to deny that some animals are intelligent agents, as much above

idiots and infants as they are below Newton and Pascal. Man both sinks and soars as the brute cannot, but his intelligence is only a power of generalising from particulars, in which he leaves the brute far behind; but if this were all, the Indian's hope of his faithful dog bearing him company to heaven, would not be so unfounded as we commonly take it to be.

Professor Agassiz, as quoted by Sir C. Lyell, confesses that he cannot say in what the mental faculties of a child differ from those of a young chimpanzee. "The range of the passions of animals is as extensive as that of the human mind, and I am at a loss to perceive a difference of kind between them, however much they may differ in degree and in the manner in which they are expressed. The gradations of the moral faculties among the higher animals and man are, moreover, so imperceptible, that to deny to the first a certain sense of responsibility and consciousness would certainly be an exaggeration of the difference between animals and man. There exists, besides, as much individuality within the respective capabilities among animals as among man, as every sportsman, or every keeper of menageries, or every farmer and shepherd can testify who has had a large experience with wild or tamed or domesticated animals. This argues strongly in favour of the existence in every animal of an immaterial principle similar to that which, by its excellence and superior endowments, places man so much above animals. Yet the principle exists unquestionably; and whether it be called soul, instinct, or reason, it presents, on the whole range of organised beings, a series

of phenomena closely linked together, and upon it are based not only the higher manifestations of the mind, but the very permanence of the specific differences which characterise every organ. Most of the arguments of philosophy in favour of the immortality of man apply equally to the permanency of this principle in other living beings."*

Again, M. Quatrefages, as quoted by Sir C. Lyell, observes, that the moral and religious are the only two attributes not common to man and brutes; and that it is on the possession of these that he would rest the distinction of man from the brutes.

As to his organization, he observes, we find in the mammalia nearly absolute identity of anatomical structure, bone for bone, muscle for muscle, nerve for nerve, similar organs performing like functions. It is not by a vertical position on his feet, or the *os sublime* of Ovid, which he shares with the penguin; nor by his mental faculties, which, though more developed, are fundamentally the same as those of animals; nor by his powers of perception, with memory and a certain amount of reason; nor by articulate speech, which he shares with birds and some mammalia, and by which they express ideas comprehended not only by individuals of their own species, but often by man; nor is it by the faculties of the heart, such as love and hatred, which are also shared by quadrupeds and birds; but it is by something completely foreign to the mere animal, and belonging exclusively to man, that we must

* *Vide* Lyell's "Antiquity of Man," p. 493.

establish a separate kingdom for him. These distinguishing characters, M. Quatrefages goes on to say, are the abstract notion of good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, or the moral faculty and a belief in a world beyond ours, and in certain mysterious beings or a Being of a higher nature than ours, whom we ought to fear or revere: in other words, the religious faculty.

The very term, "pure reason," which has come into use since the time of Kant, implies that psychology has had to give up the old ground on which it took its stand, and to fall back on a fresh distinction and a new refinement in order to maintain the superiority of man to the brute, without appealing to the Book which settles the question, by telling us that man was made after the image and likeness of God. There are so many operations of the higher mammalia which refuse to be classed under the name of instincts, that we are fain to speak of the "half-reasoning elephant," and to admit the faithful dog as fit company for man almost to the portal of the sky. Where are we to part company, where are we to draw the dividing line between man and brute? Nowhere that we can see short of the point where man is endowed with the high gift of knowing God, of feeling his accountability to Him, of enjoying communion with Him. Kant's psychology is grounded on the distinction between reason and understanding. The one, *vernunft* or reason, is proper and peculiar to man; the other, *verstand* or understanding, he has in common with the animals, though in a higher degree, and

capable of much more extended exercise. By the one, man reasons *a priori* by analogies of his own mental judgments; by the other *a posteriori* by observation and comparison of things outside him. Thus there are two classes of judgments, analytical and synthetical,* growing out of the reason and understanding severally; and the transcendental method which Kant and his followers attempted, with what success we do not here venture to say, is nothing else than the effort to raise the pure reason above all those disturbing data which are derived from the understanding, and to set it to work *in vacuo* in its own upper region of thought. No one will deny that there are wide fields of thought outside, or rather above all test of experience. Mathematical reasoning is nothing else than the deduction of the necessary laws of thought about number. The superior certainty in which mathematical excel moral and other sciences, arises from this, that the proofs are so many deductions from within. So long as we keep to our own laws of thought, which is the sphere of pure mathematics, so long our proofs will be as unerring as they are self-evident. It is only when we bring in some fact from experience that there is room for error. Hence, as soon as we apply mathematics to shipbuilding, to the science of projectiles, astronomy, and so forth, its character for superior certainty dis-

* We do not forget that according to Kant there are *a priori* judgments which are synthetical, and not analytical only or explicative. Mathematical judgments, he says, are synthetical, not, as commonly supposed to be, analytical. That $5 + 7 = 12$ is not we admit a mere analytical proposition, but a new judgment not contained in the simple idea of 5 and 7. Still, for practical purposes, it is correct enough to say that analytical and synthetical judgments belong to the reason and understanding respectively.

appears, and there are as keen disputes between rival shipbuilders, cannon founders, and astronomers, as between jurists, divines, and economists. That element of certainty which has given to mathematics the name of science *par excellence* is the pure reason which, we agree with Kant, is distinctive of man from the brute. But we think that Kant has greatly exaggerated the powers of pure reason, and extended their range. So far from accepting his phrase, a transcendental logic, we think his whole scheme of pure reason, with its transcendental dialectic, its antinomies, and so forth, to be so much piling up of clouds. It is mere posture making to draw out a succession of quiddities which we call ideas of pure thought, and to contrast, as Kant attempts to do, our ideas derived from within with conceptions from without. As we cannot make one hair white or black, so we are reasoning too fast if we affirm with Kant that $5 + 7 = 12$ is an *a priori* synthetical judgment, since the very data themselves on which we found our judgment arise from sense-perception. It is true that reason gives laws of thought to the understanding, but the understanding again supplies reason with its materials for thought, so that the benefits are reciprocal, and the mind is unable to say how much she owes to thought, and how much to things. "The *laws* of thought" is a much less objectionable expression than "the logic of pure reason." To the former, as traced out by Archbishop Thompson and others, we see no objection; on the contrary, it is important to take our stand against the school of sensation, on the ground that there are

certain truths *a priori* of all experience, forms into which we lay the knowledge we acquire through sense-perception, as bees first prepare the cells in which they lay their honey. But it is another thing to make out of these inert and abstract forms active principles. They are conditions of the thinkable rather than thoughts properly so called. The very antinomies of which Kant makes such account, are only intelligible when stated in terms derived from experience. Like the cells to which we have already compared them, they are shaped on one invariable pattern. The highest acts of pure reason, as well as those of blind instinct, have this mark of necessity in common. It is humiliating to our boasted ascendancy, that we can only take out of our thoughts what we have put in from without. The cells of the bee are always hexagons; in this respect there are no degrees of excellence where all are perfect. The quality of the honey depends upon the flowers which the bees have sipped. So of reason and understanding. Admitting the distinction as more than a verbal one, still the difference between man and the brute, and between one man and the other, is less in the reasoning process itself than in the vigour of mind and powers of concentration and abstraction which one man possesses over another.

To what, then, are we to look as distinguishing man from the brute, if not to the necessary laws of thought? Partly, as Archbishop Sumner pointed out, in his Records of Creation, to the power of progressive and improvable reason, but principally to the power of will. By will we understand not the mere

arbitrium, or power of selection only, which even Buridanus' ass, placed between two bundles of hay, must possess, but that of *selection with approval*, or conscience, that the thing selected is good or evil, true or false, right or wrong. Thus the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, beside which the two first human beings were placed, not to tempt but to test them for spiritual existence, is the real criterion between man and the brute. So far from that probation of Adam appearing a difficulty, as it is to those who ask the question why God exposed our first parents to a temptation which he knew they could not withstand, we rather regard it the other way. Without some such probation, it would be impossible for man at all to exercise the spiritual faculty of knowing and serving God. In this test of obedience lay the real superiority of Adam over every other living creature. Thus the contingency to evil could have been avoided only in one way, by denying to man the pneumatical faculty altogether; freedom to choose the good and to refuse the evil, is involved in the very definition of what a spirit is.

Man might have been innocent on lower terms, but it would have been the innocence of the idiot or the infant, who knows neither good nor evil. There is no scaling a height without passing along the brink of deep precipices; so it was that with a possibility of failure man was permitted to make the attempt to rise from the animal to the spiritual, and to become in effect, as he was in idea, the image of God upon earth. Under that attempt he failed; and where

Adam failed, all his posterity fail also. But though man has fallen, conscience nevertheless remains as the distinguishing faculty of man; the mark of his superiority lies in his sense of moral accountability to an unseen but righteous Judge. He is more excellent than the brute in other respects, but in one he stands out unique and peculiar. His thoughts "the meanwhile accuse and excuse one another." He has a conscience which tells him of God and a hereafter. This conscience fails, it is true, to answer its proper end. It does not raise him up to enjoy communion with God. It crouches in the lower region of fear, where superstitions batten on their prey, and false religions torment without appeasing the conscience. It cannot soar to the higher regions, where perfect love casteth out fear, where faith and hope exercise themselves in view of a glorious hereafter. But it is nevertheless a testimony to what God intended us to be.

We are thus brought to the point where we are able to decide what it is of the Pneuma, or God-consciousness, which remains in the psychical or fallen man in his unregenerate state. Conscience, and not pure reason, is the distinguishing mark between man and the brute.* Were man to lose this accusing and excusing faculty, he would soon lose self-consciousness as well, and sink quite to the level of the brute.

* It may seem fighting for a shadow when we distinguish between the practical reason or conscience of Kant and Coleridge, and the Pneuma properly so called. Kant, we allow, comes very near the mark in his distinction between the speculative and practical reason, the former of which is dialectical, the latter intuitive only. Still there is a distinction. Kant's practical reason or conscience is not a spiritual faculty, properly so called. Duty, not devotion, is its proper sphere—its range is ethical, not religious—its last word is the

"Mere fellowship of sluggish moods;
Or, in his coarsest satyr shape,
Had bruised the herb or crushed the grape,
Or basked and battened in the wood."

There is a point where it is conceivable that man could have sunk beyond the reach of the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. As the sin of the angels, being spiritual wickedness, a sin from within, excludes the thought of their recovery; so were man, in the other extreme, to lose the last spark of God-consciousness remaining in the witness of conscience, he would then be in the state of those whom St. Jude describes as "twice dead."

Thus it is important to see where to draw the line when we say that man is fallen, and that the spirit is dead in trespasses and sins. The spirit is dead as to all higher exercises of faith, hope, and charity; but not so dead as to have lost all fear of God, all sense of dependence on Him, or all sense that His law is the supreme standard of right. Were man to lose this remains of the spirit which we call conscience, then he would have no sin, farther than a dog can do evil by snatching a bone, regardless of the beating which it knows is in store for it. So our Lord says to the Pharisees, "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say we see, therefore your sin remaineth."

categorical imperative of the Stoic, not the cry of the Psalmist, "Oh God, thou art my God, early will I seek thee." This is why, while admitting Coleridge's favourite distinction between understanding and reason to be a valid one, we class both reason and understanding as sub-divisions of the same general faculty of the Psyche, while we reserve conscience, or the moral and spiritual element in man, as the distinct or third element in human nature, to which exclusively we give the name of Pneuma.

Thus we identify conscience with the remains of the Pneuma in fallen man. What confirms this view of the case is the remarkable fact that we nowhere in the gospels read of the conscience of the Lord Jesus Christ. We should be loath to say with Apollinaris that this arises from the Holy Spirit in his case being the substitute for the human Pneuma. Since Christ was perfect man, he took all three parts of our nature, spirit, soul, and body. But then He took them in all their perfection, and that without any spot of sin, original or actual. Hence the human Pneuma in Christ was a perfect Pneuma, not that feeble semi-animate conscience which stirs, and only stirs, in our present fallen nature. Christ appealed to the consciences of men; he convinced their consciences; and on one occasion, a whole assembly, condemned by their conscience, went out from his presence one by one.* But in the case of Him who always lived in unbroken communion with God, the expression conscience would be quite inadequate to express that full intercourse of his spirit with that of his Father in heaven. Such exercises of prayer as his, such nights of rapt enjoyment of God, and of ecstacy of spiritual worship are, in comparison with the stirrings of God-consciousnesss in us, what sunlight is to the smoking wick of an expiring candle. If conscience were an integral part of sinless human nature, we should read

* See Auberlen's very suggestive remarks on this apparent absence of conscience in Christ, in an article in Herzog's Cyclopädie.—sub. voce *Geist.* Vol. iv. p. 733. The connection between spirit and conscience Auberlen further traces out by comparing Rom. i. 9 with 2 Tim. i. 3. The whole of the article is worth perusing, and will repay careful study.

of it in Christ. But supposing it to be the remains of a nobler faculty, which has been injured past human recovery, then we can see why it is that while we read of the spirit of Christ, of his being troubled in spirit, and knowing in his spirit, we do not read of the conscience of Christ. Conscience and the law of God are correlative terms; and as the holy Christ lived above the law, so he lived above the level of conscience. The lower in his case was taken up into the higher. Instead of legal obedience, he delighted in the law of God; instead of obeying the voice of conscience, he was led up of the spirit. God's Spirit dwelled in his Spirit in a union as deep and mystical as that of the persons of the Blessed Trinity.

As conscience, then, or God-consciousness, is the *differentia* between man and brute, so, on the other hand, it is the germ of that glorious faculty which, when quickened by God the Holy Spirit, renews us in the image of God. Thus all men have a pneuma, but none are pneumatical save they who are led by the Spirit of God. And, again, when conscience is raised from a mere dormant capacity to become an active habit, it not only witnesses for God, but also delights in Him, serves Him, and longs to know Him more perfectly.

THE STATE OF THE PNEUMA IN MAN SINCE THE FALL.

We have seen that neither soul nor spirit are distinct monads, but that man himself in his totality of body, soul, and spirit, is the monad or centre of force. His nature or law of existence is to unite body, soul, and spirit in one complex whole, a Gordian knot which may be cut by sin and death, but which cannot be untied. Any theories of human nature which fail to realise this, either by confounding or dividing the tripartite nature of man, come short of the Christian doctrine on this subject. Man is incomplete unless sanctified wholly, spirit, soul, and body, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

* Dr Arnold has well expressed the nature of man as three *aspects* of the one individual man. The following extract from one of his sermons will illustrate this:—"Thus, then, when this threefold division of our nature is mentioned, the term body expresses those appetites which we have in common with the brutes; the term soul denotes our moral and intellectual faculties, directed only towards objects of the world, and not exalted by the hope of immortality; and the term spirit takes these same faculties when directed towards God and heavenly things, and from the purity, the greatness, and the perfect goodness of Him who is their object, transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

* * * * * *

"It may be observed further, although the term 'soul' includes both our moral and intellectual nature, so far as it regards this life only, yet it appears in a particular manner to express the latter. Indeed, if we set aside our relation to God as His creatures, if we dissolve the community or covenant subsisting between Him and ourselves, it seems as if the faculties of the

We have now to consider the historical relation of the three part of man's nature to each other, as we have before considered their ideal. To use a distinction of M. Cousin, that which is logically prior is chronologically posterior and *vice versa*. In the idea of man, spirit appears first, then soul, then body. But in man, as he is and was created from the beginning, we must follow the reverse order. The animal life is the first to manifest itself, then the rational, and last of all the spiritual or divine life in man. To use the words of the Apostle, "Howbeit that was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterwards that which was spiritual." *

The first pair were created, as we have reason to suppose, adults in stature and intellect, but infants in spiritual growth and experience. On the former

understanding rose at once in our estimation, and the intellect or mind assumed a place above the moral virtues. When God is regarded solely as the *Supreme Being*, His infinite wisdom may naturally appear to us His most peculiar attribute. And thus Aristotle urges this exercise of our contemplative understanding as the means by which we may most resemble God from intellect, or that which has most kindred with the divine nature. Whereas, St. John, accustomed to look upon God *as he is related to us*, considers his essential attribute to be love, and directs us therefore to seek to become one with God by cultivating our affections. In speaking of the soul, therefore, as distinguished from the spirit, although both terms include our moral and intellectual nature, yet in the first, intellect or reason is the predominant idea, while in the second, though knowledge is not excluded, the principal idea is of charity or love."—See Sermon XXVI. of Dr T. Arnold's Sermons, 3d edition, London, 1832.

* Coleridge has set out with the distinction of prudential, moral, and spiritual as the starting point of his inquiries in his Aids to Reflection. If we substitute instinctive for prudential, the division substantially agrees with ours. Prudential falls in more with the intellect or psychical man, and so is hardly distinguishable from the moral, whereas our instincts spring from the lower or sensitive life. Self-preservation is of the animal, but prudence or providence of the rational nature.

assertion we need not waste inquiry. The institution of marriage in Eden proves that man did not begin his days in immature childhood. Whether his intellectual powers were as developed as his animal, whether Aristotle was as inferior to Adam as the Academy was to Eden, is an inquiry which we may also pass by as more curious than profitable.* But on this we may rest with some degree of confidence, that the pneuma in Adam was given in its rudimentary or infant stage of growth, and that he was placed in Eden for that very purpose, that he should grow in grace and in the knowledge of God, as he had no need to grow in bodily stature, or possibly even in intellectual power.

Irenæus has noticed this distinction between the creation of man as physically and psychically an adult, but in spirit an infant. Man, he said, was created in an infantile state of mind, though in the image of God. He was like a child who is unable at first to eat strong meat, but must have his senses exercised by reason of use. Christ alone, he says, has led us up by the gift of the Holy Spirit to that higher state of being in which we can see God. The first life in man was *per afflatum*, not *per spiritum*, a distinction which he grounds on this, that the Lord breathed on his disciples after his resurrection, but when the Holy Ghost was not as yet

* See South's discourses on the image of God in man. "An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of paradise." South traces the image of God in three parts of man, but they are the understanding, the will, and the passions or affections. This corresponds to the Platonic trichotomy, but not to the Pauline, as we have already seen.

given. This *afflatus*, or breathing, on man at creation, was that partial gift of the Spirit which did not long remain with man: it is (πρόσκαιρος) for a season only, and does not enable us to see God; while the gift of the Holy Ghost is indwelling and ever dwelling (ἀέννaον). (See Irenæus, b. iv. 38, vi. 36, Ed. Stieren).*

Of the second righteous Adam, the Lord from heaven, we read that He increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favour with God and man. The intellectual and physical growth are referred to in the first clause, the spiritual or moral (for they are two sides of the same thing) is referred to in the second. Thus the trichotomy of man is here distinctly referred to, and in the case of the holy child Jesus, spirit, soul, and body, all harmoniously grow and unfold as bud, blossom, and fruit do in the living tree. We reject instinctively, in His case, the thought of anything prodigious or premature in the development of his faculties. We think of the Blessed Spirit indwelling in Him (given, it is true, without measure), but still proportionate to His capacities and powers. As the intellect and stature were that of a child, so the spiritual receptivity. The pneuma in Him was beyond that of other ordinary children, but not disproportionate with what would have been the case had Adam reached the standard he was intended to attain to, and as a spiritual nature, and now adopted Son of God, had

* On the Psychology of Irenæus, see an interesting article in the Studien und Kritiken for 1863.

begotten a son in that likeness, and after that image.* Christ, the second Adam, is rather thus the pattern of what Adam's children would have been, had he not sinned, than of what Adam was, when first made and put into paradise. The distinction is important, as it enables us to see what man has lost by the fall. He has lost the power of propagating a spiritual progeny *ex traduce*. That which is born of the flesh is flesh. Cain and Abel inherited the whole nature of their parents, the animal body, the intellectual soul, but not the Divine Pneuma. Whether that could ever have passed down *ex traduce* may seem an inquiry on which we are reasoning without data. But not altogether so. The capacity or receptivity of spiritual influences was created with the first Adam, and the bare capacity as an integral part of man's nature could not be destroyed by the fall. As a dead organ, a rudimentary organ, without corresponding functions (as physiologists speak of the mammæ in males, or the toes in a horse's hoof, or the teeth in a whale's jaws), so the spiritual capacity has passed down from Adam through all his posterity. But as they are

* The Appollinarian theory, that the indwelling Spirit in Christ was the substitute for the human pneuma, not only derogates from his perfect manhood, but also tends to throw confusion on the whole subject of the relation of the human spirit to the divine. Apollinaris' error was twofold—first, in adopting the Platonic trichotomy in which Λόγος or Νοῦς, the pure and impersonal Reason was the sovereign part—secondly, in substituting the third Person of the Blessed Trinity for the human Νοῦς in the man Christ Jesus. The Apollinarian error on this subject was, as we have seen, one of the reasons why the trichotomy was looked on with suspicion. It has been inconsiderately adopted by V. Rudloff as the right theory of the human nature of Christ. See his *Lehre vom Menschen*, p. 121, 2d ed.

born in sin and shaped in iniquity, the defect becomes apparent as soon as the intellectual nature begins to stir itself, and the motions of sin are felt in the animal nature. Then the want of the regulative or divine faculty in man is felt. Reason begins to put itself forth, and we watch the pretty blossoms of intellect, first in the retentive memory, and after awhile in the ripening of judgment. But where is the "residue of the Spirit?" Where is God's monitor and witness in man? God has not quite left Himself without witness, but it is generally an accusing, not a comforting, voice within. Conscientia, or the knowledge which we have of ourselves and our conduct, the eye of God in the soul, seldom sees much to approve, but much to disapprove of.* The passions begin to break out in our animal nature, and we give way to them. Reason, like Eli, shakes its head at these follies of our youth, but we pay reason no more respect than the wicked sons of Eli did to their father's remonstrance. Conscience, or the dormant pneuma, which still witnesses for God, mourns over these things in secret, but it cannot alter them. The government is not in

* Les moralistes ont beaucop parlé des joies d'une bonne conscience ils ont trop méconnu ses peines. Je dis les peines d'une conscience droite. Le devoir est un maitre exigeant. La conscience devient plus délicate a mesure qu'elle se purifie, ce que semblait licite, ne le parait plus: le scrupule est la bizarre aux yeux du monde angoissant pour celui qui la porte en son sein. On gravit peniblement la montagne, et a mesure qu'on avance le sommet semble reculer, et defier les atteintes du voyageur. Quelles sources de douleurs, doleurs saintes sans doute, mille fois preferable aux plaisirs la vie, mais douleurs enfin. Oh le douleur tout seul sans explication, sans experance, sans avenir. Le devoir est un noble maitre mais c'est un maitre dont le joug est dur, et le fardeau pésant.—Naville du Vie Eternelle, Disc. 1.

its hands. It is young and immature; it has the authority, but not the power to enforce its authority, and so the character is formed, and a *bias* to evil of some kind or other grows with our growth, which nothing will ever afterwards break down; till God's converting grace stirs our stagnant being to the depths, and beginning with awakening the pneuma, makes all things new.

This we take to be a fair account of man's condition since the fall. Thus the defect of good in every man, as naturally born into the world, turns the character to evil. Original or birth sin is thus not so much our fault, *crimen;* it is rather our misfortune, *culpa.* But whether our fault or only our misfortune, the consequences are equally the same. Man is born into the world incapable of attaining the true ideal of human nature, as in the case of the only one of woman born who was born without sin.

Thus Adam differs from his posterity in these two respects. He was born innocent, and also endowed with inherent capacities for becoming spiritual: we are neither innocent by birth nor capable of becoming spiritual by our innate powers. The first Adam was innocent; we are not. By innocent we mean that negative kind of goodness which is distinct from holiness, in that it lacks the sense of the presence of God. A lamb is innocent, for instance; it fulfils all the ends of its nature, and in the right order and way. It is not, like a venomous beast, the minister of evil to any It does not taste happiness at the expense of any other —it's gain is no other animal's loss. Now Adam might

have been formed for innocence of this kind, and with no higher end in view. His innocence would then have been the perfection of an animal and intellectual nature, body and psyche, well strung and attuned, capable of large generalisations and lofty ideals, making immense acquisitions of knowledge, beaming with benevolence, but with nothing entitling him to immortality. He might, in that case, have lived a Gœthe kind of existence, as an intellectualist and an art worshipper, and died with perhaps the same exclamation on his lips, "More light, more light." He would have answered the end of his existence, and reached his ideal, but that would have been not a little lower, or for a little time lower than the angels, but altogether, and for ever, lower than they.

This would have been the innocence of Adam had he been created psychical only, and with no pneumatical capacity. But we are not born innocent as he was. Our rational and animal natures do not work harmoniously, but in discord. Not only does the flesh lust against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, but also our understanding and our appetites draw in opposite directions, so that we cannot do the things that we would. A state of innocence in which the intellect has the mastery of the passions is more imaginary than real. It may be so with a few studious men, and a smaller list still of passionless poets like Wordsworth, of whom Hazlitt the critic, says, that he seemed to have lived in a world in which there was no marrying nor giving in marriage. We see an approach to this ideal state, though, as we cannot read

their inner lives, we cannot say how much of mannerism and the desire of applause was concealed behind so much simplicity. We can judge none but ourselves; but of this we may be sure, that as man is not reason and desire only, but conscience and will as well, he cannot satisfy his nature merely by restraining his passions and indulging his intellect. He has instincts after God which nothing but God can satisfy; and these cravings of conscience must either be fed with the clay of superstition or the true bread which cometh down from heaven.

This leads us to the second distinction between us and Adam. We are neither born innocent as he was, nor capable of becoming pneumatical through the native powers of the pneuma. This was Adam's glorious privilege, the excellence in which he came forth with his Maker's image stamped upon him. When God breathed into his nostrils the breath of lives, he was given that which we call the *pneuma*, or spirit, the *conscientia* or consciousness common between him and God. Bishop Sanderson's explanation of conscience, as that which is common to us and God, may seem fanciful; but we think it explains the use of the plural *lives*. The knowledge of good and evil is our life, and it is God's life. As rational beings, we know the relationship of things to each other; as moral beings, we know their relation to ourselves. Thus moral-consciousness is so much more divine than the critical faculty that it is God's life within us, as reason is not. Sceptics, like Hume, can with some good show of reason deny that we have any proper idea of causation,

and hence of a great first cause. But we fall back from our intellectual to our moral intuitions, and here, as Kant admits in his celebrated critique of Hume, the appeal is unanswerable. The moral-consciousness is the God-consciousness in man; and here, however he may hide himself in the trees of the garden, however he may sophisticate his mind with intellectual doubts, and say—

> "Drunk with the wine of life, and blind with leaves
> He stole in Eden to adorn his brow;
> I cannot see my God: the soul deceives."*

still the voice of the Lord God will penetrate into the conscience, and make itself heard, in the cool of the day. It is a strong confirmation of this that the age of the greatest intellectual scepticism was one of the deepest sense of a spiritual void, produced in and through an accusing conscience. In Tacitus' age, men believed nothing about the old gods of Rome; but they could not disbelieve in the furies which tormented a Nero. Men lose all other belief in God but as an avenging Deity; but when they part with this, then it is time to call in the sword of God, and save the world by destroying it.

But in Adam's case this conscience was not, as it is toned down by modern moralists, a bare knowledge of good and evil, and their consequences for good and evil on ourselves. It was the knowledge of good as godly, and of evil as ungodly. Hence the temptation

* Quoted from some remarkable sonnets by the late Dr. S. Browne of Edinburgh.

of Satan lay in this, that he urged Adam not only to know the distinction of good and evil; but to know it *as gods*, *i.e.*, in a god-like not in a creaturely way. This was to transcend the limits of the creature. To us, as to angels, God *creates* good and evil by the decision of his will, this way or that, as He divides the light from the darkness. We will have nothing to say to such logical quibbles as these, that a thing is commanded because right—not right because commanded. Distinctions between positive and moral precepts may have a certain relative use in the schools, but they are not as deep as they are subtle. They seem to overlook the gulf fixed between the finite and the infinite; and that "his thoughts are not as our thoughts, or his ways as our ways." Thus while with God a thing is right because he wills it, with all his creatures the converse is to be the rule, we are to will it because it is right. The rightness of a thing is not affirmed by our wills, as Jacobi, Fichte, and the egoist school wildly talk. In this pride of will there is something not only of the old stoic, but also of the old serpent. Men are to be as gods, by affirming that what they will is right, because they will it. *Quicquid vult valde vult.* This is a sign of a strong character, doubtless, but it may be strong for evil as well as for good. It is as true of Satan bound with chains of everlasting darkness, as of the Angel of the Presence, whose delight it is to do the will of God continually.

The discipline, then, man was put under in Eden was not merely to choose the good, and refuse the evil, to make reason the sovereign and appetite the

servant; it was also to *know* good and evil, to know that the essence of goodness consisted in obedience to God's rule as such; and that the root of sin is disobedience or self-will. Η αμαρτία εστιν ἡ ἀνομία. 1 John iii. 4, "Sin is the transgression of the law."

This was the root of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the reason why God planted it in paradise, and tried man by it, before he could have right to the tree of life. Moralists and divines have often mistaken the meaning of these two trees, and so mistaken the whole purpose of God in making man. Moralists have made the one tree a criterion of only the lesser and lower part of our duty, our duty to ourselves, and have overlooked its higher end as awakening the spirit in man with the sense of duty to God. What God has commanded is right, *because* commanded. The command not to eat is arbitrary—be it so—the command of a superior, who is the Father of spirits, must be arbitrary, or how else are we to learn that right and wrong turn in this very point of agreement to his will or not? But as moralists come short of explaining the purpose of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, so divines mislead us as to the meaning of the tree of life. Instead of seeing that the only approach to the one tree is by the other, *i.e.*, that through the disciplining of the spirit, and its becoming godlike and godly, we obtain right to the tree of life; they separate between the two trees, as the mystics on the other hand have confounded the two together. They place man's immortality in a metaphysical and ontological necessity, not in a moral and spiritual like-

ness to God. They read between the lines of the verse, "lest they should eat of it and live for ever," a thought written as if with invisible ink, that man was already immortal by nature, and now only lost an immortality of happiness. Man cannot, they say, eat of the tree of life and live for ever in paradise; but he has already a deathless principle in him by which he must live for ever in misery.

When we turn from systems of theology to the fountain head of Scripture, we collect that Adam was not created innocent and holy, but innocent and capable of becoming holy; not holy and immortal, but capable of becoming holy by not eating of the one tree in the garden, and so of attaining immortality by having right to eat of the other tree. He was innocent because he had a well-balanced nature, in which the passions had not got the mastery over reason, as they now have; but he was not created holy. We cannot indeed conceive of holiness as a thing created out of hand. "Perfect through suffering" seems to be the law of sonship. Angels have their trials, man his. The image of God, if it is to become an active habit, not a mere dormant capacity, must be put into the fire to be purified there seven times.* Inattention to this distinction between innocence and holiness, which is the same as the distinction between the psyche and the pneuma, has led to strange misrepresentations of the nature of Adam's probation, and the

* See a thoughtful treatise by Mr Birks on the Difficulties of Belief; a book which, if more widely known and read in certain religious circles, would help to cure us of our indolent acquiesence in stereotyped modes of thought.

effect of his fall on us. Adam, with perfect powers of self-command, innocent of concupiscence, or the motions of sin in his members, was in a condition to be led up of the spirit to be tempted of the devil. Unlike the second Adam, the nature of his temptation was much less sore, as his strength was less. Instead of a wilderness it was in a garden; instead of at the end of a forty days' fast, the tempter came to him when the calls of hunger could not have added a sting to the prompting of lust. Now, had Adam been holy, in the sense that his spirit was sanctified by the Spirit of God, he would have spurned this whisper of lust; the sophistry of Satan would not have deluded him as to his knowledge of good and evil as God; he would have said, like Joseph,—how can I do this great wickedness and sin against God? But not being holy, having only the germ of holiness, he was blinded by Satan. First the woman through lust, and then the man through pride, were in the transgression. Flattered and fooled by Satan, who was a liar from the beginning, they took of the tree and did eat. That instant the spark of the divine image in man was quenched. He had the knowledge now of good and evil, but it was not as God, but as without God. As he found his spirit empty of God, so he knew himself to be naked of his former innocence. The greater loss brought with it the less. Privation of holiness brought with it the loss of innocence. The spirit had lost its hold on God, and so the soul rebelled against the spirit, and the body against the soul.

Such was Adam's state from the time that he fell.

The spirit now, instead of going on to know God and so attain the proper end of man, viz., to enjoy God, and to be happy with Him for ever, fell back into a dead reception of divine impressions. The motions of the Spirit were no longer felt, or felt only as the voice of conscience reproving him for what he had left undone. Man tries to satisfy that conscience, and quiet the witness within, by external religious duties. The more sharply the stings of conscience are felt, the more he tries by superstitious services, fasts, penances, and such like austerities, to say peace, when there is no peace. He scourges his back for the sin of his soul; he makes long prayers; and the farther he strays from God, the more ascetic and severe his religion becomes. Superstition and spiritual-mindedness are contrary to each other, and the more man loses of the one, the more he vainly tries to make it up by the other. Thus to measure the depth of man's fall, we should pass the religions of human nature in review, from China to Mexico; from the first act of idolatry, on the plains of Babel, to the last decree of the Church of Rome—the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. In all this descent, we see no power of self-recovery; no sign of improvement with the advance of enlightenment. No one will deny that in all superstition there is ignorance; but we may dispel the ignorance and not cure the superstition. The truth is, that conscience or the half-deadened spirit will assert its claims to be heard. It will witness for God, and man fearing to come to God, uses religion as a contrivance for keeping on terms

with God, while we continue to live at a distance from Him.

Such are the effects of the fall on human nature. Body, soul and spirit are all affected by it, but in very different proportions. It has impaired our animal and intellectual powers—to what extent, it is impossible to say, as we have not the means of comparison—and the case of the Lord Jesus Christ, for obvious reasons, cannot be pressed too far into such an argument as this. But the ruin is complete in the crowning part of human nature—the spirit.* Hence it is that man cannot now develop himself as God intended he should; body, soul, and spirit, unfolding harmoniously together, and the lower being always subservient to the higher. For want of a spiritual mind, the intellect is proud, knowing nothing, but doting upon questions and strifes of words, and the animal part, over which reason, now itself a rebel, has lost its proper authority, breaks out into excesses, which bring with them their own punish-

* Dr Manning, in one of his Oxford Sermons, has very eloquently described this defect of the pneuma which marks the psychical man. "Great as the knowledge is that some men void of God's presence have attained in natural and human and even revealed truths, yet there is something perceptibly wanting in them. They maze us with the light of their speculations, and then astonish us with a pur-blind ignorance of some self-evident and vital axiom of truth. There is evidently some stupendious breach in their intellectual system; some want of continuity in its perceptions; or some faculty related to particular kinds of truth wholly wanting. And this is in fact the true solution." That faculty which Dr Manning truly says is wanting in fallen human nature is the pneuma; and thus it is that the psychical man understands not the things of the Spirit of God, because they are pneumatically discerned. The spiritual organ, in consequence of the fall, cannot discharge its function; hence a state of disease is set up in our inner constitution, which must affect every other organ of mind, as well as that where the seat of the disease lies.

ment. That this state of anarchy does not go the lengths which it did in the antediluvian world, is owing to other causes than those which are under the control of human nature. God's restraining grace has never been withdrawn; and he has never left himself without a witness within, as well as a protest without.

Under such conditions then as these, men are born, live, and die. As like produces like, we each come into the world possessed of exactly those qualities and capacities of mind, as well as of body, which our parents are able to transmit. It was always intended that the order of manifestation should be from the lower to the higher; hence there is no direct proof of the fall, in the fact that the animal nature is the first to appear, then the rational, and last of all the moral or spiritual. But the effect of the fall is seen in this, that at the time when we should expect to find the higher controlling the lower, we miss it. As the tares did not appear till the wheat had begun to grow, so man's unspirituality is not seen till the intellectual and animal powers have begun to put themselves forth. Then we see with surprise that the young nature, like a wild vine, instead of training upward, trails along the earth. We look for grapes, but behold wild grapes; for judgment, but behold oppression; for righteousness, but behold a cry. Now we discover what man ought to be, from seeing what he is not. We learn the nature of the spirit by its defect. This negative proof is perhaps the most convincing of any. While our survey of these texts, which point out the distinction between the psyche and pneuma, leads us some way

on our inquiry, and the well-known distinction between the intellectual and moral faculties, helps us still farther on the road, the decisive proof awaits us at this point. We have found that the pneuma is an essential ingredient in man, when we see that for want of it he fails of the proper end of his being.

This would itself be a sufficient testimony on which to rest our case; but we have a yet stronger one. Plutarch, in his treatise on false and true religion, balances the question between atheism and superstition, as to which is the greatest plague to man. It seems to him a choice of evils, and he is unable to decide which is the greatest. He wishes to recommend cheerful piety as the happy mean between these fatal extremes, but feels that this is not to be expected of human nature as he met with it. What is this but an unconscious testimony to the extent and nature of the fall? Cheerful piety would be the natural outcome of human nature if men increased in wisdom as in stature, in favour with God as with man. That there is no such golden mean is the proof we desire for the defect of the Pneuma which we call original sin.

Long and learned controversies have arisen on the nature of this defect in man. Pelagius and Augustine are at the head of two schools which, with all the intervening shades of semi-Pelagianism, divide the Christian Church to this day."* No fresh light can be thrown on this dispute from the ground of experience or Scripture. The passages that have a meaning either

* *Vid.* Mozley's Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination.

way have been sifted again and again. The appeal to experience about the innocence of childhood, and the assertion, men are naturally good till the effect of bad example has begun to tell, has been advanced and refuted over and over again. Experiments even have been tried whether, by removing the external excitements to evil, we could cause it to die a natural death. Dreamers, like Owen and St Simon, have tried to cure the world of sin, as high farming does the land of weeds. But the result is always the same. We find mankind making endless advances in knowledge, but brought to a stand-still in moral goodness and spiritual-mindedness. Mr Buckle makes a great parade of this fact, as if it told in favour of the Positive theory, the very contrary being the case. The inference we draw from this fact is indeed the opposite to his. So far from glorying in our shame and boasting of such advanced knowledge, while the nobler part of man is torpid or dead, we lament that it is so, while we thank God that we know the cause. The fall is the key to all man's after history. The sin of Adam, or what is called original sin, accounts for what would otherwise be inexplicable.

But if man were not created at first as body, soul, and spirit, original sin, which is the key to all the mysteries of his present existence, would be the hardest and most contradictory of all dogmas. Suppose man a bipartite nature only of body and soul, appetite and intellect, is it conceivable that the taint of Adam's transgression could pass down as a virus (for this is the way it is sometimes expressed)

through six or seven thousand years? To the third or fourth generations a physical taint or peculiarity will continue, and then it dies out. If original sin were something positive, and which passed down as unsound states of the body are transmitted until either the taint is worn out or it wears out the race that suffer from it, we do not see how we can avoid the conclusion that God, who is the author of nature, must be also the author of sin. Augustine's reply to this objection is verbal only. "Both," he says, "are propagated together, nature and the depravity of nature, one of which is good, and the other evil—the first is derived from the bounty of our Creator, the latter must be attributed to our original condemnation. The first has its source in the good pleasure of God, the latter in the perverse will of the first man. That exhibits God as the framer of his creatures, this as the punisher of disobedience. Finally, the same Christ, from the creation of our nature, is the Maker of man; but, for the healing of the disease of this nature, became man." The dogma that original sin was something positive, not privative only, was pushed to its extreme conclusions by Flaccius Illyricus—who held that it corrupted the nature of the soul. This was resisted by orthodox Lutheran divines as an error in the other extreme; but we do not see on what principle they can draw the line where they do, and speak of a birth-taint as affecting only the inner powers of the mind. If the whole nature is born with us at our birth, and education be only the unfolding of our innate powers, we do not see

how a taint *ex traduce* is to stop short at the rational powers and not to affect them. Probably those who opposed the Flaccians held the creationist theory of the soul, and so desired to remove the appearance of God in any way being the author of evil. But for our part, we cannot see any middle course between the private and positive theory of the transmission of evil. Original sin is, we admit, an ambiguous expression. What divines really mean to teach is, the origin of sin and the transmission of evil in man. What they wish to deny is, that each man is the origin of evil to himself, a position which ought to be as simple and self-evident as that man is not the author of his own being, or self-contained and independent, as the Stoicks boasted to be. It is a matter of fact that, as men come into the world by mediate descent from Adam, not by an immediate act of God's creative will, so they come into the world with infirmities and under disabilities, which, if it does not remove responsibility, restricts it. Of the evil that men do, and of which their conscience condemns them, all must acknowledge that part of it is our own fault, and part of it our misfortune. "I was born frail, I have become foul; I would not make the one my excuse for the other. For what is my fault, I deserve to suffer; but for what is my misfortune, I am distressed. O God, undertake for me." This is the voice of conscience when true to herself on the subject of this mystery; and if divines had kept to this, the doctrine of original sin would never have raised the strife which it has. But urged on by con-

troversy and the love of system, the fact of experience was turned into a dogma, and two new theories of evil were rolled into one, to give the dogma a more imposing and logical form. The one was the theory of concupiscence, that it has the nature of sin. Divines very properly shrunk from saying that it is quite the same as sin. Lust, when it is conceived, bringeth forth sin; but it is only when desire has been impregnated by the will, that sin, properly so called—sin, *i.e.* as the transgression of the law—is produced. Hence the Church of Rome, with its quantitative views of sin, says that of all sins original sin is the least. To express how light original sin is, as compared with actual, the *limbus infantum*, to which all unbaptised infants were supposed to go, seemed little more than an exclusion out of heaven, without any suffering or misery, like a state of sleep or inactivity. The other theory is that of imputed guilt. Either, it is said, we existed federally in our father Adam, and so his act became ours, or our wills were bound up in some mysterious way in his, so that his *guilt* could be justly transmitted to us as well as his nature. Of course, imputed righteousness and imputed guilt are correlative; they stand and fall together. The same controversy which suggested the one suggested the other also. Now as we do not see ground in the New Testament for the distinction between imputed and inherent righteousness, on which the Reformers laid such stress, so the distinction between original and actual guilt looks like a scholasticism. There is a deeper truth which embraces

both inherent and imputed righteousness, viz., that we are in our regenerate nature mystically one with the Lord—the seed of divine life in our spirits, which cannot sin, being taken from Christ, as Eve was taken from the side of Adam. Hobbes' theory of the Leviathan is an immoral exaggeration of a deep spiritual truth, viz., that humanity is a mighty unit; Adam and his posterity are one, as a river at its mouth is the same as at its source. If this be so, we see that original sin consists not of so many successive acts of birth sin, a supposition which Aquinas rightly rejected; nor is it again even a habit or taint, as he supposed, passing down, as concupiscence, from parent to child; much less is it the fictitious transfer of the guilt of Adam to his innocent and unborn posterity. "As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall no more use this proverb, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," should have put divines on their guard against this forensic theory, which is indeed most unforensic; for what court of law ever held a man accountable for other than his own acts?

We must clear away all these theological phrases to get at the Scriptural truth underneath. The definition in the Augustan Confession, which is clearer and shorter than our ninth article, shows how far we hold with it, and what we think to be an aftergrowth of theology. "*Peccatum originis habet privationem originalis justitiæ et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animæ, unde non est privatio, sed quidam habitus corruptus.*" Original sin consists in the want of original righteousness, and in an inordinate disposition

of the faculties of the soul, so that it is not merely a privation, but a certain corrupt habit. This definition has the great merit of being precise, and put in the fewest possible words. It defines original sin as a corrupt habit as well as a privation. We are far from denying the fact of a corrupt habit. Men are born with this *tendency* to evil. "As soon as they are born, they go astray and speak lies." But we do not think that Aquinas' distinction between habits is sound or satisfactory. Original sin is, he says, in one sense, a habit, in another not; just as we speak of health as a good habit of the body, and sickness as the contrary; to us it seems much simpler to explain the corrupt habit which no one denies, not as a distinct fact, but as to the effect of the privation of original righteousness. To our mind the negative or privative idea of birth-sin is quite sufficient to explain the facts of the case, and by the law of parsimony we should never import more into the cause than the effect requires. The babe is born very good, as we should not hesitate to say, both as to his animal and intellectual faculties, but with a fatal defect which mars all the rest. Just as if a ship were launched complete in every respect, but unprovided with a rudder. The defect would be fatal to her making a safe or successful voyage, but it would be strange, when she struck on the first rock that lay in her course, if fault were found with her timbers or iron work for not resisting the shock. The fault lies with the regulative faculty in man. One defect we know will mar the perfection of the whole in any nature whose perfection consists in the *constitution* of

parts. Bishop Butler, and also Chalmers, have very truly pointed out that this constitution of parts makes up a balance of forces in man's inner nature. If man, then, be a constitution of body, soul, and spirit, is it conceivable that the constitution can work when the sovereign power is dead or disabled? The loss of the one must lead to the destruction of all the rest. But this is only saying that birth-sin is privative, not positive. To test our view of the case we maintain that were the pneuma in any man quickened from the earliest dawn of infancy, were he effectually sanctified by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit from the first moment that appetite began to stir and intellect to dawn, it is not conceivable that such a man could sin; he would not even feel concupiscence in the sense that St James speaks of lust, for every act of appetite or intellect could be prevented as well as followed by a spiritual motion. He would live in the light of God's countenance, and sin would be as foreign to his nature as to that of the Holy Son of God Himself, when He took our nature of spirit, soul, and body upon Him.

Thus a sound system of psychology solves one of the most vexed questions in theology, on which divines have differed for fourteen centuries, and on which hardly two men hold quite the same shade of doctrine. God withdrew from Adam the presence of His Holy Spirit, and thus the pneuma fell back into a dim and depraved state of conscience toward God. We need not suppose more than this fatal defect allowed to continue, and Adam to propagate a race under the unspiritual condition into which he had fallen, and we

have enough to account for the condition of man as we see him to this day. Original sin is thus a privation, judicial we admit; but a privation only of original righteousness, or the image of God in every man. Given this one fact, that man was intended to become spiritual and has failed of this end, and all that divines call original sin is easily explicable. To conclude, we do not see any account of original sin, from a dichotomist point of view, which does not make more difficulties than it solves. The trichotomy of man, and the present defect of the governing part in man, is the true origin of evil. We dare not attempt a Theodicee of evil in general; but this we can say, that the privation of grace, which we call original sin, is consistent not only with the character of God, but also explains the defect of that special religious faculty in man, which is called the spirit, and which Scripture distinguishes from the soul. That man born into the world with a defective and dormant pneuma should not decline to evil would indeed suppose a continued miracle on God's part, in comparison with which the ordinary doctrines of grace are easy of belief. The theory we advocate meets the two tests of truth: it is simple, and it is self-consistent. No other theory accounts for the hereditary depravity of the human race so well as this; but from the defect of the regulative or sovereign pneuma, body and soul fall away into evil as soon as we begin to act and think.

THE QUESTION OF TRADUCIANISM AND CREATIONISM SOLVED BY THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOUL AND SPIRIT.

In discussing the subject of original sin, we purposely passed over the question of creationism and traducianism, which at once occurs as calling for some settlement when we consider the transmission of evil from Adam to his posterity. The derivation of sin with the race from a single pair, obviously suggests the question whether at every birth the entire nature of the child is transmitted from the parents (*ex traduce*, the phrase was first used by Tertullian), or whether the soul and its powers came from God by a special act of creation. Thus, as a corollary from the doctrine of original sin, the question of creationism and traducianism comes up for settlement. We shall endeavour to show that the distinction of psyche and pneuma, which is the key to the question of original or birth sin, also solves the creationist controversy, on which divines are still divided.

The history of the question is briefly as follows: In the east, Origen and his school seem to have held a theory of the pre-existence of souls, which is nothing else than the Platonic argument for knowledge,

founded on memory, as is seen in the Meno. According to Origen, God created spirits at first, one by one, and all perfect. Some of these kept their first estate; some fell and were degraded into the class of demons, and others, who had sinned less, into the condition of men. This extreme theory of creationism was condemned at the council of Constantinople. The orthodox theory was then declared to be that of partial creationism; that the body and psyche came from the parents, but the spirit by a special creation from God. If the trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body had been upheld by the Church, this division would have satisfied every candid mind, and the question would probably have been forgotten long ago.

Unfortunately for the cause of truth and peace, the Latin Church, partly from the poverty of the language, partly from want of ability to deal with points of divinity which were speculative rather than practical, rejected the distinction of psyche and pneuma, and the result was soon seen in Tertullian, the first Latin writer who approached the question of the transmission of evil. In his treatise, De Anima, Tertullian decided that body and soul came *ex traduce*—God deputing to the parents a kind of quasi-creative power of the soul. This, like Descartes' theory of occasionalism, to account for the action of the mind on the body, only made the difficulty greater than it found it. If the parent creates the soul by a kind of deputed power, the soul clearly comes, like the body, *ex traduce*, and that this was Tertullian's real opinion there can be no reasonable doubt. Duas species confitemur

seminis corporalem et animalem indiscretas tamen vindicamus et hoc modo contemporales ejusdemque momenti.* According to Jerome, who was a creationist, the Western Church, for the first four centuries, generally adopted Tertullian's view of traducianism. Augustine, however, took the side of creationism. The other theory offered such an obvious account of the transmission of original sin that it is no small mark of Augustine's candour that he declined to take advantage of it, even though Pelagius was a creationist. Augustine's decision in favour of creationism set the question at rest for centuries. The traducianist theory fell in consequence under a cloud, and was almost reputed a heresy in the middle ages. Peter Lombard's distinction is only verbal: "Creando infundit infundendo creat." The creation of the soul by infusion is still creation; and this account of the question the Roman Catholic Church has pronounced to be the orthodox one. In the Lutheran Church, on the other hand, traducianism was adopted as the only account of the transmission of evil, and as Delitzsch observes, in the seventeenth century, there was scarcely a Lutheran divine who did not oppose creationism as either semi-Pelagian, or as a Romish error.

Of modern psychologists, Delitzsch is a Traducianist, while J. H. Fichte takes the other side, though with a theory of the pre-existence of souls, which is Platonic, but not Christian. Frohshammer (Ueber den Ursprung der menschlichen Seele) takes the side of Traducianism, which he calls Generationismus. Lange,

* Tertullian, De Anima, chap. xix.

on the other hand, objects that pure Traducianism would reduce man to the condition of a brute. The true 'Tradux' of the human race is, he says, the word "Let us make man," not "let the earth bring forth." Martensen, in his Dogmatik, sets out with the premiss that human beings without any varied and inner individuality would only be a mere repetition of the race, and he comes to the conclusion that men are both *born and created.* There is, he says, a truth of Traducianism that men are not mere units, but links in a living chain. The truth, on the other hand, of creationism is this, that the general productivity "of nature, through which the human race propagates itself, is the organ and occasion of an individualising work of creative activity, so that in the existence of every man there is a new revelation of the will of God which has made man in his image. Every man, he says, is born, and so comes under the law of Traducianism, Ps. 51. Every man is created, and so comes under the law of Creationism. Ps. 139."*

Schubert, on the other hand, sets out with the incautious assertion that a being who is to have an existence for eternity cannot have had a beginning in time. The spirit, therefore, is pre-existent in a certain sense: as the air exists before the lungs which inhale it, so the spirit exists before the soul which it vitalises and gives personality to. The spirit enters the soul, and wraps it more closely round within than the body does without. The spirit has an eternal origin; it has existed *a parte ante* in God, and shall exist for eternity

* See Martensen's Dogmatik.

a parte poste before Him. The soul which man has in common with the brute would perish with the body, but for the spirit. It is the spirit which sustains the soul's consciousness after death, and supported by it, it arrests that dissolution to which it would otherwise tend.*

Such is a brief account of the leading theories on the subject. It is clear that divines are as far off agreement as ever, and that some of the later theories of pre-existence are as strange and mystical as those of Origen and Plato. May not the relation of psyche and pneuma help to throw light on this, as on the previous question of original sin? The view we have taken above is, that Adam was created with a "living soul," and with a capacity of becoming a quickened spirit. But when Adam fell, he not only lost the pneumatical faculty for himself, but also the power of transmitting it to his posterity. He had become carnal-minded, and alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance which was in him. The soul, now enslaved in sin, could only "gender to bondage." That which was born of the flesh is flesh. We are thus on the side of Traducianism, so far as to hold that body and psyche, or the sum total of the powers of the natural man, are transmitted by generation. As to the *pneuma*, or divine image in man, that we consider to be dormant since the fall. The *capacity* is, we admit, transmitted, but it is a dead capacity—it is an organ which never attains to its proper function in the unregenerate, and though, as conscience, it witnesses for

* See Schubert's "Lehrbuch der Menschen and Seelenkunde."

God, accuses or else excuses, still it never leads us to any spiritual exercise, properly so called. The race of Adam transmit the pneumatical nature from one to the other, as the exiled race of Stuarts handed down, for three generations, their pretensions to the crown of England.

For our part we see no need of the creationist hypothesis on account of the supposed dignity and immateriality of the soul. That the thinking principle is immaterial is rather a self-evident truth than an important principle charged with the consequences which Descartes and his school attached to it. Granting that man is material as to his body, and non-material as to the soul or reason, it is as difficult to understand the transmission through generation of physical as it is of mental or moral qualities. To suppose that the body comes *ex traduce*, but the soul by a fresh creation of God (for this is all that Creationists ask for, they do not object to the animal part of man descending by propagation) is to distinguish, where Scripture does not, between matter and spirit or reason on the half-heathen theory—

"Nec deus intersit *nisi dignus vindice nodus.*"

The birth of a soul, these Cartesianists would say, is worthy to call out God into a fresh act of creation, which the birth of a mere animal frame is not. But such conceptions of God's interference with the ordinary course of affairs on great occasions, but not on little, carry their own refutation with them. They rest on a fundamental mistake as to the present nature

of man. God has been pleased to make man for a little while, and in a little degree (both senses are here applicable), *lower* than the angels. The birth of an angel is, we admit, an original act of creation, the same as when God said, Let light be, and light was. The angelic nature is not successive as one of a race, but single. Men, on the other hand, are first separated from their mother's womb, and then called by God's grace. First the animal, then the intellectual individuality, and, last of all, if at all, the spiritual. The truth is, that we learn our intellectual individuality through our animal. We grow into our sense of personality by the aid of the body, and by those acts of sensation and perception which are preconscious. The baby, as experiment has proved, cannot for a while localize its sensations; it *learns* to transform its sensations, which are passive, into perceptions, which are active, and so memory and judgment (psychical faculties, as all would allow), grow out of and wait upon the exercise of the animal. The use of the body to teach the mind the sense of personality is nowhere better described than in Tennyson's lines,—

"The baby, new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is pressed
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never said that this is I,
But as it grows it gathers much,
And learns the use of 'I' and 'me,'
And finds I am not what I see,
And other than the things I touch;

> So rounds he to a separate mind,
> From whence clear memory may begin,
> As thro' the frame that binds him in,
> His isolation grows defined."

This, then, being the case, we do not see why either reason or religion requires us to sever, as the Creationists do, between body and soul, as if the dignity of the soul required some special act of interposition on God's part. Two errors seem to lurk in such a supposition as this—one is, that all lower lives are left to the operation of what are called natural and necessary laws; the other is, that God, at the creation of each fresh soul, breaks in on that Sabbath which He has entered into at the close of His six days' work. Our Lord tells us that God's Sabbath is not one of inactivity (John v. 17). God works hitherto or up to the present day. This He does by upholding all things by the word of His power, by giving to all life and breath, and all things. But this *creatio continua* is very different from the distinct art of creating an individual soul, which is the creationist hypothesis. So difficult, indeed, is this hypothesis, that those who espouse it, as J. E. Fichte and Schubert, fall back on a theory of the pre-existence of souls *in* God, which is not only mystical, but self-contradictory. For, if they exist in God, they are not created, but *proceed* from Him. We do not object to the distinction of Irenæus between the *afflatus* of Christ and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The soul or rational part *may* be given at birth *per afflatum*, and the pneumatical part

be quickened at regeneration *per spiritum.* This *may* be so. If any, as Fichte, object to the higher powers, as of the pure reason, descending by generation from father to son, we shall not seriously differ with them. Embryology, even in the lower forms of life, is beset with mysteries, but when we rise to man it is better to be silent on the question, whether the genius of a Newton or a Pascal comes by descent from their parents, or was a new and original gift imparted to them by God. It is a question on which thoughtful minds have been long divided, one on which neither psychology nor physiology throws the least light at present. From a large induction of instances, it certainly seems as if the mothers of great men have generally been women of character, if not of rare and original genius. Whether the explanation of this fact be some physiological law which embryology, a science still in its infancy, has not been able to detect, we cannot say. We only notice the fact, without attempting to found any inference on it. So far at least as we can see at present, there are examples either of hereditary genius, as in the Sheridan family, the Coleridge, the Herschells; or conversely, of hereditary dullness in some of our old families, where "the tenth transmitter of a foolish race" has passed into a proverb. These examples go to confirm the Traducian hypothesis. We do not know *why* the mothers of great men generally belie Pope's account that "most women have no character at all." But the fact is so, and cannot be overlooked in an inquiry like the present. Martensen is doubtless right in saying there is a truth in Tra-

ducianism, and also a truth in Creationism. The truth of the former is, that men are not units, but part of a race. Humanity is a great tree, of which each generation is a foliage, each individual a single leaf. The illustration is as old as Homer, and a great deal more graceful than Hobbes' monster man, the Leviathan. On the other hand, Creationism represents a truth, that each man is an *ens individuum* with a sense of personality and responsibility which we carry with us into the future world.

> "This use may be in blood and breath,
> Which else were fruitless of their due,—
> Had man to learn himself anew,
> Beyond the second birth of death."

The distinction between psyche and pneuma seems to reconcile these two aspects of truth, and to solve the question between Creationism and Traducianism. So far as the animal and intellectual nature of man is concerned, we are quite on the side of Traducianism. But there is another part in man's nature in which personality resides. Our knowledge may belong to us like our rank, riches, and other things, which are outside the kernel and centre of our being. But the conscience, the hidden man of the heart, this is the true centre of man's being, and this organ or faculty is that which Scripture distinguishes from the nephesh or psyche. The ruach, or the pneuma, is that which comes from God, and is of God. Its etymology implies an inspiration or afflatus; it is "the candle of the Lord," in the spirit of man. And we admit that the

Traducian hypothesis does not account for the transmission of this pneuma from father to son. For the pneumatical part of the tripartite nature of man, we revert to the Creationist theory.

But do we then hold, as Barclay and Fox, as well as the Cambridge school of Platonists, that this pneumatical faculty is born with every man naturally born of Adam? We have already disclaimed agreement with the school of the Neo-Platonists. We do not understand their favourite text, "That is the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," to apply at all to the doctrine in question. Their theory of the inner light is mystical, and not borne out by missionary experience. But like all theories, it rests on a truth which its opponents would do well to admit, if they would hold their own against the new school of Origenists. To explain the truth, of which the "inner light" theory is an exaggeration, we fall back upon Irenæus' distinction between *per afflatum* and *per spiritum.* The *pneuma* of all men comes from God at birth, by a general Creationist power, such as that which the risen Saviour breathed on his disciples. But the pneuma is quickened in the regenerate to a higher and divine life, by a special Creationist power, such as the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, when *it sat upon each of them.* The first birth of the pneuma is general; the second, or new birth, is particular. The one is in all men, yea, in the very reprobate; for if they had no inner light, they would have no sin. Sin and light; law and transgression, being always reciprocal ideas. The other is that

inner light of a man who doeth truth and cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest that they are wrought in God. The spirit, *per afflatum*, goes no farther than conscience, which the Apostle (Rom. ii.) describes as doing for the Gentile what the written law did for the Jew. The abuse of the written and unwritten law are the same in both cases. Jew and Gentile alike took the law, whether written within or without, as a means of justification, and flattered themselves that they kept the law, when they kept only certain traditions and customs, to which they had lowered the standard of the law's demands. The inner light, then, or the light of conscience, never leads men to Christ; not through defect of the light, but because it is not fairly used. Where it is fairly used, when men, casting aside Pharisaism and formalism of all kinds, become conscientious and scrupulous in the deep sense of the word, then they are already beginning to be led of the Spirit of God. They may not know it; like unconverted Saul, they may little suspect what they are being led on to. The violent prejudice, for instance, of certain conscientious formalists, against what they call evangelicalism, is a case like that of Saul. Their conscience is pricked —the law is doing its work, convincing them of sin; and though they are far from knowing the joy and peace in believing which they may afterwards attain to, they are, nevertheless, not far from the kingdom of heaven. That no flesh should glory in His presence, Zacchæus the publican, and Paul the Pharisee, are both called, one in one way, and the other in another. But in

both cases alike, the spirit or conscience was stirred up to higher conscientiousness; and out of this deeper sense of right and wrong, with a corresponding sense of defect, there grew the convictions of sin, righteousness, and judgment, which are the unerring marks of a man being regenerate and born anew of the Spirit.

To trace the connection between the pneuma, *per afflatum*, in the unregenerate, and that, *per spiritum*, in the regenerate, is a subject worthy of a separate treatise. We only here give an outline of the chief points of correspondence. When we speak of the new birth, we do not mean that the human pneuma begins to exist then for the first time, for that would amount to a dichotomist view of fallen human nature, which we are far from agreeing with. But we mean that the pneuma in man is now quickened and acted upon by the divine pneuma—the third person of the Blessed Trinity. The pneuma, or conscience, works in the man who is not yet regenerate. His state before conversion, and when pricked by God's law, is as when an ox is pricked by a goad. It struggles for a time against these convictions of sin, and learns to its sorrow that it is hard to kick against these pricks. It knows the law of God and fears its threatenings; but it does not delight in God, or love Him, or hold fellowship with Him, or tell Him all its wants, sins, and sorrows; in fine, it does not demean itself as a reconciled child with a father, who loves us too dearly to be indulgent —who is too true not to chide us when we forget Him.

Thus as the Traducianist hypothesis is the only one

which accounts for the facts of body and soul, so the Creationist explains the spirit's existence either as the unenlightened natural conscience, or as the awakened and converted pneuma. If the pneuma were not an integral and original part of man's nature, the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost would be utterly unmeaning. They are consistent who to deny the one, deny the other as well.

But to believe in the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the hearts of the regenerate people of God, and not to see that such a doctrine of theology requires a special doctrine of psychology, on which to rest its credibility, would argue very little discernment in those who professed it. The spirit in man presupposes that there is a spirit in God, or else how could the heathen ever say,—"for we are also His offspring?" On the other hand, the truth that the Spirit is shed abroad among men would be unaccountable, except in the lower sense of his dwelling corporately through the Church, and in her sacraments, unless we saw that this special function presupposes a special organ in man. The adaptation of means to ends, and of parts to each other, is always seen in whatever comes from God. Hence a spiritual theology must require a spiritual psychology, as certainly as the eye is adapted to light, or the lungs to inhale air.

CONVERSION TO GOD EXPLAINED AS THE QUICKENING OF THE PNEUMA.

THE mystery of human nature seems to lie in this, that men are born into the world with a living body and soul, but with a dead or dormant spirit. How else are we to reconcile the Scripture statement, that men are by nature dead in trespasses and sins, with the fact that the intellectual and sensitive powers, though impaired, are not destroyed by the fall? But for the distinction between psyche and pneuma, we should either have to understand the expression, "dead in trespasses and sins," as merely figurative, or else we must contradict the facts of experience, and speak of the psyche as born naturally dead as well as the spirit. According to the popular account of the matter, the unregenerate man is said to be made up of two parts, a living body and a dead soul. To quote from an able address by the late Sir James Simpson of Edinburgh, entitled, "Dead in Trespasses and Sins:"—"While unbelievers in Christ, people are not what they seem to be. They are indeed hideous and loathsome in the eye of God; for with all their efforts to hide it from themselves and others, they are

carrying about in connection with their living bodies, dead souls. They remind us of the fearful punishment described by Virgil as inflicted by the mythical Mezentius, king of the Tyrrhenians, when he bound dead corpses to living men, and the living moved about with the dead, decomposing bodies tied to them, face to face, and hands to hands. In God's holy sight, the soul of every unbelieving man, however moral, and good, and virtuous, and excellent, and exemplary in the estimation of the world that man may be, is *dead,* dead in trespasses and sins."

Now, if for soul, in the above passage, we read spirit, the language is both true to Scripture and consistent with the facts of the case. It is hardly correct to say that the psyche of an Aristotle or a Laplace was dead: their intellect was as serene, their moral nature as sweet and amiable, as that of many whose spirits are quickened by the divine spirit. We do not, of course, imply that sin has worked *no* damage on the pure reason, or that the standard of moral good and evil has not been grievously lowered by the fall. But these are the indirect and secondary results of the fall—they do not touch the root of the evil, or explain what the loss is by itself. The loss lies in this, that man, with all his natural powers, cannot find out God, and, what is stranger still, does not even desire to do so. His nature is "psychical, having not the Spirit." He is "dead in trespasses and sins," in the sense that while his interest is keen and his ability great towards the things of time and sense, he is apathetic to the

things which are unseen and eternal. The state of spiritual death is the more awful because it is conjoined with moral and intellectual life. Were the soul dead as well as the spirit, then there would be nothing surprising that there should be no life to God within. But that man should be alive to anything else, and dead only to God and the things of God—this is indeed that living death, that Mezentian union which Sir James Simpson describes with practical truth, though not with psychological accuracy.*

The pneuma in the unregenerate man is, as we have seen before, a dead or dormant capacity. We leave it open to question whether it is more correct to describe it as dead or dormant. If dormant only, it is dormant in the sense that it will never awake of itself till Christ awaken it; if dead, it is dead in the sense that Lazarus was when Christ said, "Our brother Lazarus sleepeth, but I go to awake him out of sleep." If there is any life at all in the unregenerate pneuma, it is the life of the embryo, which

* No one has better argued for the depravity of man from his general goodness than Dr Chalmers. The argument is a great advance on the illustrations of the corruption of nature adduced by the old school of divines. Nothing could be weaker than some of these—thus the crying of an infant in pain; the passion of a young child, which is a compound of weakness, ignorance, and fear, and quite as instinctive as its loud cries of joy; the brutality of savages, who are only full grown children: these were the proofs of original sin to which divines appealed. The argument was as inconclusive as King James' attempt to discover whether Hebrew was the primeval tongue, by exposing two infants on an island—an experiment, by the way, as old as Herodotus; or again, in the case of the wild boy Peter of the woods, who was intrusted by Queen Caroline to Dr Arbuthnot, "for the purpose of investigating his theory of innate ideas." When great truths are propped up by irrelevant or insufficient arguments, we cannot complain if the cause suffers with its advocates. No chain is stronger than its *weakest* point.

stirs, but cannot act or think for itself. There are the motions of conscience, feeble, few, and inconstant—the witness for God, which excuses and accuses, but which never discharges its right functions as it was intended to do, viz., of bringing us into communion with God, and judging all our conduct in the light of his countenance. So fallen is man, that instead of the Spirit witnessing with our spirit that we are the sons of God, all that remains to us is a feeble and accusing witness of the law of God. Conscience does not testify of the person of God, but only of his law. As in a dream, confused recollections start up of scenes and persons which we once knew, but all so broken and disturbed, that we cannot say what it is that is recalled to us: so of the stirrings of the pneuma in the unregenerate man. At times something flits before him to make him feel that he is not what he ought to be. A word from the pulpit, a death-bed warning, the example of one who has passed through the great change, and to whom old things are passed away, all things are become new—when these things rise before the unregenerate mind, there is a stirring of conscience to which, better than anything else, may be applied the words of the poet:—

> "Blank misgivings of a creature,
> Moving about in worlds not realized,
> High instincts before which our mortal nature
> Did tremble, like a guilty thing surprised."

That conscience is the fallen Pneuma, "trembling

like a guilty thing surprised," has been understood by our poets better than our philosophers. "That conscience doth make *cowards* of us all," is that profound view of the fall, and the witness within to it, which makes the psychology of Shakespeare as true to life as that of the schools is false. There are several passages in which conscience is described as a troublesome witness for God's law. So *Gobbo*, in the "Merchant of Venice," supposes a dialogue between conscience and the fiend, which is as true as it is humorous. So the *Murderer*, in "Richard III.," speaks of conscience as a dangerous thing:— "I'll not meddle with it; it makes a man a coward: 'tis a blushing, shameful spirit, that mutinies in a man's bosom."

But this witness of conscience is not real spiritual life, though it wears the appearance of it, and sometimes deceives the inexperienced. As the babe leaped in the womb as soon as the sound of the salutation of the mother of the Lord reached the ears of Elizabeth, so there may be stirrings of conscience, strivings of the Spirit with our spirit, which may or may not afterwards come to the birth, and result in spiritual life. Sensibility is not spiritual-mindedness; it may be its precursor, one of those marks of a gracious Spirit which we are not to slight. But the real birth of the spirit is determined by other and more unmistakable signs. Both in Herod and Felix there was much religious sensibility. The readiness of Saul to fall in with religious emotions, when prevalent, gave rise to the proverb in Israel,

"Is Saul also among the prophets?" Yet none of these men ever felt the great change, or were awakened in any saving sense. The Word of God, which is quick and powerful, is said to pierce to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit. As we have explained this above, it pierces not only into the soul, the seat of the emotions and mere intellectual notions, but also down into the spirit, where the conscience lies sleeping and unalarmed, and where the will, the master principle of all, is at present at enmity with God, though we know it not. When a man's spirit is acted upon by the quickening Spirit, and is really regenerated of the Holy Ghost, the sure and certain mark that a work of grace is begun is a certain sensitiveness to sin and a certain fear of offending God, arising not so much from fear of the consequences as because we hate sin even as God hates it. "Oh ye that love the Lord, see that ye hate the thing which is evil." In this one clause, the two tendencies which mark the regenerate mind are linked together, as they are in experience. The love of God and hatred of sin are inseparable, and when they are found together, as they invariably are in the case of the really awakened, there we may pronounce with the greatest confidence that a work of grace has begun. There may be much or little intellectual insight into the plan of salvation as such; there may be more or less of assurance, as there is much or little of a present personal sense of acceptance. These will differ with the nature of the teaching which we receive, with our constitution of mind and previous habits. In the case of those who enjoy a

free and full gospel preached, there will not be much "tarrying at the place of the breaking forth of the womb." As the terms of salvation are stated to be, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved," so their acceptance of these terms will be prompt and joyful. They will not pass, like Wesley and Whitfield at Oxford, through a long and dreary time of probation, proving themselves with the law as to whether they are worthy to accept the gospel. It is our happy privilege to live in an age of religious light, when such experiences as those of the early Methodists ought to be exceedingly rare. But with all this difference in our favour, the new birth is the same mighty and marked change as it ever was. It is the awakening of the pneuma to conscious life and activity, the conscience turning to God, instead of away from Him.

This is at first a painful process. Spiritual, like natural birth, is not passed through without throes and birth pangs; indeed, it is the symptom in both cases of a healthy birth, that it shall be a painful one. Conscience has hitherto turned us away from God instead of to God: is it likely that it can be given a change of direction without a wrench of our previous habits, the pang of separation from old associations and old habits of thought? Hence it is that the later in life the new birth occurs, and the more confirmed in worldliness the character has become, the more painful is the change. It is as if in the case of the new birth those sorrows are multiplied which were the curse upon woman in consequence of her fall. Conscience

in the unawakened man keeps him as far as it can at a distance from God. It witnesses to the holiness of God and approves His law as holy, and just, and good. But conscience, until convinced of sin, does not use the law lawfully. It lowers the standard of God's requirements, and accepts partial as a composition for entire obedience, for which there is no warrant in the Word of God, but quite the contrary. Thus it is by playing us false, and saying peace, peace, when there is no peace, that our conscience keeps us at a distance from God, and God at a distance from us. But when the time of spiritual awakening comes, conscience cannot play off these little deceptions on us any longer; it would act like the unjust steward if it could: it would keep up the deception: to the demands of the law on its debtors it would say, "take up thy bill and write fifty" or "write fourscore." This is how the unawakened conscience would act. But the awakened conscience, the spirit or pneuma as we must now call it, so soon as it is quickened by the Holy Ghost, will not palter with itself any longer. God requires of us an hundred measures of wheat, an hundred measures of oil, and now He shall have full measure and full weight if we break for it or have to go to prison. Instead of the pitiful evasions and compromises with which a deceiving heart puts off the day of settlement, conscience now brings out its ledger and day-book, and tells the account with God as it really stands. Before men are awakened they are continually setting one good deed done against some good deed left undone. The Italian brigand will set up a cross over the spot where

he has hurled a traveller over the precipice, and pay for a mass for his soul out of the plunder to which he has helped himself. The pharisee will pay tithe of mint, anise, and cummin, while he neglects the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and truth, The writings of the prophets are one long protest against this abuse of the law. This is why our Lord so continually warned His followers against the leaven of the scribes and Pharisees, which was hypocrisy. His reproof of them was for the very thing that they had made the law void through their traditions.

The first mark, then, of an awakened conscience is this, that it will not allow the demands of the law to be disposed of by evasions like these. Instead of treating the ceremonial law as a set off to the moral, it sees that the latter is, of the two, the most important—that "to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams." Brought to this conviction, it cannot regard with its former complacency those breaches of the moral law which once were indulgently passed over. A great change comes over its view of the law of God. The commandment which was ordained unto life it finds to be unto death. It is drawn by a fatal attraction towards that very law which only discovers our sin, and, through the commandment, makes that sin to appear exceeding sinful. Then a horrible dread begins to overwhelm the spirit. We were alive once without the law,—alive, that is in the lower sense of the word,—living a natural life in the flesh, feeling no great attraction to God, on the one

hand, but, on the other hand, feeling no great dread of sin or fear of displeasing Him. Now this state of insensibility is over. We can deceive ourselves no longer, either as to the necessity of strict and entire obedience, or as to the reality in us of an evil heart of sin and unbelief. Thus the spirit, on its first awakening, is drawn by two opposite attractions—one towards, the other averse from God. Plato, in the opening of the Republic, describes the strange fascination with which we cannot turn away our eyes from some object we most loathe to see. So it is that we are at one and the same time drawn to God by a desire after holiness, yet driven from Him by a sense of indwelling sin. Peter cast Himself on his knees before Jesus, and uttered the prayer which was the farthest from his real desires, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord. Legion, in the same way, prayed Jesus for relief, and then broke out in the opposite strain, "What have we to do with Thee, Jesus, thou Son of the Most High God?" This explains that strange phenomenon of a double consciousness in the awakened conscience. The Ego is at one time the will identified with the law of God, and then, again, with the law of sin that is in our members. Those commentators have misunderstood the seventh chapter of the Romans who refer the Ego, or will, the centre of the man, to either of these * personalizations, the law or the flesh exclusively.

* We have intentionally passed by the question of the relation of the will to the Psyche in the unregenerate, and to the Psyche-Pneuma in the regenerate, lest we should seem to countenance a tetrachotomy of body, soul, spirit, and will, or the Ego acting in and through the three natures. Psychologists

The truth is, that it wavers between the two, and the very meaning of the conflict consists in this. Were our identity connected exclusively with either the higher or lower nature, there might be war, but it would not be civil war. It would be the invasion of our nature, and its possession by some other foreign power. We should not then be responsible as we are, and the conflict would assume a totally different aspect. But as the Apostle describes it, and as the experience of all truly awakened Christians bears him out, the conflict arises out of this very duality of our nature in flesh and spirit, and the long hesitation of the *Ego* or will to which of the two to yield itself.

When the new or pneumatical nature begins to stir under the old or psychical nature, it asserts its rights, and claims our whole being, spirit, soul, and body as the temple of the living God.

The conflict, properly so called, begins then, so soon as we first begin to waver in our wills whether to yield subjection to the law of the Spirit of Life in Christ

are divided as to the nature of the will—on the one hand, there are those who call it a self-determining power, that "innate intellectual energy which, unfolding itself from all the other forces of the mind, like a flower from its petals, radiates through the whole sphere of our vitality,"—on the other hand, the school of sensation confound will with desire, and deny any previous determination of the will. The truth seems to lie between the two, man is both "Nature and Person," as the Germans say, midway between the animal, who has no self-determination, and the angel, which has, and whose will is free for good or evil in the fullest extent. Thus, it is said of Adam, he was made a living Psyche, not, as the angels, a living Pneuma. Were man a free will, in the full sense of the word, probably there would have been no possibility of his redemption; but as the evil came from without, so the remedy. The will, then, is seated in the Psyche, and according as the will is drawn up to the spirit or down to the flesh, so we become pneumatical or carnal, and our character is formed in time for eternity.

Jesus, or to the law of sin and flesh. But unaided and alone, the psyche cannot begin this conflict that we speak of between the lower and the higher parts of our nature. We do not read in Scripture, nor do we find in experience, that reason and the flesh are contrary to each other, as the flesh and the spirit are. Reason, or the psyche, is, it is true, superior to the flesh; but it is not the rightful master within us—it is not the lord of every motion there, because it is not the faculty which brings us into relationship with God, the true Lord of our being. But on the other hand, if our nature were entirely pneumatical, in the sense that the Second Adam was made a quickening Spirit, there could be no conflict. In that case we should instinctively yield our members as instruments of righteousness unto God. The pneuma would direct the psyche, and the psyche our carnal appetites. There would not be a single motion of sinful desire. It would be as in a well-ordered city, where a single constable with his truncheon can keep the peace of the streets, because the whole power of the law is behind him to enforce his orders. But such is not the state which man is in at present. He begins life with a dormant pneuma, and therefore with desires which have become exorbitant, and with a reason unable to control them. For a time he patches up a kind of hollow truce between desire and reason, the flesh and the psyche, and thus the apostle tells us that he was alive once, *i.e.*, led a contented psychical life once, without the law. But by and by the pneuma, or conscience towards God, is quickened and begins to behave

itself, "like a guilty thing surprised." It discovers the exceeding holiness of God, and its desires after holiness are as vast as the law's demands are great. It puts the flesh and the reason upon obeying God's law, and the flesh and reason kick against these restraints, refuse to meet its demands, and thus the conflict begins. Between the desires after God of the spirit, and the desires of the self-indulgent flesh, the weak psyche, or natural reason, is divided and distracted. At times it yields to the flesh, and then at better moments it falls in with the spirit. But the conflict is too sore for it to endure long, and at last it cries out in despair, "Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

This cry of despair is the critical moment of our existence. It is not the exact moment of the quickening of the pneuma, for the pneuma is quickened, as we think, as soon as it is convinced of sin by the law; but it is the moment of its coming forth to self-consciousness and God-consciousness, the moment of its effectual conversion to God. On the subject of conversion, we may here remark there are two opinions, each true from the point of view of those who hold them. There are those who think that a man is converted even while he is under a mere legal experience, and before he has found joy and peace in believing. There are others who will not allow that a man is converted until he is able to say, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus." Both these two views have a measure of truth in them. It is easy to see that there is a common ground on

which we may agree with both. On the one hand, we hold that the pneuma is already alive in those who are drawn to the law of God by a secret attraction, and who, in desiring to keep it, only discover the strength of indwelling sin. But still they are not yet converted, in the sense that the pneuma is acknowledged to be the master principle, and that they yield their members as instruments of righteousness unto God. The spirit has the right, but not as yet the might, within. Hence it is that there is a state of conflict within; and that in one sense they are, and in another sense are not, to be classed as converted men.

But the work of grace, blessed be God, does not stop here. We are not to read the seventh chapter of Romans without going on to read the eighth. If in the one chapter we read of the conflict between the law and the flesh, in the other we read that there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; and, as the apostle goes on to show, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit. It is the work of Christ on the cross which destroys the enmity which exists between the higher and the lower parts of our nature. The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and the result in the case of a newly awakened man, whose experience is only legal, is, that he is brought to a stand-still. He finds his will paralysed, because it is drawn in contrary directions. The flesh and the spirit distract him, so that (*or in order that*, ἵνα μὴ) he cannot do the things that he would. (Gal. v. 17.)

This conflict is God's appointed way of bringing the

will out of the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. The work of Christ, when applied by faith, appeases the voice of an accusing conscience, and assists the halting will to remove the last hindrance which stands between us and our return to God. The flesh is already condemned in the death of Christ; and we are given strength to arm ourselves with the like mind. That He paid the debt that was due by us is only a part of the work of Christ. On this single view of the atonement too many rest, and hence, with such a defective view, we need not be surprised that there is so little power, and life, and love in their religion. The doctrine which is according to godliness is this, that Christ died for our sins to enable us to die unto sin, and to rise again unto righteousness.

In dying He condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law may be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. Those who do not grasp the distinction between the psyche and pneuma fail to make clear to themselves, or at least to make clear to others, the connection between the justifying and sanctifying grace of Christ. Being justified freely, *i.e.*, forgiven freely by His blood, preachers tell us that we ought to give ourselves to Him who so freely gave Himself for us. Gratitude is thus called in as the motive which is to constrain us to live no longer to ourselves, but to Him who loved us, and gave Himself for us. I do not overlook the importance of pressing this consideration. I do not make little of gratitude as a constraining motive. But,

judging human nature by what we know it to be, I do not think that God would have intrusted the sanctification of his people to a single motive, however strong. Besides, the force of gratitude, or the remembrance of a past benefit, is apt to decline as time goes on. Old impressions of forgiven sin, the remembrance of a transaction once accomplished on Calvary, and once applied by faith to our conscience, is in danger of becoming dim, and at last fading away altogether. In this case of trusting to gratitude only, which is the one which the Apostle Peter contemplates, a man will forget that he has been purged from his old sins (2 Peter i. 9), and is in danger of lapsing into antinomian security. Thus it is that antinomianism is the bane attendant on so much of our popular preaching. The so-called forensic theology, taken by itself, must inevitably degenerate to this. Even in Luther's life-time the evil had already begun, and in the generation after Luther popular Lutheranism was as dead in notional theology as Rome in ceremonial. Spener in his day called the pulpit one of the four dumb idols set up in the churches of Germany. This defect in the popular doctrine of justification by faith is not to be met, as Bishop Bull and his school thought, by preaching faith and works as contrasted with preaching salvation by faith only. St. James, misunderstood, is sometimes set up to counteract the errors of St. Paul, misunderstood; and the result is only a darkening of counsel by words without knowledge. The remedy for these mistakes of doctrine must be sought in a deeper study of the plan of salvation. The adaptation of the atone-

ment to meet all the wants of the case will then be fully seen; and we shall see in the work of Christ all the wisdom of God, and the power of God unto salvation.

The application of the atonement as a sanctifying power is on this wise. There is in the regenerate pneuma a striving after holiness, as well as a thirst after God. The spirit, when quickened, is that seed of God which is said by one apostle to be incorruptible (1 Peter i. 23), and by another that it cannot sin (1 John iii. 9). It is the image of God in man, which, though dormant, and, in consequence of the fall, unable to become quickened of itself, is nevertheless there, as a δύναμις or capacity, if not an ἐνέργεια or active habit, and which we could not lose altogether without losing with it the nature of man. When the Holy Spirit of God quickens this spirit in man, and draws its desires upwards to Him, then the conflict which we have before described begins. Evangelical preachers who describe human nature as made up of two parts only, body and soul, and who say, correctly enough, that the soul, as well as the body, is desperately wicked, are therefore in this dilemma—how can a good thing come out of an evil? "Can a leopard change his spots, or an Ethiopian his skin?" The psyche or heart of man, the fountain of his natural life, is poisoned and impure; can it send forth out of the same place sweet water and bitter? Hence, from not reserving a *nidus* in human nature in which the Divine Spirit can descend and purify all from within, these accounts of Christian sanctification are

often most lame and inconsistent. At one time they say that the heart is desperately wicked, and remains so, yea, even in the regenerate; while at another, men are said to be led of the Spirit of God, and to walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit. How a heart that is desperately wicked can yet obey godly motions is as unexplained as how a deaf man can hear, or a lame man walk. Let but the distinction between psyche and pneuma be seen, and all is clear and consistent. The psyche is like the flesh, prone to evil, and remains so, yea, even in the regenerate. But the pneuma or godlike in man is not prone to evil—indeed it cannot sin.* Its tendency is naturally upward to God, as the tendency of body and soul is outward and earthward. Regeneration, then, is the quickening of this pneuma, and sanctification is the carrying on of that which conversion began. Sanctification is regeneration continued, as regeneration is sanctification begun. The pneuma, when first quickened, is barely able to show its existence. It is far from able to assert the mastery which it has by right over soul and body. It is like an infant on the throne, unable to choose his

* When we say that the spirit cannot sin, we are far from overlooking the possibility of the spirit becoming devil-possessed (*δαιμονιώδης*, James iii. 15). We are far from agreeing with Origen's theory of the spirit, which lies at the root of all our modern universalism, that the spirit or divine part in man is impassive of evil (*ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν χειρόνων τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*). Still the case of spiritual wickedness, the climax of which is the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, happily for the salvation of the mass of mankind, is an exceptional state. It is true of the majority that the tendency of their pneuma is to God; but they are unable to break the chains of evil habit with which they are tied and bound, till the Holy Spirit brings deliverance.

own advisers, while his guardians use his name for their own advantage. The advance of sanctification is marked by a growth of the pneuma. It begins to assert its supremacy, and to compel the psychical and animal parts of our nature to know their place, and own their subjection to it as the governor supreme under God. The more sanctification advances, the more marked is the supremacy of the pneuma. At last it comes of age, and on attaining its majority the inferior faculties in human nature own their subjection to it, and yield a cheerful obedience to it as their natural protector, as well as their lawful superior. Thus it is that the character is formed for God, and the man becomes pneumatical in the full sense of the word. It is not at once on our believing in Christ, and tasting his forgiving mercy, that we become pneumatical. The pneuma may be quickened, but it may not yet be the master faculty in human nature. So it was with the Corinthians, who by their party spirit and sensual practices were, in the judgment of the apostle, still carnal. No censure could be so severe, no language so cutting as this. Here are men, spiritual by profession, who are still carnal, Ἀχαϊδες οὐχι Ἀχαιοι was not a more cutting reproach to the Greek warriors before Troy. It is sinful of course in natural men to follow their natural inclinations; for though an unconverted man has not the pneuma with which to rule psyche, yet he has the psyche which ought to govern the flesh, but fails to do so. But this is doubly sinful in spiritual men, who not only have the spirit, but who know that the spirit ought to rule the soul as well as the soul to rule the flesh.

Where this mastery of the spirit over the soul, and the soul over the body is complete, there sanctification is complete also. The apostle prays that this may be the case with his Thessalonian converts. 1 Thess. v. 23. But we are not to infer because this is the aim of sanctification, that it is ever attained on this side of the grave. The apostle disclaims this state of entire sanctification even for himself. "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect" (Phil. iii. 12). It was the ideal state that he followed after, as the sculptor tries to hammer out of the marble the ideal that dwells in his mind, and will not come out of the stone at his bidding. So Michel Angelo felt, and expressed in one of his sonnets, that the more the marble wastes, the more the statue grows.*

> The vile shall day by day
> Fall like superfluous flesh away.

In the same way it is, that as the external man perishes, so the inward is renewed day by day. As in the process of petrifaction, for every particle of wood washed away by the dropping well, another particle of stone is deposited in its place; so our sanctification goes on by a minute molecular change of the heart from stone to flesh, a process of depetrifaction as it might be called. Little by little the flesh gives way to the spirit, and more and more the spirit becomes accustomed to claim and enforce obedience. We do not say that the conflict will ever

* See Life of Michel Angelo by Grimm, Miss Bunnett's Translation.

cease on this side the grave. The will, related as it is to the psyche or soul, will sometimes turn to the flesh; and if we are not on our guard, and prayerful as well as watchful, we shall be surprised into sin, and find ourselves, like Samson, quickly hurried from the arms of Delilah to the prison-house of the Philistines. But so long as we are true to our Nazarite vow; so long as we keep the secret of our strength, and do not presume on our past prowess, we are safe. The Lord will not forsake those that depend upon Him. At times we may be cast down, but we shall not be destroyed. The spirit, like Samson's hair, will quickly grow again, and we shall shake our invincible locks again, and do more in the strength of the Lord than we ever have done before. Such is the teaching of Scripture with regard to the Christian's sanctification. Thus it is that a sound psychology and a sound theology establish and confirm each other. On this distinction between psyche and pneuma, rests the true doctrine of sanctification. It is an error to build again the things which we destroyed, and to try to save ourselves in gratitude for Christ's love in so freely saving us; but sanctification, rightly understood, is the working out of what is begun at our conversion —the seminal principle is then quickened, it grows and asserts it presence, and by asserting its mastery over the lower parts of our nature, restores the true harmony of man's constitution, as spirit, soul, and body, which has been overturned by the fall.

THE QUESTION OF THE NATURAL IMMORTALITY OF THE PSYCHE CONSIDERED.

When man has breathed his last breath, and sighed his last sigh; when the muscles begin to stiffen with the *rigor mortis*, and the eye is glazed, and the pulse still, and the heart ceases to beat—for "the pitcher is broken at the fountain, and the wheel broken at the cistern,"—we say that the man is dead. The physician and the physiologist carries his description a little farther: he can describe how the vital functions cease, one after the other, and in what order. It is a moot point, whether the last pulse, or the last breath, or even the last sense of excitability to muscular contraction, is the final and supreme moment when physiology is to pronounce that the man is dead.

But at the point when the physiologist closes the inquiry, the moralist may take it up. Is the man truly dead, or is he only sleeping? He is dead, the physiologist says, because life, which is the sum total of all those powers which resist dissolution, has ceased; the higher law by which certain chemical affinities are arrested in living organic bodies is broken; and

now the lower law, by which the particles of matter seek their natural affinity, resumes its reign. Thus, as life is an instance of a higher law by which chemical affinity is suspended, death is a return to the lower law. All organic matter comes out of inorganic, and returns to it. This self-assertion of the higher law is life, this mastery of the lower law is death.

This is all the account that physiology can give of death. As far as appearances go, death is an entire dissolution, disintegration, and annihilation of man. Immortality is a dream or desire projected into fact or logical quibble.

> "Thou makest thine appeal to me,
> I bring to life, I bring to death,
> The spirit does but mean the breath."

We may project our desires forward, and delude ourselves into mistaken memories for hopes. In that sense we may speak of the immortality of fame, we may say that Cæsar, Alexander, or Napoleon are not dead because they live in our thoughts, and will live in history so long as the world lasts. Or again, we may cheat ourselves with a quibble that though the individual should perish, the race is immortal. But that is saying nothing more of man than of any of the other mammalia which now inhabit the earth, and even this immortality of the species will not stand the test of geology.

> "So careful of the type, but no,
> From scarped cliff and quarried stone,
> She cries a thousand types are gone,
> I care for nothing, all shall go."

But here the moralist has a right to be heard. He says that it is very true that as far as appearances go, death is the end of man's existence. But may we not be reasoning too fast, and coming to conclusions for which we have no data? We give up the body to the physiologist, death is the end of the outer man; but suppose there be an inner man, how can you assert that this inner moral nature is destroyed by death as the outer case that contains it is? May not the reverse be the fact, so that the death of the outer is the birth of the inner man; he is set free then from this body of corruption and passes into a world of light. Eastern spiritualism says that we are born when we die, and die when we are born. Western physiology says the very opposite. Who will pronounce that the East is wrong and the West right?

Thus the moralist throws back upon the physiologist the *onus probandi*, that death is the end of each man's separate existence. It may be so, but he has not proved it. As far as the body goes, appearances are certainly in his favour; but from all we know of mind and its operations, there are certain appearances of which physiology takes no account, and which we choose to set on the other side as evidences that man does not wholly die. It is in this sense that the first chapter of Bishop Butler's Analogy is to be understood. As *proofs* of our existence after death, the arguments there adduced are merely verbal, and such as would satisfy no reasoner, much less one so exact and severe as

the author of the Analogy. But as *presumptions* against materialism they are quite strong enough for his purpose. They throw back upon the atheist the burden of proof, that when a man's brains are out it is all over with him. Till this is settled demonstratively the Bishop will hold with the immense majority of mankind, that death is not an eternal sleep, and that there is every likelihood that our real existence, so far from being destroyed by death, only then enters upon a new and higher state of being.

Thus the question of existence after death has reached this stage, that there are certain appearances against it, but on the other hand certain deep instincts for it. All that physiology can tell us bears against the notion of our existence after death, but all our moral convictions bear the other way, and between these conflicting presumptions, the *præjudicia* of two opposite schools of thought, the judgment, if candid, cries a halt, and like Paul and his shipmates with anchors out, but breakers ahead, wishes for the day.

But let sceptics say what they will, contented ignorance is, of all states of mind, the most painful to the majority of mankind. To sit on the tongue of the balance, and weigh the objections on either side, without perceiving the scales incline either way by a hair's breadth, may suit some peculiar tempers, in whom the speculative faculty has entirely overpowered the practical. But mankind in general will never long continue in such a state of mind as this. It will have some solution of this mystery, whether true or false; it will

set up some guide, and accept his teaching as the truth on this question.

Superstition, philosophy, and the Revelation of Jesus Christ, all come forward to assure us of man's existence after death. Their witness agrees in condemning the materialist theory, that death is the annihilation of man as well as of brute. But it agrees in little else. The three witnesses give a conflicting account of the *mode* of our existence after death. They may, therefore, all three be false—but it is certain they cannot be all equally true witnesses to a fact in which their witness agrees not together.

Of the superstitious theory of the soul's existence after death we need not say much here. It forms the groundwork of all systems of priestcraft everywhere. Under a thousand fanciful aspects we find the old thought recurring, that the ghost of a dead man is that part which survives the body. Reluctantly it disengages itself from the body. Virgil describes Camilla extricating herself from her corpse after the spear of Aruns has given her a death-wound,—

> "Tum frigida toto
> *Paulatim* exsolvit se corpore."

For awhile it hovers over the place of the dead, waiting till the body has received decent burial, it then passes across some fabled river to an under-world of gloom and shadow, where it leads a vague and dream-like existence, pleasurable or painful according as its deeds in the body were good or wicked.' In these superstitious theories of existence after death, there is

generally only the faintest degree of moral sentiment. The rewards and punishments are sensual only, and dealt out capriciously, and with little regard to character. A hero, for instance, or the offspring of the union of a mortal with an immortal, is deified after death, and passes, not to the under-world at all, but to the upper world of the Gods. The crimes, moreover, which call for deep and eternal punishment are crimes generally of sacrilege, which the priestly order were interested to punish and repress, or incestuous acts committed under the leading of destiny or blind passion. We may dismiss these superstitious testimonies to man's existence after death. Like the religions of which they formed the chief support they are dying out under the light of common day. The only one of them which has any seeming vitality lives because it is a monstrous after-birth of Christian and pagan thought, endued with all the vitality of the one and the sensuousness of the other. Yet, even the Romish dogma of purgatory, cannot survive the advance of sound views on psychology and physiology. It lives on human ignorance as the parasite on the decay of the tree. Heaven and hell, it has been said, are as much a part of the Italian's geography as the Adriatic and the Apennines: the Queen of Heaven looks on the streets as clear as the morning-star, and the souls in purgatory are more readily present to conception than the political prisoners immured in the dungeons of Venice.*

A state of mind like this will not last much longer.

* Quoted from Alger's History of Doctrine of Future Life, p. 427.

We need not trouble ourselves about such spectres as these. As the poet of hell said of a similar subject,—

"Non ragioniam di lor ma guarda e passa."

The next theory of existence after death is that of philosophy. By a natural confusion of thought, the instinct or voice of universal conscience, which whispers that man is not mortal as the brutes, is elevated into a declaration that he is immortal. Thus the *posse non mori* is transposed to mean *non posse mori*. The voice of conscience, which is the voice of God in the world, says everywhere,—

"Thou madest man, he knows not why,
He thinks he was not made to die."

But the postulate or presumption is not strong enough to support our hopes of existence hereafter, and so philosophy comes forward to underprop it with its proofs and analogies. There are certain anticipations of immortality, presages of a life beyond the grave. Philosophy offers her method to turn these anticipations into arguments, these presages into proofs. Proof is too often the finding reasons for what we have already decided to hold, and as the majority of mankind have rejected (and rightly), the materialist version of death, reason is set to the task of justifying the convictions of conscience, and finding proof that man does not die when his brains are out.

Unfortunately reason does not begin the inquiry at

the right point, but takes up the argument at a middle point in human history, instead of at the beginning. Philosophy sets out with assuming the *fact* that all men die, instead of asking the question *why* men die. It assumes death to be a normal stage in man's development, instead of a disease and disturbance of the right course of nature. Now, as in all cases of analysis, until we get to the ultimate facts of the case, our analysis will be faulty; the unresolved quantity in the problem will come out unresolved in the solution. Death is not an ultimate fact in human nature; it is not the law it is assumed to be. "He thinks he was not made to die" is a true deliverance of conscience; but there are two explanations of this complex phenomenon—the *fact* of death, and our *fear* of it. The one explanation of death is that of Scripture, that death is penal; the other, that of philosophy, that it is a process to a higher life. Which are we to accept? The two are not to be reconciled; they exclude each other. We do not blame philosophy (pre-Christian, we mean) for thinking that death was normal. What else could the mind conclude about a fact to which there was not a single exception? The Greeks knew nothing of the story of man's fall and his loss of immortality in Eden; and finding men mortal, they were obliged to feign an immortality, and build up a fiction (a noble one, we admit, like a Grecian temple, beautiful in its very ruins) of the immortality of the Psyche, and its deliverance by death out of the body, in which it was imprisoned as a butterfly in its cocoon.

The mistake of Greek thinkers was the most

natural one in the world; so natural that they are to be excused, nay honoured, for holding to it. But for us to repeat their error is to betray wilful prejudice, the same as if chemists persisted in speaking of phlogiston after Lavoisier had taught the theory of combustion. Till the middle of last century, it was quite as reasonable to say that a candle burned because it gave off an unknown x (we will call it phlogiston), as because it consumed an unknown y (we will call it oxygen). The one hypothesis was as good as the other, *quoad* hypothesis, *i.e.*, as a provisional theory to account for the facts of the case. Without these hypotheses or landing-places, the heights of discovery would never have been scaled to this day. But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part must be done away. The phlogiston hypothesis retires on the discovery of oxygen. The one was only an *opinion*, the other is a *fact;* and when opinions and facts come into collision, there is but one conclusion in any mind where truth retains her supremacy.

So with philosophic theories of existence after death. Till life and immortality had been brought to light by the gospel, it would have been reasonable to argue, as the philosophers did, that the soul does not die because it cannot die. As there was no external evidence for existence after death, they had to fall back on internal. The immortality of the soul was the phlogiston hypothesis which accounted very plausibly for the contradiction between man's inner aspirations and the humiliating fact of his early and untimely death. But the resurrection of Christ as the first-fruits from the

dead is a *fact* in these moral speculations the same as the discovery of oxygen in the speculations of chemists. It is not only a fact in itself, but one irreconcileable with all previous hypotheses. Which are we to embrace? Either man is non-mortal because he is immortal, or he is non-mortal because "the hour is coming when all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth: they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."

We will now proceed to consider the *proofs** with which philosophy seeks to build up the *presumption* that the dissolution of the body is not the entire death of man. These proofs may be classified under the three following heads:—the Metaphysical, the Ontological, and the Teleological.

A. The metaphysical proof rests on the assumption that man is a being of two natures; the one of which we call the body, and the other the soul. The one is

* Kant's *Kritik*, of which the following is only an expansion, ought to have set at rest the popular way of speaking of the soul's natural immortality. Here is philosophy throwing up the tables, after passing in review, one by one, the usual arguments by which it is attempted to roll away the stone from the door of the sepulchre. Whatever may be thought of the constructive part of Kant's *Kritik*, the destructive is positively unanswerable. Yet in this country at least, to judge from recent editors of Bishop Butler, Kant's criticism of the usual philosophic proofs of the soul's immortality is almost unknown. It is a curious instance of that habit of mind which the late Archbishop Whately called proof-proof. An argument is demolished, as we think; but we turn our backs, and it starts up again as lively as ever, proving what a little hold logic has over men's convictions when their wishes go in the other direction. To reason from our wishes is very illogical, but it is very natural and very human.

compounded, and the other uncompounded. Whatever is made up of parts is capable of dissolution; but that which is indiscerptible is also indestructible. The soul is such a unit. Immutability is an essential property of the soul, as cold is of snow. This argument, which every reader of Plato's Phædo is thoroughly familiar with, has come down to modern times, and still plays its part in modern metaphysics. The schoolmen relied upon it as their strong point. It was elaborated by Descartes, whose whole philosophy rests on the assumption of the essential distinction between the animal and the intellectual soul. Brutes, he thought, were mere machines; their existence a kind of waking dream. Consciousness, so far from being a mode of existence, as with later metaphysicians, was with him the condition of existence. *Cogito ergo sum* is a noble but fallacious attempt to rest the soul on itself. "O set me on the rock that is higher than I," is the exclamation of the Psalmist; to which spiritualizing philosophers return the answer that the soul is itself a rock. Maximus Tyrius argues for the immortality of the soul from the duration of knowledge and memory.* The body, he says, can no more retain the impressions made on it than a piece of melting wax can the stamp of the seal. He therefore compares the soul to a rock standing out of the sea. The same comparison of a rock, engraven with certain characters, and washed by the waves beneath, is used of conscience by an eloquent but superficial French moralist. The comparison in the case of conscience, Bishop Fitzgerald

* *Vide* Diss. xxviii., p. 292. Ed. Davis.

well remarks, might gain something in correctness if we imagine the inscription traced upon a softer substance. "For the stormy waves of passion not only conceal, while they prevail, the sacred character of virtue, but as billow after billow passes over the tablet, they tend to obliterate the lines." The same may be said of Maximus Tyrius' comparison of the soul to a rock breasting the waves. The duration of knowledge and memory are like the rock which resists a wave for centuries, but is worn away at last. Our sensations, even that of light, will not live for ever on memory. Milton, for instance, who wrote the Paradise Lost a little while after he had lost the use of his sight, had lost (as critics have often remarked) the sense of colour when a few years after he wrote the Paradise Regained. Colour-blindness had become a mental as well as a physical affliction, and this is one of the causes of the falling off of the latter poem. If memory thus fails us during our lifetime, to rest our immortality on the ineffaceable nature of mental impressions is to rest our hopes on a broken reed.

The Cartesian theory, that thought being the inseparable quality of soul, the extinction of a thinking being is a logical contradiction, was carried a step farther by Mendelssohn. He argued that no time could occur between the moment preceding the soul's extinction and that in which it ceased to exist; and that as we cannot conceive of such an interval between thought and consciousness, consciousness must be an attribute of thought inherent to and inseparable from it. But Kant easily disposed of these

kind of subtleties. He showed that while the soul could not cease to exist by any diminution of its extensive quality, that the argument, from its simplicity, did not exclude its extinction through the gradual weakening of its forces and the successive relaxation of its intensive quantity. For even memory has always a degree which may be indefinitely decreased —so of self-consciousness, and so of all the other faculties. Hence there is nothing to prevent a simple substance from being resolved into several simple substances, and several simple substances from flowing together into one, which would contain within itself the degree of the reality of all the preceding substances together.

Thus the metaphysical proof of the soul's immortality rests on two assumptions, which are not only without proof, but also contrary to all experience. It is assumed, in the first place, that body and mind are distinct and divisible parts of human nature; and, *secondly*, that of these parts one is compounded and dissoluble, the other uncompounded and indissoluble. To the first assumption modern physiology has advanced a decided negative. Crude as the theories of the French school of last century, that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile, they were not more wide of the mark than the Cartesian theory that the soul is in the body as an oak in a flower-pot. We have not yet reached the point when we can say what the connection between the two is; but all advance is in the direction of a fusion of physiology and psychology in one,

when we shall neither speak of the body without the mind, nor of the mind without the body. When two gases uniting in definite proportions combine into a new substance with distinct properties of its own, unlike those of the gases when separate, we call this *tertium quid* by a name of its own. For all practical purposes water is still an element. It is not a fusion or mixture, as of water with wine, much less of one floating on the other, as of oil on water; but it is a union in which the very substance itself of oxygen and hydrogen, and not the phenomena only, are absorbed into a new substance, with new and distinct phenomena of its own, which we call water. So in the union of mind and matter in the formation of man. Man is not a mixture of mind and matter, much less an immortal mind in a mortal body; but he is the identity of two distinct substances which lose their identity in giving him his.

Man, and not mind by itself, is thus the true monad. We may analyse the constituent elements of which he is composed, but our analysis does not warrant us to say that the essential property of man resides either in body or mind, or to suppose that man could exist as pure mind without body, any more than as body without mind. All analogy goes to infer that dissolution of unity is entire destruction. That the life lies in the *nexus*. In the case of these Siamese twins the ligature that binds the two together is situated, it is said, in a main artery; so that separation would be fatal, and the death of the one must lead to that of the other. So it seems to be

with mind and body in man. They have been joined together by no freak of nature, but by the appointment of God. Just as water is the substance, and oxygen and hydrogen only the elements,—elements incapable of any separate existence of their own,—and passing into fresh combinations, when the union in which they are held is dissolved. So of mind and matter, the elements of man. For aught we know to the contrary, the one element might pass away to form fresh combinations of mind, as the other element, matter, certainly passes away to form fresh combinations.

But mind, it is said, is not compounded, and is therefore not dissoluble. We have already considered Kant's reply to this objection, that the soul may decay from loss of intensive as well as of extensive force. Assuming it to be indivisible, it is a long step from this to assert that it is indestructible. Plato begs the question when he argues that every body is destroyed by its own kindred evil, and that sin is the kindred evil of the soul. But that, as sin does not destroy the springs of being, the soul can continue to exist whatever evil passions it may fall a prey to. Such a theory of evil might be held by a Greek whose notion of sin was only superficial, though Aristotle rightly recognized that depravity as φθαρτικὴ τῶν ἀρχῶν, destructive of the nature of that which it depraves.

However small the beginnings of evil may be, we know that it works through and through our nature like corruption, "mining all unseen." To suppose that evil is not corrosive of the very nature of the soul,

when it has entered in and been taken up into it, is to incline to, or even to go as far as, the Manichean conception of evil, and hold with the Persian philosophy, that there is an eternal principle of evil as well as an eternal principle of good, and that the conflict between the two is both necessary and eternal.

Thus, the two assumptions, on which the metaphysical proof of the soul's immortality rests, crumble away under the touch of inquiry. We may distinguish, but we cannot divide soul and body, nor can we say of the soul that it is a unit in itself, and therefore indivisible and indestructible. Had man no better ground than this on which to rest his hopes for hereafter, he would have little hope in death, and the discoveries of modern physiology of the relation between mind and brain would fill him with the gloomy fear that the mind was but a certain harmony of brain which could not outlast the conditions that produced it.

B. The ontological proof is the celebrated one of Anselm applied to the soul. We have an idea of infinite holiness, goodness, and truth, and as holiness, goodness, and truth in us are not substances, but only qualities of beings, who are finitely holy, good, and true; so they must be qualities of a Being who is infinitely holy, good, and true. The argument from the idea of a thing to the fact itself, is one of very dubious validity. We know too little of the necessary laws of thought to be able to assert in any particular case, that a thing must be so because it is inconceivable otherwise. Three centuries have swept away a whole world of self-evident truths, and set up their inconceiv-

able opposites in their room. It was inconceivable that our head should point at night where our feet had pointed at noon. It was inconceivable that the world should roll through space at a velocity greater than that of a cannon ball, and that we should not be whirled off by centrifugal force. It was inconceivable to Voltaire that the wonders of the Bible, its miracles, types, and prophecies, should have been wrought for the benefit of an obscure race in a corner of the world. The question of probability before proof has been worked out with great ingenuity by many able thinkers, and the conclusion they come to is this, that except a few laws of thought connected with the properties of number, the metaphysical law of identity and difference, and the moral law that we are bound to obey conscience, we know of nothing which may not have been otherwise than it is. There are many truths which undoubtedly seem necessary or first truths. but when tested we find they are contingent and relative. They depend on some appointment higher than their own, they are conditioned by other causes more remote than they.

The ontological proof, if worth anything, would bear to be tested by an appeal to experience. Necessary laws are always universal. Cicero lays this down as a test of a law of nature, that it has the consent of all nations.* But so far from all men everywhere having this sense of the immortality of the soul, opinion has been always divided on this subject, and some have

* Tusc. Ques. i. 13. Omni autem in re consensus omnium gentium lex naturæ putanda est. So Origen de Princ. ii. 11, iii. 1, 13, 122.

held that the soul dies with the body, others that it survives indeed, but passes into animal forms, and, as the vital principle, thus runs the circle round of animated nature: it is only a very few of the better sort of philosophers who have distinctly held to personal immortality. The *consensus gentium*, whatever it is worth in itself, is against the argument, that the soul's immortality is part of our conception of it, as extension is our conception of body. If the voice of human nature everywhere gave response that it was so, then we should attach great weight to such a testimony. But is it so? Does not an appeal to history decide against it? We do not deny an element of truth in this ontological proof. Conscience whispers of a hereafter—her voice goes as far as to testify that it is appointed unto men once to die, and after death the judgment. But a *hereafter* is one thought, eternity another. The possibility that I shall not die with the brutes is different from the impossibility of my dying at all. The one is a genuine voice of conscience, the other is only a philosopheme founded upon it, though apparently as stable as the foundation on which it rests. But the foundation is not to be confounded with the superstructure.

Kant's test of the ontological proof is decisive of its worthlessness. For a man to think that he has a hundred dollars is surely not the same as actually to possess them. The ontologist says in reply, that we could never think of a hundred dollars, unless dollars really existed. But if so, he is only reasoning in a circle, that the idea proves the fact, as well as the fact sug-

gests the idea. There must be some objective reality to account for the subjective conviction. If we were to admit reasoning like this, it is impossible to say where we should stop. It is but one step from this to say, they exist because we think of them. It is easy to see that the ontological proof found favour with Spinoza and Hegel. Spinoza advancing on the Cartesian notion of thought as the condition of being, identified the two as the essential qualities of substance. It is substance which is, and substance which thinks. Substance is thinking being, and outside of thought there is no existence at all. Descartes said, *cogito ergo sum.* Spinoza went a step farther and said of the universe, *Est ergo cogitat.* Pantheism was thus the inevitable conclusion of reasoning in this vicious circle from thought to things. Hegel went, if possible, further. With him substance is not the identity of thought and existence, but existence is rather a quality of thought. His system, under another name, is the barest phenomenology. Man, as with Protagoras of old, is the measure of all things. The identity of the Ego and non-Ego is thought, bnt it is thought which thus identifies the non-Ego: things exist because they exist in thought. Outside this there is no criterion of truth. Truth is what each man troweth of things; and as men have the idea of the absolute and infinite, the absolute and infinite exist. But as the idea is impersonal, so it has no existence outside the thinking subject. This school of ontology can never produce anything higher than the idea of the infinite, which is very far short of proving our personal

immortality. The ontological proof, like the metaphysical, is valuable only for its negative results. Its positive results are nil. It is a fair presumption before proof that man is capable of immortality because he can rise to the conception of it, but for any further demonstrative force it is valueless. If the reason from our wishes is worth anything, the believers in Nirwana outnumber those who believe in heaven and hell in the proportion of five to two.

C. The teleological proof is the one which is least logical, and yet the most satisfactory of the three. The argument for a future life from the inequalities of the present, would of itself be insufficient to convince any acute thinker. Because there are wrongs on this side of the grave, to suppose there must be another life beyond the grave to redress these wrongs would be to assume too much. How do we know that they will be redressed there? If there are inequalities and anomalies in this life, why not in the next? It is like the pre-existence hypothesis to account for the origin of evil. The difficulty is only pushed back or pushed forward: it is not really solved in either case. Why was evil permitted in a former state of being? we ask in the one case. Are we sure that all wrongs will be redressed in a future state of being? we ask in the other case. But the real force of the teleological proof lies in this, that God is a righteous ruler, and that He must enter into judgment, and render to every man according to his deeds. At present his judgment tarries; and men, if they were wise, would feel that this long-suffering of God is salvation. But that He

has appointed a day in which He will judge the world in righteousness is a truth which conscience at once accepts, though it could not say beforehand that it must be so. The person of the Judge, and the nature of the award, we can only learn by positive revelation; but unless we sophisticate our conscience, and drug it with excuses, we must feel that there is a day of judgment for men, and that, if for no other reason, there must be an existence after death in order that there may be an award to all.

The teleological proof thus rests for its support on the character of God. We see no good reason why the inequalities of life should be redressed except this, that God is a God who hateth iniquity, and will by no means clear the guilty. Lax or Epicurean views of his moral attributes would leave us with the impression that as there is evil unredressed in this life, so there will be in the next. But a sound view of God's moral attributes leads us on to hold that full retribution and reward must attend on vice and virtue, if not in this world, then certainly in the next. If for no other reason therefore, there must be a future life, in order that God may so vindicate his holy abhorrence of sin. This is the proof which has commended itself as most convincing to thinkers of the most opposite schools of thought—Athenagoras and Raimond de Sebunde, Mendelssohn and Göschel.* But at most it

* *Vid.* Athenagoras "De Resurrectione Mortuorum," xix., xx.; Mendelssohn's "Phœdo," 201; Goschel, p. 32. The authorities are quoted at length by Schultz, "Die Voraussetzungen der Christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit," p. 46.

only proves an existence after death, not that this existence is either final or endless. It argues with great plausibility that as we see no settlement made with wickedness here, there must be some settlement made hereafter. But whether that settlement is to be a final one, it does not presume to say. Proof it is none; but it furnishes a strong presumption in favour of the proof which revelation brings, that all men shall rise to give an account of the deeds done in their bodies. It is the voice of conscience within witnessing to that truth which it cannot by itself establish, but which, when once brought in, it goes far to confirm.

Thus, to sum up these three proofs, the metaphysical, the ontological, and the teleological, are unsatisfactory, chiefly because they attempt too much. If put out of their place, and raised into independent proofs, they only arouse criticism, and excite the scepticism they are intended to lay. Their logical value is little; but we should err in the other extreme if we were to reject them as altogether worthless. The sense of a hereafter awaiting us after death is as strong as any moral instinct in human nature. Like other instincts of the lower creation, it works blindly, not knowing its own end and aim, but none the less true for the purpose for which it was implanted. The real base on which this instinct of immortality rests, and without which it would soon fade out and disappear, is the continuity of moral character, and the consequent necessity for a world beyond the present, in which the character here formed for good or evil, may receive the full

fruition of that for which it has been preparing itself in time.

We should describe these so-called proofs of our immortality as intimations more than arguments. They are presages rather than proofs, and belong to the poet more even than to the philosopher. Wordsworth, in that noble ode in which these intimations are described, with lyric grace and almost prophetic fire, has carried the proof, if proof it can be called from the dignity of man to the point where it breaks down with its own weight. Man is made for immortality, and a voice within whispers that it must be so. He comes from God, and goes to God.

> "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
> The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
> Hath elsewhere had its setting,
> And cometh from afar."

But this argument for our immortality from our pre-existence, leads to conclusions which the poet himself would reject, if he really considered the consequences of his own theory. It would lead, either to the Brahminical theory of transmigrations of being, or the Buddhist notion of a final absorption in the ocean of universal spirit, in which there is no more being, because there is no more birth.

Thus the argument for man's natural immortality, is no sooner put into a logical form, than it leads to a paralogism. We prove too much. These presages of a life beyond the present, carry us back as well as forward. In the hands of a poet like

Wordsworth, or a poetical philosopher like Plato, they make out a case for pre-existence, on which we can say nothing more than this, that anyone who can stake his hopes of existence hereafter, on any thing so shadowy as this theory of pre-existence, must be one who confounds memories with hopes, and fancies with facts. Taken as a whole, these presages of immortality, which we call the ontological, cosmological, and teleological, are enough to excite a surmise, but not to establish a proof. They bring reason, like the women, early to the tomb of Jesus, but they are unable to roll away the stone, much less to bring the dead to life.

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRICHOTOMY TO DISCOVER THE PRINCIPLE OF FINAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

"God is a spirit." "He alone has immortality." Is there any connection between these two declarations as to the nature of God? Do we see any relation between his essence as a spirit, and his attribute as the Being who was, and is, and is to come. We think there is. The little we know of spirit as opposed to matter amounts to this, that whereas material existences depend each on the other, and the higher the organism the more dependent it is on all lower organisms for support; with spirit the very converse is the case. Spirit is not supported by, but sustains all existences lower than itself. Unlike the atoms of matter, which are in continual flux, the mineral passing into the plant, and the plant into the animal, spirit is self-contained. It does not draw its springs of being from without, but from within; and when it goes out in action, does so rather for the good of others than for its own. Forasmuch as we are the offspring of God, we are dimly conscious of having

something akin to this essential property of spirit in our spirits. It does not come into distinct consciousness in many cases, but in so far as it exists at all it is an intimation to us of a Being who is pure spirit, and who in the fullest sense of the word is self-contained, and therefore eternal.

If God, then, is immortal because He is a Spirit, we have not far to look for the true ground of man's immortality. We are made in God's image, and we have seen that this image of God is not to be sought in the animal or even in the intellectual part of our nature, but in the moral or spiritual. It is only in so far as man is a spirit that we can see any ground for supposing that he is made to exist for ever, and to enjoy the favour of God. But man is not a pure spirit. We cannot say this even of angels. The immortality, then, of men or of angels seems to depend upon their continuing in the image of God. Once that they lose this they lose with it that eternal life, which seems to consist in the knowledge of God. Their existence does not instantly end with the extinction of spiritual life; but the conditions of immortality are gone, and they exist only for such time as God is pleased that they shall live, as monuments of his wrath, and warnings to those who have not sinned.

As we know so little of the nature of angels, it is safer to confine our reflections on this subject to the case of men. Of the immortality of man we may collect this from Scripture that it springs from his being given a spirit made in the image of God; but that when he lost that image and became dead in

trespasses and sins, then he fell under the law of mortality of the lower animals, and from the day that he sinned came under the sentence of death. "Death passed over all, for that all have sinned." Man chose to follow the lower instincts rather than the higher. He indulged his intellect at the expence of his spirit; and the flesh at the expence of his intellect. The psyche rebelled against the pneuma when Adam saw that it was a tree to make men wise; the sarx or fleshly desire rebelled against the psyche when the woman saw that it was pleasant to the eye, and good for food: and the result was anarchy. The constitution of human nature was broken up. Man had made the fatal and final choice—for a mess of pottage he had sold his birthright—like the base Indian, he had thrown a pearl away richer than all his tribe. But the choice was irrevocable; his destiny was fixed; dying, he must die. For himself and his posterity Adam had chosen the animal instead of the spiritual nature, and he had now to live the animal life, and, like the animal, to fall back upon the law of decay and dissolution. He had sown to the flesh, and must of the flesh reap corruption. Hence it was that from the day that he sinned, the sentence began to take effect —dying, thou shalt die. Thus the death was in the same order as the sin. First there was the death of the spirit, then of the soul or intellect, and lastly of the body itself. The instant that Adam sinned his spirit died; for what is death but the higher sinking into subjection to the lower? When we speak of the animal dying, we mean that the power which arrests

chemical action fails, and the organic sinks into the inorganic. So when we say that the spirit dies, we mean that the higher or pneumatical nature falls under the law of the psychical, and shares its fate. The higher nature thus is subdued by the lower, and if there is no property of inherent immortality in the intellect more than in the body of man, it is clear that with the death of the spirit the only spark of immortality in man died, and the reign of death began with the reign of sin.

The objection to this view, which confines the immortality of man to the possession of the spirit, is this —that it appears to exclude the necessity for any future state of rewards and punishments. How, it will be said, can we reconcile this with the teaching of Scripture, that the wages of sin is death, not the death, *i.e.*, of the body only in this life, but of body and soul in hell hereafter? To this we answer that the popular view of the punishment of Adam's sin is founded on a misconception of the reason which Scripture gives for an existence after death, and of rewards and punishments in a higher state of being. If we might conjecture on such a subject without committing the folly of arraigning the wisdom and goodness of God, we should say that had there been no provision made for putting away Adam's sin, the sentence of death passed on Adam would have been instantly and exactly enforced. Dying, he would have died. In the day that he sinned his spirit or immortal part died, and soul and body would have followed a few years after, by that law of dissolution which is common to all

animal life, and which he was only exempted from in so far as he was a spirit, and continued to live in the image of God. Thus the penalty on Adam's sin was death, or gradual and entire extinction, as life was withdrawn successively from spirit, soul, and body.

If we take our Lord's words,* in their plain and natural meaning, all life beyond the grave, as well as all judgment, either to life eternal or to death eternal, comes from Him as the Son of man. He has life in Himself; this life is given to Him in virtue of His incarnation. He is the quickening Spirit as the first Adam was the living soul. He not only executes the judgment, because he is the Son of man, but He even called men from their graves. All who are sleeping in their graves, the dead of all time, from the first day to the last are to hear that voice, and come forth, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation.

The plain meaning of this passage is this, that the *hereafter* of the whole human race is bound up with the person and work of Christ, not merely, as we commonly think, the *happiness or misery* of the human race. He is the resurrection and the life—the two words are not tautologous. He both raises men and judges them—the being of all, and not only the well-being of the saved, results from his Incarnation. We are not going beyond the sense of this and many other Scriptures when we say that if Christ were not raised, death would most probably have been what the

* John v. 25-29.

ungodly and impenitent would wish it to be, an eternal sleep. The life to come and the judgment to come are both from Him who, for this end, both died and rose, and revived, that he might be the Lord both of the dead and of the living.

Thus heaven and hell, and the fearful alternative awaiting every human being, in the one or in the other, are both the result of Christ's work. It is not enough to say, that hell was prepared for the sin of Adam, and that Christ's work has opened heaven to all believers. It is more consonant with Scripture to say, that both heaven and hell, the life eternal of the one and the second death of the other, are the results of that meritorious work of Christ. If we had sinned only after the similitude of Adam's transgression, and no provision of mercy had been made in Christ, the hereafter of man would have been better for some and worse for others than it now can be. It is agreeable to all we know of God's character, that to whom little is given of him little will be required, and to whom much is given, of him more will be required. The higher the gift the greater the penalty consequent on its abuse. Pleasures and pains are co-extensive, rights and duties are co-relative. The animal suffers less, because it enjoys less than man, and man, when endowed with higher sensibilities of goodness, becomes capable of greater misery for a loss of goodness, and the sense of wickedness becomes part of his being.

Thus the question of the final state of mankind turns on the point, whether they are in Christ or not. As to the case of those whose spirit is renewed by

the Divine Spirit, the language of Scripture is clear and explicit. They have eternal life begun already, for "he that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life," and with it they have the pledge that He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken their mortal bodies by His Spirit which dwelleth in Him.

But what of those who are not in Christ; who are not renewed or quickened by the quickening Spirit? It is a solemn question, and one not to be lightly answered. It is easy to make confident assertions on such a subject, but confident assertions are no sign of deep conviction. Besides, as Archer Butler has well observed,—"Our liability to error is extreme when we become immersed in the holy obscurity of the cloud, over the mercy-seat of the divine mysteries."

We would then at once dismiss, *in limine*, all those popular theories of the life everlasting, which as they rest on the old dichotomy of soul and body, do not throw any real light on the mystery of evil. The question of the duration of future punishment has generally turned on the natural immortality of the soul, and thus three opinions have grown up, each of which has found its advocate.

They are these: 1. The usual orthodox opinion that the soul is naturally immortal, and hence that a life everlasting must await all alike, either in heaven or in hell—in happiness or in misery: 2. The opinion that the soul is naturally mortal as well as the body; hence, if it is raised at all, it is raised to receive a finite punishment for a finite sin, which is to end in de-

struction or annihilation. This view was held by Socinus and Crellius, and afterwards by Locke, Dr T. Burnet, and the Latitudinarians generally. The late Archbishop Whately adopted it in his scripture revelations of a future state. Mr Litton, in his recent work on "Life and Death," and an increasing number of writers, who shrink from Universalism, but see no ground in Scripture for the common opinion of the soul's immortality, take this view: 3. There is the theory of Dodwell, which is a compound of the two preceding. According to Dodwell, the soul is naturally mortal, but actually immortalised by the waters of baptism, either to everlasting happiness or misery. Many Lutheran divines have held a similar opinion, with this only difference, that the bread and wine of the other sacrament is supposed to convey the immortalising virtue, instead of the waters of baptism. Of these Sacramentalists we need say little for or against. Their theory is a compromise between two contradictory views, and, like other cases of compromise, satisfies neither party. It takes, moreover, a shallow and external view of the work of grace. It falls under the reproach of superstition, as it tends to confound the accident with the essence of salvation. The life eternal which comes from feeding on Christ by faith, should not be confounded with the bodily act of eating bread and drinking wine in remembrance of Him. To confound in this way mind with matter, the spirit with the letter, the essence with the form, is mysticism in philosophy, and superstition in religion. Dodwell's paradox probably never convinced a single

individual, who has read that strange farrago of misapplied learning; so we need not take up space by confuting it.

Thus the question of the life everlasting has been hitherto discussed on the narrow grounds of the natural mortality or non-mortality of the soul. Three opinions, we have seen, have been held on the subject: but from their defective psychology, none of them seem to us to throw much real light on the question. The truth is, that the soul is neither mortal nor immortal, and as long as we keep to the grounds of dichotomy, we cannot go farther than the words of Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, "The souls* of good men, who are worthy of God, die no more, but the souls of the unjust are punished as long as they exist, and God will have them suffer."

But when we take into account that besides a soul or thinking principle there is in every man a spirit, a God-consciousness, a faculty endowed with almost infinite capacities for good or evil, an organ or instrument either for God or Satan to work upon, and so of being inspired either with "airs from heaven or blasts from hell," the question becomes awfully deepened and

* This much controverted passage is found in Justin Martyr's Dialog. cum Tryphone, ch. 9., Ed. Otto. It is quoted by Dodwell, Burnet, and others, in favour of their view of the mortality of the soul, but it fairly may be taken to mean no more than this, that the existence of the wicked in the place of punishment depends on the appointment of God, not on the necessary immortality of the soul. Irenæus has the same view, "Perseverant autem quoad usque deus et esse et perseverare voluerit," (l. ii. c. 34). The stress of the early apologists was against Platonism, and we must bear this in mind in quoting their words against the natural immortality of the soul.

solemnised. Viewing man as a spiritual being we see that he has within himself heights and depths of happiness and misery, which we can only catch glimpses of here, but which we shall explore hereafter. We carry within us unrealized heavens and hells, of which the majority of us are as little conscious as men are of the subterranean fires beneath their feet. It would be a relief to us to believe, if we could, that this dormant pneuma will never be aroused in the finally lost. For then, though there is a natural shrinking from bare annihilation, and we are loth to believe that even sin can cause God to undo his own work, and consign back to unconsciousness any who have breathed the breath of thoughtful life, still it would be far less terrible to think of such fallen spirits becoming as the untimely fruit of a woman, or as corn blasted before it be grown up.

But we cannot think of the pneuma, even in the unregenerate, remaining as a bare potentiality, undeveloped in the adult as much as in the babe unborn. Such a view as this would never explain the case of those who resist the Holy Ghost, who quench the Spirit, who do despise to the Spirit of Grace, who are not only earthly and psychical, but even devilish or devil-inspired; who yield their spirits to Satan—who sell themselves to work wickedness—who call evil good, and good evil—who put sweet for bitter, and bitter for sweet—who put light for darkness, and darkness for light—who, knowing the judgment of God, not only do these things, but have pleasure in them that do them. Such are said to "treasure up to themselves

wrath against the day of wrath." To such there is "no more place of repentance, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment." Of one such it is said, that "it would have been good for him if he had never been born." To these blasphemers of the Holy Ghost, the Saviour says, there is repentance neither in this life nor in that which is to come. He calls them serpents, a generation of vipers, and exclaims, "how can ye escape the judgment of hell?" The punishment of mere privation may apply, as Augustin thought, to unbaptized infants, or with good Dr Watts we may suppose that the souls of little children may be annihilated. But what of those who have exercised the pneuma, and have thereby resisted the Holy Ghost, and heaped to themselves wrath against the day of wrath?

We are here shut in to the fearful conclusion, that there are some who are vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, as there are others who are vessels of mercy. Certainly with some, if not with all, their day of grace is closed in time, and their probation is ended in this life, by their treading under foot the Son of God and doing despite to the Spirit of Grace. Universalism seems to shut its eyes to all those passages which speak of spiritual wickedness as distinct from mere fleshly or psychical sins. But the distinction is Scriptural. As there are three natures in man, so there are three degrees of sin. It seems to deepen in malignity as it rises from sins of the flesh to sins of temper and intellect, reaching at last devilish sins. Thus the climax is reached, and a seal set upon the character,

when men attain to spiritual wickedness, when they call evil good and good evil, and when they speak a lie, not from infirmity, as Peter, or cowardice, as Jacob, but as Satan, who speaks of his own, for he is a liar, and the father of it.

Now, the duration of punishment, and the malignity of evil, must bear some proportion to each other.* "Whatever else we can say of the unseen world, we may assume this as an axiom, that the unhappiness of the wicked will last as long as their wickedness lasts. We cannot suppose to find in the next world any exception to the rule that sin and misery go together. If, then, the misery of the wicked be not eternal, it must be terminated either by their reformation, or their annihilation. Now, I think it is the first only of these suppositions that needs to be discussed on this occasion."

If Dr Salmon had noticed the distinction between carnal, psychical, and spiritual wickedness, growing out of the threefold nature of man, he would have seen that while it is undeniably true that men's misery will last as long as their wickedness, there must be three different degrees of misery corresponding to these three degrees of wickedness. The earthly, the psychical, the devilish, are all punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, but may it not be with few stripes in one case, and with many stripes in the other?

* Quoted from Dr Salmon's Sermon on the place in preaching which the Doctrine of the Eternity of Future Punishments ought to hold. Dublin Hodges and Smith. 1865.

We are far from saying that the distinction of spirit, soul, and body warrants us in affirming that there will be three circles in hell for carnal, psychical, and pneumatical sin respectively. But at least it suggests some middle truth between the Augustinian theory of a *massa perditionis*, the undistinguishable misery of all out of Christ, and the universalist doctrine that all punishment is remedial, and after a certain baptism of fire purified souls will return back to the bosom of the universal parent. On such a subject we agree with Bengel, that the doctrine of final retribution is not one fit for discussion.* But this at least we may affirm, that the judgment of God will be according to truth, and there will be love as well as justice and truth seen in the final sentence, "Depart ye cursed, into the place prepared for the devil and his angels."

Christian psychology may not be able to explain Christian eschatology, but it raises at least a higher issue than the old one, as to the natural immortality of the soul, on which the question was supposed to turn till the true nature of the spirit and of spiritual wickedness was seen from Scripture. Whether the devil and his angels are immortal, and whether all who go to the place prepared for the devil and his angels,

* Bengel adds, "that the word *αἰώνιος* has two significations, is undeniable, and thus the Scriptural expressions *κόλασις αἰώνιος* and *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (everlasting punishment and everlasting life, Matt. xxv. 46), seem to have unequal meaning. Considering," he adds, "all that we experience, and that is revealed to us respecting the divine mercy, we may fairly believe that there is an economy for the poor ignorant heathen apart from that with which we are concerned. St. Paul does not undertake to give any final decision about them, "what have I to do with them that are without" (1 Cor. v. 12).—*See Bengel's Life and Writings*,, English translation, p. 376.

like the children of the resurrection, "cannot die," lies beyond the horizon to which Scripture bounds our view. There are some who think that as evil carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction, even spiritual wickedness will not exist for ever, but will end, not with the reformation but the extinction of those who only live to defy God, and gnaw their tongues with pain. He must reign, we read, till He hath put all enemies under His feet, and the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. This may, of course, only mean that the enemies put under His feet will exist for ever, broken but still defiant, crushed but still rebels. But it may also mean that the enmity itself shall cease because the enemy is brought to a perpetual end; it may mean that evil will end at last with the existence of the evil one, and that death itself shall die. Thus the second death may mean not life in death, but the "death of death, and hell's destruction," when all that shall remain of the old enemy will be the ashes in the valley of Hinnom, to remind the dwellers in the new Jerusalem of the long conflict between good and evil, and of the final and glorious triumph. There is again, the other view, in which 'eternal' punishment is understood to mean 'everlasting.' We are told, that "the smoke of the torment" of the lost shall go up for ever and ever, even as the smoke of the incense of praise will ascend for ever, from those who stand before the throne, and who worship in the heavenly temple. However terrible this view appears, it is certain that the judgments of God will be according to truth. All we wish here to impress is, that everlast-

ing punishment, as well as everlasting life, loses its full depth of meaning unless we grasp the distinction between spirit and soul. Spiritual wickedness is that which makes us children of the devil (δαιμονιώδης, James iii. 15), or devil inspired. To this fearful climax the psychical man is always tending, though it is as impossible to say when he has reached it as it is to define what the sin against the Holy Ghost may be. Certain it is that as flesh and spirit are the two poles of man's existence, so we begin in the flesh, and our characters are formed for heaven or hell, according as the spirit is quickened by God's Spirit, or hardened by rejecting its gracious influences. In this, as in other respects, psychology throws light upon theology; the distinction between flesh and spirit teaches us that there is a distinction in wickedness here, and leads us therefore to believe that in the government of a righteous God there will be a distinction in punishment hereafter.

OF THE INTERMEDIATE STATE.

WHEN the Reformed Churches rejected the Romish doctrine of purgatory as a fond thing vainly invented, and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, the question of the intermediate state at once presented itself in a new light. Is it a state of entire consciousness, or is it one of blissful expectation on the one hand, and of a certain fearful looking for of judgment on the other? On the one hand, a sect arose, called, in the jargon of that age, the Psycho-pannuchists, which taught that the soul, when separated from the body, subsided into entire unconsciousness (παννύχια, hence the name).* One of Calvin's earliest controversial labours was a reply to these opinions, in which he maintained the view held by the Reformers generally, and which the compilers of our Liturgy undoubt-

* The Psycho-pannuchists, or Thnetopsychists, as they were called, among whom Petrus Pomponatius, 1525, was the most distinguished name, were condemned by Leo X. in a bull dated 1513. This opinion of the soul's sleep seems to have come from the East through Averroes, and was condemned in the Council of Lyons, 1274; that of Ferrara, 1438; and of Florence, 1439. At the time of the Reformation it was adopted by Socinus and his followers. The Anabaptists, or Katabaptists as Calvin called them, also took the same view of the soul in the intermediate state. The Arminian party also inclined to the same opinion. For the literature of the subject, see an article by Goschel Seelenschlat in Herzog's Cyclopedie.

edly held. The prayer in the Funeral service beginning, "Almighty God, with whom do live the spirits of them that depart hence in the Lord, and with whom the souls of the faithful after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in joy and felicity," was introduced intentionally, no doubt, to controvert the opinion that the intermediate state was one of entire unconsciousness. The fortieth of the forty-two Articles of (1852) also contains the following:—"The souls of them that depart this life do neither die with their bodies nor sleep idly. They which say that the souls of such as depart hence do sleep, being without any sense, feeling, or perceiving, until the day of judgment, or affirm that the soul dies with the body, and at the last day shall be raised up with the same, do utterly dissent from the right belief declared to us in Holy Scripture." This article, it is true, was erased by Archbishop Parker in 1559, and does not form one of the articles of belief as finally revised and subscribed by the clergy in 1562; but we are not to infer from this that any difference of opinion on the nature of the intermediate state had arisen during the time between the two revisions which the articles underwent. The orthodox doctrine has remained substantially the same, although the Church has abstained from any definite censure of those who hold the contrary view. The notion that the intermediate state was one of entire unconsciousness was held by Socinus and his school, and in later times generally by those who belonged to the Latitudinarian party. Blackburne, last century, wrote a treatise on "The Contro-

versy concerning an Intermediate State, and of the Separate Existence of the Soul between Death and the General Resurrection," in which he maintained the opinion that the disembodied soul passes the interval in entire unconsciousness. Bishop Law, of Carlisle, maintained the same view, which has been held in our own day by Archbishop Whately and others. It was the subject of a curious controversy in which Coward, Dr Thomas Burnet, Dodwell, Pitts, and a number of other writers, whose names are now forgotten, opposed the popular view of the soul's immateriality and natural immortality, and were answered by Dr Samuel Clarke, Norris, Whitby, Earberry, and others. The preponderance of opinion has remained, however, on the side of those who maintained the opinion of the soul's natural immortality. We may set out with saying that we agree with that opinion, though not with the grounds on which it is established. On the other hand, we differ with those who maintain that the disembodied soul sleeps, though on the grounds of the common dichotomy, we should say, that they have the best of the argument. We have now to examine the grounds on which the question has been argued, and to point out that the distinction between Psyche and Pneuma cuts the knot of a controversy which no amount of argument can otherwise untie.

On the grounds of the common dichotomy of man into body and soul, we do not see how we could differ with those who hold that the intermediate state is one of entire unconsciousness. Man goes to the grave,

and there, as it seems even from Scripture, "all his thoughts perish." There is no more remembrance there either of his love or his hate. The existence of the soul or rational principle seems, so far as our observation reaches, to be so dependent on the activity and health of the brain that the physical and the intellectual vary in direct proportion. The decline of the one is the signal for the decline of the other. Any injury to the brain affects our powers of thought. Memory, judgment, affection, will—all our intellectual, together with all our active powers, decline with the decline of the brain's vitality. There is no fact better attested than this. There must be an end of all inductive inquiry, before we can shake the testimony of the physiologists, that mind, however separable in idea from the organ that it uses, is yet as dependent on that organ for its power of exerting itself, as the steam is on the boiler in which it is generated. If, on the other hand, dead matter, when unensouled with some vital principle to act as the centre of force, is inert and powerless—*vis ingenii expers;* so, on the other hand, disembodied mind would evaporate, so to speak, as steam when not compressed; the *resistance* in both cases being the condition though not the cause of the force.

> "As through the frame that binds us in
> Our isolation grows defined."

If the dichotomy were a complete account of the powers of man, we should incline, without hesitation,

to the side of those who say that during the intermediate state the soul sleeps on in a dreamless sleep—our life, like a vapour, has passed away, with the destruction of the machine which contained it, and through which it exerted that subtle force of volition and thought which we call mind.

But, on the other hand, the Scriptures do not assume that man ceases to exist, the instant that his brain has ceased to act. There are many passages which assert the contrary. Death, though it is sometimes spoken of as a sleep, is never described as a state of entire unconsciousness, as the psychopannuchists maintain. Not to rest on such expressions as those, that he was "gathered to his fathers,"* or "I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me,"—the meaning of which is equivocal, our Lord in the parable of Dives and Lazarus plainly teaches that immediately after death there is a discrimination between souls, and that the rich man in hades lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and saw Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. Now, however much we may allow for what is called drapery, or, in plain words, accommodation to Jewish conceptions in this description of hades, with its two abodes adjoining each other, and only divided by a deep impassable chasm, we cannot allow, consistently

* The expression, "He was gathered to his fathers"—unlike the classic phrase, "He has joined the majority"—*οἱ πλέονες—ad plures penetravit* Plautus—implies something more than dissolution, for God was the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in a deep and peculiar sense; hence whatever might be said of the majority or mass of the dead, the patriarchs were with God, and therefore in joy and felicity, as our Lord taught the Sadducees by the word of God to Moses in the bush.

with reverence for our Lord's character, that there is any description here contrary to the real state of the case. If the state of the dead until the resurrection morning be one of entire unconsciousness, our Lord's parable is worse than unmeaning. It is untrue in a sense which we forbear here to characterize. Nor is this the only decisive statement of Scripture. Our Lord's promise to the dying thief, "this day shalt thou be with me in paradise," would be worse than unmeaning if the dying man were to lapse that instant into unconsciousness, and continue in that state till the moment of the general awakening. The apostle Paul, moreover, puts the contrast between being absent from the body and present with the Lord in a light which will bear no other interpretation than this, that though he did not desire to be unclothed, *i.e.*, to enter upon the disembodied state, and would rather be of those who are alive and remain to the coming of the Lord, that so mortality might be swallowed up of life; yet that he would accept the disembodied state as the less of two evils, or, rather, as the greater of two gains, and would desire not to be at home in the body, seeing that thus he was absent from the Lord. If the choice lay between body and soul living without the Lord, or soul and spirit with the Lord, he would willingly choose the latter, and consent to be (ἐκδημῆσαι) an exile from his home in the flesh, that so in the spirit he might enjoy the full communion of his exalted Head. Why should he be willing rather to be absent from the body, and to accept such a certain privation as that, unless that there was a presence which more than com-

pensated for the loss of sense perception and bodily consciousness? If the state of death were a state of entire unconsciousness, the Apostle could never have chosen it as the better of two alternatives. In a lower degree he already enjoyed his Lord's presence, and unless he were to pass into a state in which he would enjoy it in a much more perfect way, he could never have thought death the less of the two evils. If to him to live was Christ—to die was gain. But where would the gain be if he lost one kind of consciousness, and did not presently enter into a higher? We do not press into the argument the expression found in the Book of Revelations, of the souls beneath the altar crying out, "how long?" though the fair meaning of such language would imply that the waiting saints, in the intermediate state, are not unconscious of the lapse of time, and feel some of the same impatience as the church on earth, that the Lord delays his coming. Whatever view we take of the passage, it seems at least irreconcilable with the view of death as a state of dreamless sleep.*

We arrive, then, at this conclusion, that while all observation of the connection between soul and body inclines us to agree with the Psychopannuchist, the in-

* But Rev. xiv. 13 is at least decisive. Here it is said that henceforth (ἀπ' ἄρτι) either, *i.e.*, from the moment the voice spake, or now in prospect, *i.e.*, of the harvest of the earth in salvation, and the vintage of the earth in judgment, proclaim this truth as if with a voice from heaven, that the dead in Christ are blessed—blessed in a twofold way. 1. In that they rest from toil, κόπος. 2. That they do *not* rest from that which is their proper service—for they rest not day nor night, saying, Holy, Holy, Holy. This seems to determine the nature of the intermediate state; there is no bodily toil, κόπος, but there is the highest spiritual activity, ἔργον.

timations of Scripture are so strong on the other side, that an irreconcilable opposition between reason and revelation here occurs, which cannot be got over on the ordinary supposition of the dichotomy of human nature. To resolve this contradiction, and reconcile the two voices of God, in his word and in his works, we must fall back on the trichotomy, or the distinction between soul and spirit, as well as between body and soul. We have described the three parts of man's nature, as three kinds or degrees of consciousness. There is sense-consciousness, or the animal body; self-consciousness, or the rational soul; God-consciousness, or the spirit. We have also seen that it is conceivable, that any two of these forms of consciousness could exist without the presence and co-operation of the remaining third; the first and second without the third; or the second and third without the first. As two chords in music will make a harmony, but not less than two, so either the animal and rational, or the rational and spiritual, will combine to sustain what we call life or consciousness in man. The loss of one will deprive him of part of his powers, and this is the first death. It is an instance of the first death when Adam transgressed, and, in consequence, the Spirit, or God-consciousness, died in man, leaving only the animal and rational life remaining. In this sense we are born into the world, dead in one sense, though alive in a lower sense. Conversely, we can understand that though the body dies, yet, if the union of spirit and soul is still undissolved, there is ground for supposing that consciousness will survive this first death. We have

only another instance, though a reverse one, of the first death, in the suspension of the animal life, which is the lowest of the three essential elements of human nature. The second death is, we suppose, when the capability of receiving spiritual life is at an end, and when there shall be no more place found for repentance. In that case, which Scripture speaks of as following, not as preceding the day of the general judgment, the final state of the lost will be sealed for ever.* On this distinction, then, between the first and second death, we ground our views of the nature of the intermediate state. Man, in passing out of the body, becomes "unclothed," but does not, therefore, pass away into entire insensibility. On the contrary, by being deprived of sense-consciousness, he is thrown in on himself, and so, during the intermediate state, attains to a higher consciousness than before, of things unseen and eternal. Self-consciousness, and God-consciousness, the one the function of the pure reason, and the other of the spirit, are now exercised in a greater degree than ever. While present with the

* This view differs in one respect from the common one. The received view of that of Augustine (de Civ. Dei xxi. ch. 5). Non enim nulla sed sempiterna mors erit quando nec vivere anima poterit Deum non habendo, nec doloribus corporis carere moriendo. Prima mors animam nolentem pellit e corpore, secunda mors animam nolentem tenet in corpore. Both deaths, he adds, have this in common, that the soul suffers from the body that which it most dreads. Aug. seems to conceive that the immortality of the souls of the wicked arose from their being joined to immortal bodies of flesh; but while Scripture tells us of the resurrection of all from their graves (John v. 27), and of the glorification of the bodies of believers (1 Cor. xv. 44, Phil. iii. 21), it is silent as to the state into which the unregenerate shall rise, for 2 Cor. v. 10 is not decisive on this subject.

body we are absent from the Lord. If even the Apostle Paul, who lived in the Spirit, and walked in the Spirit, felt this, how much more must we feel it. Even the most advanced saints feel that sense-consciousness distracts and diverts them from the inner and hidden life. Not to speak of the lust of the flesh, there is the lust of the eye, which continually draws us away from communion with God. The body, or rather the flesh (for that is the term Scripture uses to describe it in our present fallen condition), lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh. The demands of the body are so incessant; its desires so many and various, and call for such attention—the preparation of our food—the care of our health—the provision for our families, that the spirit's life is but a feeble one at best. The body clearly must die if the spirit would live.

This, then, is the use of the intermediate state; this the compensation to which the spiritual look with such joy and hope, and the unspiritual with such dread and dismay. At the moment of death, the tie which connects us with sense and sense-perception is snapped, and the higher kind of consciousness begins, unbroken by the calls of our animal life. It is this which makes up the real dread of dying to the natural or psychical man. At present, the psyche or reasonable soul is diverted or amused with a thousand distractions. Art, science, and the pleasures of sense, all keep him busy and amused. He is seldom or ever driven in on himself. He can always fly from his own thoughts, to find occupation, either in criticising the thoughts of

others, or in mixing with the crowd in the common haunts of men. The unspiritual or merely psychical man is never so little at home as when at home. He does not like to exercise the higher powers of the psyche, and rise to self-consciousness, for that would suggest the sense of God-consciousness, and of the pneuma, which he has deadened and dulled by an outward worldly life.

But at death this state of self-deception must end. Then sense-consciousness ceases at once, and self and God-consciousness begin together. An accusing conscience is that which men are seldom long troubled with on this side the grave. There are a hundred ways of lulling or amusing the psyche, so long as we are in the body. While the union of body and soul lasts, the soul does not miss its true partner the spirit. But when all animal enjoyment is at an end, and reason must betake herself within to chew the cud of sweet and bitter memories, then the dreadful discovery will break in on natural men, of a higher consciousness, which they have studiedly, and all their life long, neglected. Then prayer and meditation on God's word, and self-examination, and all those other spiritual exercises which they evaded so easily, will press in on them with all their terrible reality. We dare not carry this thought farther than God's word has expressly revealed to us. Whether any who have not wilfully resisted the strivings of God's Spirit, and done despite to the Spirit of Grace will be given to know Christ in the intermediate state, is a question which it is better not to approach. Secret things belong unto

the Lord. The question whether few shall be saved is one which the Lord refused to answer. In nothing do we see the contrast between the inspired and apocryphal books so much as in the proneness of the latter to fall into disquisitions on this subject, on which the canonical books maintain a solemn silence. There is one passage which certainly seems an exception, and which, as such, has raised more discussion than any other in Holy Writ. 1 Peter iii., and iv. 6, would certainly seem to connect Christ's descent into the under world with the salvation of some who have never heard the gospel preached, when in the flesh. The testimony of the early church is uniform as to one part of Christ's work in Hades. That He there proclaimed His redemption to the waiting spirits of the patriarchs and fathers of the Jewish Church who had died in faith, not having received the promise, is a truth on which they are very nearly agreed. The unanimity indeed of the early church in holding this opinion has been one of the strongest arguments alleged by the Romish Church in favour of purgatory. The *limbus patrum*, and the *limbus infantum* were held long before the mediæval church had formulated the doctrine of purgatory, with its ascending spirals, as described by Dante. It was but carrying this notion of *limbus patrum* one step farther, to assert that the intermediate state was a place of washing and purification for all who died after, as well as for those who died before the work of Christ. Such hold did this notion of a place of purification take on the mind of the middle ages, that it practically overshadowed their conceptions alike of

heaven and hell. With indistinct notions of the work of Christ's redemption, and untaught in the great doctrine of justification by faith, it was natural that heaven and hell should sink into the background, and their notions of the hereafter cluster around the one thought of a place of purgatory. Hell might be the place reserved for unbaptized infidels, and heaven for eminent and miracle-working saints. But for the great majority of the baptized, reason seemed to call for some middle place of purgation. And so what reason called for the doctors and schoolmen were not slow to find warrant for in revelation.

The Reformation swept away this fond superstition of penances, pardons, and indulgences, which had grown out of the belief in purgatory, as the tares from seed sown in the night. But as in every case of reaction the reformers did not see that in plucking up the tares they were in danger of rooting up the wheat also. They dispelled the delusion, about a place of purgation for sins not atoned for by penance on earth; but they also lost with it all sense of the contrast between the intermediate and the state of final blessedness.

Sudden death was sudden glory,

> "Swift as the eagle cuts the air,
> We'll mount aloft to Thine abode,"

is the common conception to this day of the passage of the spirit after death into the presence of God.*

* It was the same in the Lutheran Church as with ourselves. While Luther held the opinion that the intermediate state was one of progressive holiness, a state—to use his own words—"der zunehmender Liebe;" this view was

So much was this the case, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, to a great extent, lost the importance which it holds in the New Testament. Though not denied, it became a difficulty instead of an evidence for the truth of the Christian religion. Those who held advanced views went so far as to deny it; for it was impossible to see any reconcilement between the philosophic notion of the immortality of the soul and the apostle's teaching with respect to the resurrection of the body. Such a return to what seemed materialism was abhorrent to the notions of the platonising divines of last century, who either explained away the doctrine of the resurrection of the body altogether, or held it as a mere dogma, a thing apart, which did not enter in any living way into their belief.

The intermediate state is one of those lost truths of the Bible which it is to the credit of our age that it has rediscovered, and restored it to its right importance. We do not of course understand this subject in all its bearings, and never shall on this side the grave. Whether salvation is reached forth to any there, who have never heard the gospel here, is a matter of private opinion, in which we may indulge the hope, without committing ourselves to any strong statement on either side. Pope Gregory had set his heart on the thought that the Emperor

gradually dropped by his followers, and the doctrine of immediate glory and condemnation took its place. So B. Lorcher, in his "Sammlung von Abhandlungen über den Zustand der Seelen nach dem Tode," speaks of the soul springing from the mouth straight into heaven, "Vom Mund auf, zum Himmel fahren."

Trajan might be a favoured exception to the general doom which awaits the heathen. Reasoning therefore by his wishes, he had a vision at last that his prayer was heard, and the soul of Trajan given to him at his intercession. In an age when prayers for the dead were believed to be availing, instances of these exceptions were not uncommon. Virgil was —*il maestro*—the guide of Dante, not only through the gloomy circles of hell only, but also through the upward spirals of purgatory. It was difficult for a good schoolman to believe in the eternal perdition of Aristotle, without whom orthodoxy itself could not sustain its ground. Socrates, the great example of a pre-Christian martyr, and Plutarch, the lover of good men, the panegyrist of whatsoever is lovely and of good report, must be instances of souls included within some general amnesty. So reasoned the more charitable divines of the middle ages, and we, at least in our zeal for truth, need not fall behind them in charity. It may be—and it is a mystery probably as much hidden to us as the salvation of the Gentiles was hidden to the Jews—that God has purposes of mercy in store for those who have not wilfully hardened their hearts and sinned against the Holy Ghost by stifling the pneuma within them. We are not to argue, from our ignorance of the plan of this future salvation, to its impossibility. This was the mistake of the Jews of old with regard to the election of the Gentiles. They claimed to be the elect. They held God bound by His word, and when they went so far as to do evil that good might come, and fell into

an immoral predestinarianism, declaring that God could not cast off those whom he had foreknown, we feel with the apostle that their damnation was just. May we not reason in the same presumptuous way? We do know that *for us*, "now is the accepted time, now is the day of salvation." We are also told that for those who wilfully reject Christ there remaineth no more offering for sin, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment. But where our duty ends there the silence of scripture begins, and we are left to our own conjecture as to the want of universality in revelation, on which nothing better or wiser can be written than the words of Bishop Butler.

Having spoken of the gradual and slow progress of discovery in the useful arts of life, and the fact that many of the most valuable remedies existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for ages, are known but to a few now, and that probably many valuable ones are not known yet, he adds that,* "not only is this the case, but often the remedies are so unskilfully applied as to produce new diseases, and with the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful. Many persons who labour under diseases for which there are known natural remedies are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal." The inference from this is of course obvious, that the objections which lie against the

* See Analogy, Part II., chap. 3.

want of universality in the one case are paralleled by like objections in the other case.

Bishop Butler is far too acute not to have anticipated the usual objection which has been urged again and again to the Analogy, viz., that Revelation as a redemptive system, instead of repeating the difficulties of natural religion should meet and relieve them. His answer to this is that as discoveries in nature are made by little degrees and by slow advances, so it may be with the scheme of redemption. Men are impatient and for precipitating things, but the Author of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations, accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps.

This being the case, the fault lies with those who reason from our knowledge of a part to a knowledge of the whole. Christianity is, as he is careful to remind us, a scheme imperfectly comprehended. "Our present state may possibly be the consequence of something past which we are wholly ignorant of, or it has a reference to something to come, of which we know scarce any more than is necessary to practice."

It would have been well for the cause of truth and charity if divines had be contented with this "learned ignorance,"—

> Nescire velle quoe magister maximus
> Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.

We should be content then to judge those that are within, and to leave to God's secret councils his mode of judgment of those that are without. Everywhere we see in nature the gifts of God showered down

without partiality, the sun and the rain given equally to the just and to the unjust, yet we also see priority and even preference, some greater some less, some invited to sit down in the highest place, and some compelled to take the lowest room. May there not be the same distinction in the kingdom of grace? On the one hand, the manifestation of the goodness and long-suffering of God to all, but on the other hand a difference of degree. That God's judgments are a great deep who can doubt, who has ever seriously thought of God's dealings with himself? On the subject of preference without partiality we cannot do better than again refer to the words of Bishop Butler.

"Nor is there,"* he says, "anything shocking in all this, or which would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we could really keep in mind that every one shall be dealt equitably with, instead of forgetting this or explaining it away after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances in this various economy of providence would be lost, if we would keep in mind that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more required of any one than what might have been equitably expected of him from the circumstances in which he was placed, and not what might have been expected had he been placed in other circumstances; or in scripture language, that every one shall be accepted according to what he hath, and not according to what he hath not. This, however, doth not by any means imply that all per-

* See Analogy, Part II., chap. 6.

sons' conditions here is equally advantageous here with regard to the future. And providence designing to place some in greater darkness with regard to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they should not endeavour to get out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in matter of other knowlege should not endeavour to learn, or should not be instructed."

But while we are content to take our stand with regard to the hereafter on the safe ground that it doth not yet appear what we shall be, we are not to overlook the possibility of light unexpectedly breaking in on us on these subjects even before their accomplishment through the careful and diligent study of God's word. As the prophecies with regard to the millennium, the restoration of Israel, the life from the dead of the heathen world, through the gathering in of the Jews, and the personal reign of Christ with the first resurrection of his beheaded martyrs, are understood in our day even before their fulfilment, by those who are diligent in comparing scripture with scripture; may it not be, that with regard to the intermediate state and the purposes of God with regard to those who die either in infancy, or who as idiots and savages are only children of an older growth, that our error may arise from our knowing "neither the Scriptures nor the power of God." It has been assumed far too hastily that because the Bible has been in the hands of men for nearly two thousand years, there can be nothing new to be discovered there, and so the dictum admitted both by friends and foes has been that theo-

logy, at least, is not one of the Inductive Sciences. The fact is that theology is stationary, but the fault is not with the Bible but with us, its interpreters. Bishop Butler, with his usual acuteness, has pointed this out—that the methods of study, whether of the book of nature or Revelation, must be the same, and that if we have not made discoveries in the one case as well as in the other, it must arise from the same causes. "The hindrances, too, of natural and of supernatural light and knowledge have been of the same kind. And it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood: so if it ever come to be understood before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way that natural knowledge is come at, by the continuance and progress of learning and liberty, and by particular persons attending to comparing and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made, by thoughtful men tracing out obscure hints, as it were dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths, as yet undiscovered."

That the intermediate state may be the scene of a display of the riches of God's long-suffering and grace as far transcending any we know of at present as this dispensation transcends that of Judaism is an opinion of some, on which possibly the well-known passages

(1 Peter iii. 18, iv. 6) are intended some day or other to throw light. For eighteen centuries these two passages have been considered by divines of all schools without their coming to any agreement as to their meaning. In the one passage it is said that Christ was put to death in the flesh but quickened in the Spirit, which means either that the Holy Spirit, who quickened Him, had preached before in the days of Noah to the antediluvian world, or that He (Christ) though dead in the flesh died not in the Pneuma, which could not die, but which then descended into Hades or the underworld, and there preached or proclaimed His gospel to the inhabitants of the underworld, of whom the multitude who were disobedient in the days of Noah are mentioned as examples of a class. The second passage asserts that the gospel is preached to them that are dead, either, as many interpreters say, to men who are figuratively dead, *i.e.*, in trespasses and sins, which would be here not only a truism but also unmeaning, or that the gospel is preached to those who are literally dead in the flesh, and departed to the underworld of spirits, in order that at the judgment of the last day they may be judged according to men in the flesh, *i.e.*, according to the same principle of judgment, viz., whether they refused or accepted Christ. In this view of the case there will be equality in God's dealings with all, and whether in the body or out of the body the probation of men will, may turn on the same principle, viz., whether they "did truth and came to the light," or whether they "loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil."

Of the meaning of these two passages and the inferences we are entitled to build on them, there has been an infinite variety of opinion. First, there are those who deny any reference whatever to Christ's descent to Hades, and maintain, as Augustine, Aquinas, Hammond, Leighton, and others, that the preaching of the Spirit was that by Noah, a preacher of righteousness. Again, even of those who understand the passage literally of our Lord's descent into Hades, some, as Hollaz, understand the preaching to mean a *concio damnatoria*, a sentence, *i.e.*, of judgment upon those who are already in prison reserved to the judgment of the last day. Of this we need only say that it is a sense of the word κηρύσσειν, never elsewhere used in the New Testament, and evidently resorted to here as a critical expedient to get over a theological difficulty. Several of the fathers again, as Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus, and Zwingle, and Calvin, among the Reformers, limit this preaching to the spirits of the patriarchs of the Old Testament Church, who were waiting in Hades for the announcement of a coming deliverance. This is the origin of the doctrine of that *limbus patrum*, of which the schoolmen made one of the many mansions of the underworld. Suarez, Estius, Bellarmine, and Luther, as well as Bengel, assume that the words refer, not to all unbelievers of Noah's time, but only to those who repented at the last moment when the flood was upon them, an interpretation which leaves the difficulty just where it found it, and only piles up one hypothesis upon another. Lastly, there is the view of Athanasius and Ambrose, to which Cal-

vin appears to have inclined in his Institutes, that the preaching was of two kinds, a saving message to the waiting saints, and a message of judgment to those who were condemned already and kept in prison until the sentence of the last day.

As it is clearly impossible either to add a new interpretation to the many here referred to, or to weave any consistent teaching out of such a conflict of opinion, we must either despair of finding any meaning at all in the apostle's words, or remember Bishop Butler's hint, that it is not at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. The remarks of Lange on this passage are worth translating, as they suggest the view now taken by most orthodox commentators in Germany, and to which also Dean Alford gives his adhesion:—"Holy Scripture nowhere asserts the eternal condemnation of those who have died either as heathen or as not having heard the gospel. It rather implies in many passages that repentance is possible even beyond the grave, and distinctly declares that the final decision is made, not at the moment of death, but at the last day (see Acts vii. 31; 2 Tim. i. 12, 18; 1 John iv. 17). In this passage, however, as in 1 Pet. iii. 19, St Peter distinctly teaches that God's way of salvation does not end with this life; and that to those who have departed this life without hearing of Christ, such a proclamation or preaching shall be made hereafter. There is no support, however, from this passage for the theory either of the restitution of all, and the salvation of the devil and his angels and

all wicked men alike; nor for the doctrine of a purifying fire, on which the Roman Catholic Church rests her theory that all souls which are not made perfect here will be purified by suffering hereafter."*

It is at this point of the argument that the trichotomy of man into body, soul, and spirit throws light on what is otherwise an inexplicable mystery. As man is at present, he is born into the world with a strong animal nature, with a weak rational, and with a spiritual nature that hardly, if at all, asserts its existence. Is this the right order of things? Is this the balance of power as God intended it to be? Or is it not rather a proof that an enemy has done this? Man, wounded and half dead, lies at the roadside, a fit case for the compassion of the good Samaritan, but in no condition to rise and recover himself by the aid of any remaining strength that he has left. This being the case, it is misleading to speak of the present being a state of probation in the strict sense of the word. We do not test an instrument till all its parts are in working order. Till the balance is restored, and, in the language of the South, "human nature is set on its legs again," we cannot say that probation, properly so called, begins. With the passions strong and the judgment weak, what hope is there for man if left to himself? To suppose that he can return to God of himself, while the spirit is so disordered that it feebly, if at all, testifies even of the being of God, is to suppose that a child turned adrift in an open boat could safely cross the Atlantic. One of two ways only are

* *Vid.* Lange's Biblewerk, 1 Pet. iv. 6.

open by which the probation of man is possible. We incline to the belief that God will employ both, one in one case, and the other in another. Either God may give his grace now while man is in the flesh, and, by quickening the spirit, as well as training the rational soul, may so far restore the balance as that the flesh shall be subdued to the spirit, and we, who brought forth fruit only unto death, may now bring forth fruit unto life. Or, when the body is laid at rest in the grave, and the spirit has returned to Him that gave it, He may be pleased to quicken that spirit by his Spirit, either to everlasting life or to everlasting death, at the judgment of the last day, according as the awakened spirit is turned to Christ or away from Him. Sanctification consists principally in subjecting the lower parts of our nature to the higher. In the case of those who are called in time, their discipline will be so much more complete as they have learned to keep their body in subjection to the soul, and the soul, in its turn, to the spirit. The former of these two branches of sanctification will be wanting to those who are called late. Something analogous to this occurs in time in the case of late conversions. Those who at the eleventh hour, in old age or on a death-bed, repent and turn to Christ, miss much preparatory discipline, which the deeply-taught child of God would not be without. Yet we never doubt that they are finally saved, though we say that their cup of glory, though full, will not be so great as that of those who have known and served Christ during a long life. As there are many mansions, so we doubtless believe that there are degrees of

blessedness. What is to forbid the call at the eleventh hour being understood of those whose discipline begins too late to subject the body to the soul, but not too late to subject the soul to the spirit, and the spirit to God? The essential part of sanctification lies in the fact of this subjection, not in the degree to which it is carried out. Even the most advanced Christians are very imperfectly sanctified in time, and to the last cry out on account of the motions of sin which stir in their carnal natures. How often the most watchful saint is overtaken in a fault, surprised by temptation, and finds that sin revives, and he dies. He does not, therefore, give up the conflict. He knows that for this sin he has an advocate with the Father, and he also feels another advocate pleading within him with groanings which cannot be uttered. Thus forgiven the guilt of sin by the one advocate, and encouraged against an accusing conscience by the other advocate, he renews the strife, and at last is made more than conqueror through Him that loved him. But even this advanced and experienced saint is only saved by hope. He still groans within himself, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body. He feels that, so long as soul and spirit are joined to this body of corruption, his sanctification must be incomplete, and that he is not yet one of the spirits of just men made perfect.

Thus we look forward to the intermediate state as the time when God will perfect that which is lacking. Not in purgatorial fires—quite the contrary—but under the sunshine of God's love, his spirit shall then grow in increased likeness to the Father of spirits.

Thus, as the spirit grows in likeness to God, so it will grow in strength and mastery over the rational soul. Rationalism, as well as animalism, is one of the tendencies of our present fallen nature. Sins of the intellect and sins of sense are among the corruptions that remain even in the regenerate. Of the two, the former are not so easily overcome as the latter. It is easier even to subject the body to the soul than the soul to the spirit. This higher discipline, then, probably awaits us in the intermediate state. Then relieved altogether from the conflict with the lower or animal nature, the spirit can give its whole undivided strength to subdue the soul. To bring not our animal desires only, but every thought, into subjection to the mind of Christ, is the idea of sanctification not attainable here. By and by it will be possible. The blissful and unbroken communion with Christ which the spirit will enjoy during the interval between death and the resurrection may be intended to procure us advances in holiness which are impossible in our present low condition of being. The wonder is that creatures with capacities so little above the brute can be sanctified at all while in such bodies of corruption as those we now possess. But after death these unfavourable conditions will be withdrawn, and then our advances in holiness will be proportionately rapid. In the light of Christ's countenance, every mist of doubt and prejudice will be lifted off, as the fog before the rising sun. Things now difficult and contradictory will then seem plain and perspicuous. Order will reign in our moral nature, and our faculties will fall into their right

places, without much marshalling on our part. Our affections will not then be heated by fancy, nor our judgment warped by prejudice. Reason will not then stagger as now under a load of self-made difficulties about the character and purposes of God. We shall not be enslaved by the systems of men, or afraid of looking a question in the face for fear of some awkward conclusion which does not comport with orthodoxy. The opinion of the religious world will then trouble us as little as that of any other mere secular society. We shall see all things in the light of God's love, and so, in the words of a Moravian poet, make one thing of all theology.

The late Isaac Taylor,* in his "Physical Theory of a Future Life," handled the subject of the intermediate state with much originality and freshness of view. The principal point which he made out was that, connected as our emotions are with the physical system, it would be impossible to know God as He is without the emotions undergoing a preparatory training out of the body. To see God as He is would rather distract us and drive us mad in such weak and excitable frames as our present mortal bodies. Our nervous system, as strung at present, would not bear the strain, for no man can see God and live. Thus the Apostle

* See Isaac Taylor's "Physical Theory of Another Life." His argument was almost exclusively directed to the one point of the emotions, and the unconscious control which the will exerts over them at present. If with our present emotional system, which is principally, if not exclusively, physical, we were to behold the glory of God and divine things, the mind would be thrown off its balance. But there are other uses of the intermediate state besides this suspense of the *excito-motor* system, and it is to these other uses that we call attention in the text.

Paul, when caught up to the third heaven, saw things which it is not *possible* (ἐξὸν, 2 Cor. xii. 4) for a man to utter; and this strain on the nervous system was probably connected with, if not the direct cause of the thorn in the flesh which left him a shattered broken man. St John, too, fell as dead when he beheld the glory of Christ in the vision in Patmos. Such being the case, there is need of a state in which, the *excito-motor* system being set at rest, the emotions may be exercised at first without tearing to pieces the framework of flesh in which they are now contained. Thus the intermediate state is, as Isaac Taylor conceives it, a preparation for a state in which we shall know God through the organs of sense-perception in a way that we cannot bear to do now.

To this view of the subject we have no objection whatever; on the contrary, we think it as probable as any conjecture on a subject so remote from present interests. But the view we here commend is less speculative and more practical. The intermediate state will doubtless be a preparation for a higher state of being, and one of its uses will be to inure the spirit to assert its mastery over the lower or emotional nature, so that when clothed upon with a spiritual body, all danger of a revolt of the lower against the higher nature, like that which occurred with our first parents, will be excluded. But while this is so, we think it even more important to see that a discipline will be completed there, which is here only begun in certain cases, and in others not attempted at all. If man were only body and soul, then there would be no

room for this discipline, when the soul is separated from the body. The disembodied soul would have little else to do than to drink deep of the knowledge of God, and bask itself in the eternal sunshine of his love. This is nearly the sum total of what is usually thought to be the occupation of those who are absent from the body, and present with the Lord. They see His countenance and are satisfied therewith. But we can conceive of some discipline, probation, or preparation, whatever we choose to call it, superadded to this state of blissful rest. The distinction of soul and spirit implies self-consciousness as well as God-consciousness; introspection as well as intuition: and a growth in holiness proportionate to our growth in the likeness of God. If we might distinguish holiness from heavenly-mindedness, we should say that the latter is the exercise of the spirit, the former of the soul. As the spirit governs the soul, so heavenly-mindedness produces holiness. The one is the painter's eye, the other the painter's hand. Without looking long, the artist would never get the ideal stamped on the brain; and, without handling the palette and brush, he could never succeed in transferring that conception to the canvas. "Here, in the body pent," we are like artists whose conceptions are poor, and their execution poorer still. We want, in the first instance, the conceptive faculty raised, and, in the next, the cunning of hand, to translate our thoughts into action. But this we never can attain to while this muddy vesture of decay wraps us in. Our spirits seldom rise at all, and then not for more than a moment or two, to the state

of silent ecstacy when we hold real communion with God. These Tabor glimpses of God and Christ are too transitory to enable us to show more than a shadowy reflection in our own life, of the unseen beauty of holiness. Like Moses coming down from the mount, though our faces shine, yet it is with a passing brightness. It dies away in the light of common day. Neither heavenly-mindedness nor holiness, neither the contemplative nor the active side of Christian character, ever attain to their full growth in the unfriendly soil of our present animal nature. The fault is inseparable from our present condition of being; a fallen world and a treacherous evil heart are not friendly to the development of the inner and higher life in man.

But, let the conditions of our moral and spiritual existence be altered in this one important respect; let the attractions which draw us to earth disappear altogether, and those which draw us to God be not only strengthened, but actually replace them, and then our growth in holiness and heavenly-mindedness will be as sudden as if we were transformed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. We need not suppose that in the intermediate state we shall climb up the way of holiness step by step, with many a stumble, and many a relapse, as the Christian pilgrim now does. One moment of the presence of Christ will do more to ripen our character than years of self-discipline here on earth. We believe in cases of sudden conversion on earth, there are transformations of character even here, wrought by one look of faith at

the cross of Christ. But this is nothing to the suddenness with which our whole soul shall be melted and fused into the mould of holiness, when the full blaze of Christ's love breaks in at once on the departed spirit, and when found in the spiritual image of Christ, we shall also rapidly grow into his moral likeness.

The author of "The Religion of Common Life,"* very truly said, that the fret and care of life in its round of common duties and worldly occupations were the very means wisely made use of by our Heavenly Father to sanctify us, His children. He compared them to the weights of a clock, which, so far from impeding its movements, are actually the source of its movement. This may be very true, though the illustration is more ingenious than solid. The *weights* of a clock are its *forces;* they are to a clock what the elastic force of a steel mainspring is to a watch, or the expansive force of steam in a boiler. Now no one will say that the duties and troubles of life are the mainspring or motive power of the divine life in the soul. There is a *need be* for them, no doubt, and it is certain that, so long as we are in the body, we cannot do without them. But we must not make them the efficient instrument of our sanctification; they are its condition, not its cause. The true and only cause of sanctification is the presence of the Holy Ghost, the sanctifier, in our hearts, taking of the things of Christ, and showing them unto us. All other discipline, however providential and necessary, is only to keep down the undergrowth of

* See Dr Caird's Sermon, preached before the Queen.

earthly-mindedness. The body is thus kept under by the care of providing for our daily bread, or by those public and professional engagements and duties of life, which, however little profitable to holiness in themselves, are necessary as means to keep the body under.

But when the body itself is laid aside in the grave there will be no need then of *counterpoises* to the overwhelming attraction of earthly things. When the weights which draw us to pleasure and self-indulgence will be gone, then those other weights made up of the cares and duties of life will be taken off, and it will be seen that the soul only wanted the one to right the balance which the other had unduly disturbed. There is nothing sanctifying *per se* in the occupations of life —quite the contrary—though we admit that with animal natures such as ours to keep in check, the discipline of worldly duty cannot be dispensed with. Still we must not confound, as Mr Caird seems to have done, the sanctifying Agent himself with the discipline he at present makes use of. It is very natural for us to say, because we see human nature sanctified under circumstances like the present, that these conditions are indispensable, and that men could not be sanctified unless under precisely the same conditions, *i.e.*, by the flesh striving against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. We can only repeat, that the conditions of an experiment are not the same as the cause, and that we can conceive the same experiment carried out under much more favourable conditions. Let the body be disposed of in the grave, and the spirit brought into the presence of God with the reasonable soul sub-

dued so far as to obey its godly motions, in this case sanctification will be both rapid and complete. The likeness of God in the spirit, and his image in the soul, will then be so much more perfect on account of the disturbing element brought in by animal nature being laid at rest in the grave.

This is the use then of the intermediate state in the case of believers. When man was made of body, soul, and spirit, the lower was intended to serve the higher. But ever since the entrance of sin it has been otherwise. God has then brought in death to right the balance which sin has disturbed. Through sin the spirit dies, the body or the flesh reigns, and the soul serves the body; all is thus confusion and wrong. Death then comes in as a stage in the redemptive work for those who are saved. In death the body dies, the spirit lives, and the soul serves not the body, but the spirit. Thus the right order returns. The balance is restored, and all traces of the former anarchy are removed. The spirit during the interval is so deeply settled in its allegiance to God, and the soul brought under subjection to the spirit, that when at the resurrection morning we are given a new and incorruptible body, there will no longer be any danger of a disturbance, the balance will be righted for ever, and through the ages of eternity we shall perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord.

THE RESURRECTION AND SPIRITUAL BODY.

We have seen that the use of the intermediate state was to carry on, out of the body, that work of sanctification which is begun, but never reaches completion, in the body. It is the opposite thus to the state of the carnal mind into which we enter at our birth: it compensates its defects. In the one the body lives and reigns, the soul lives and serves, and the spirit sleeps. In the other the spirit lives and reigns, the soul lives and serves—but serves its rightful master, the higher, not the lower principle—and the body sleeps. Physical death is thus a stage in the work of redemption, not as we sometimes hear it described, its full triumph. It is only when this corruptible body shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal have put on immortality, that shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, "Death is swallowed up in victory." Sanctification, or the conflict of the spirit against the flesh, is begun the moment the pneuma is awakened; but it is never complete until the flesh is dead in fact, as it is already dead in idea. Death is thus a stage in our sanctification, the midway passage between grace and glory.

This is why sanctification and death are so constantly associated in St Paul's Epistles. "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." Baptism is both death and burial. "We are buried with Christ by baptism unto death." "He that is dead is freed from sin." Man's redemption, thus including in that term not only the forgiveness of sins, but also renewal in the image of God, is never complete on this side the grave. While this body of sin lives we are only saved by hope, and groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body. But as soon as the body, and with it all carnal lusts and affections, is laid in the grave, that instant our redemption is complete, and we enter on a state of sinless perfection, which is unattainable so long as we are in the flesh. The state of death is thus seen to be the only saving antidote from the poison of sin. As sin reigned unto death, so death now reigns unto holiness. In the one case, man was in a state of outward life and inward death. Now, he is in a state of outward death, but of inward life. The intermediate state is the sabbatizing of the people of God (Heb. iv. 6), the compensation for a lifelong conflict with indwelling sin. Now our life is all outward—then it will be all inward. We groan now because the senses are so strong, and the spirit life so weak. It will be a glorious retribution to lay the senses by for a little, and enjoy a life that is inward only.

This is why the intermediate state is described as a state of rest. As a compensation for the over activity of the body, and the distraction of earthly cares and

duties, we shall be given a season when we rest from these *labours*, while our *works* do follow us. The κόπος and the ἔργον in this passage in Rev. xiv. 13, are perhaps thus distinguished: the one refers to flesh and its busy-bodiness about what is, after all, nothing at all, a κόπος, in which it is all toil and no result; the other to that ἐνέργεια of the spirit, which results in a ἔργον, something definite, real, and enduring. Thus as Noah was given his name, with reference doubtless to that rest from the toil and moil of a wicked world which the waters of Noah brought with them, so death shall be a rest or a comfort to us from all the work and toil of our hands. Death is the needful antidote of that worldly-mindedness which is the peculiar bane of life. "So he giveth his beloved sleep," that they may not for ever eat of the bread of carefulness. Redemption from sin will never be entire till we lay down the burdens of daily life which the entrance of sin has laid on us.

Thus far we see the need of the intermediate state. It is the sabbath of man's existence, without which his week day of life on earth would be miserably incomplete. But the Sabbath being past, the first day of the week, the Easter-day of a new creation, must begin to dawn. On the Sabbath, the activity of man is turned into a new direction, and the body rests, that the spirit may bestir itself. But the Sabbath is the last day of the old week, not the first day of the new. The resurrection morning will bring in a new order of things. As with Christ the first fruits, so with us his people. He was put to death in the flesh, and

quickened in the spirit, and in that spirit passed into the intermediate state. But to be made like his brethren in all things, He rose again on Easter morning in the completeness of human nature, body, soul, and spirit. He is thus the first fruits of them that sleep. All his people, without exception, are either one or two removes behind Him in the process by which mortality is swallowed up of life. We who are in the body are two removes behind Him, those in the intermediate state are only one. But none, not even Moses and Elias, have yet put on the resurrection body. They are only conformable to his death, but have not yet attained to the resurrection from the dead.

The nature of the resurrection body has not been revealed to us. It doth not yet appear what we shall be. All we know is, that our present bodies of humiliation shall be changed, to be made like unto his glorious body. Farther than this we cannot go—we know "that we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." It does not throw the least light on this mystery to speculate on the nature of the Lord's resurrection body. It is only *obscurum per obscurius*. Of the two, indeed, it is less mysterious to think of the nature of our resurrection body. We know, at least, that we shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more—that we shall neither marry nor be given in marriage—that it will not be a body of flesh and blood, and that it will be subject to none of the present laws of pain, decay, and death. But in the case of the Lord's resurrection body there is this added difficulty, that it was the same body, *i.e.*, of the same identical particles of matter with

the body laid in the sepulchre, and yet transfigured and spiritualized in some way which is at present inconceivable to us. In the case of our bodies of flesh and blood which are laid in the grave, and see corruption, they are like the seed which dies in the ground, and never reappears at all, but sends up instead that which is to the old body what the shoot is to the root buried beneath the earth. We have thus an analogy to help us to conceive of the nature of our resurrection bodies. There is not any identity of particles in our case as in the case of the Lord's body. Thus, of the two, the resurrection of Christ is much more unintelligible to reason even than ours. We have analogies for the one, but none for the other. The apostle was able to rebuke the folly of the Corinthian sceptics by the comparison of the seed corn. "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." But how could he have confuted a questioner who asked for an explanation of how Christ rose from the dead, not as the revivification only of a dead man,* but as the type of those who shall be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. If the alchemist's dream

* Christ's resurrection has been said to have been both a *revival* and a *resurrection*. The distinction is founded on Rom. xiv. 9; but as the reading is doubtful—the best MSS. omitting *και ανεστη*—nothing certain should be founded on it. That our Lord's was a *revival* as well as a *resurrection* is probable from the nature of the case; for, 1. It was not possible that He should be holden of death. 2. His body, after His resurrection, was identical in matter, as well as in form, with the body in which He suffered. Less evidence than this failed to satisfy Thomas. 3. Unless He had taken the very body which death had destroyed, He could not be said to have destroyed death by dying. A glorified body only veiled for a time under a mantle of flesh, would not satisfy the conditions of His meritorious death. Hence we conclude that *in His case* it was both a revival and a resurrection; but the higher truth, which is to reconcile these two views, we do not see.

of the transmutation of metals were to become a reality of modern science—if the chemist who can reduce a diamond to carbon could raise the carbon back again to the diamond, we should then have an analogy on which to ground our conceptions of the change which the Lord's body underwent in the grave. The Lord's resurrection then is a pledge that we shall rise; but it is more than a pledge, it actually prefigures the nature of the resurrection of those who are alive at the last day, and are changed in a moment of time. A change it will be in both cases, not a mere re-collection of particles and revivification of them. The vision of Ezekiel is thus quite inapplicable to the resurrection of the body. It was meant to teach a different truth, the national restoration of Israel, and when applied to illustrate another subject, loses its peculiar beauty, and only misleads us, by suggesting another class of conceptions. In the vision of Ezekiel there is a re-collection of particles; it is a revival like that of Lazarus, or Jairus' daughter. Divines, in many cases, have not paid sufficient attention to this distinction. Hence the common objection of infidels of the old school falls pointless against the right view of the resurrection of the body. If it were the resurrection of relics; if the sea were to give up its dead in the sense that we have seen depicted in an old picture, in which great fishes, like Jonah's whales, are swimming up with the heads and arms of those who perished in the sea centuries ago; then, indeed, the miracle of the resurrection would not only be stupendous, but out of harmony with all the other miracles and works of God. But

the resurrection is more than a revivification, it is a new creation. God, in the new creation, uses up the particles of the old; but so we see it has been in all the advances of life on the world, of which geology tells such a wondrous tale. We have every day an instance of something analogous to it, for creation is continuous, not occasional. The plant, in its lowest form, rises out of the rock or mould, animal life follows on the vegetable, and the forms of one rise step by step with the forms of the other, so that we can measure exactly how many steps we have risen in the scale of organic life in the plant world, by comparing what corresponding stage we have reached in the animal world. In man, we have reached the top of the scale, so far as we know at present. But why should we assume that the upward growth is abruptly to end here? If the next step in the ascent should be the new heavens and the new earth, with man in his resurrection body as its occupant, why should it, in this point of view, seem a thing incredible, that God should raise the dead?

The resurrection body is said in Scripture to be a *spiritual* body. The expression, if it does not clear up the difficulty, throws light at least on one corner of it. It teaches us that the spirit will be so supreme in the new nature of man, that man may be described or defined by it, as in logic each species is by its differentia. When we speak of man's body now, we think of a framework of flesh and blood, strung together with sinews, muscles, and nerves, and served by certain special organs, that we call organs of sense. There

have been many definitions of man. He has been called by Buffon, an intelligence using organs—that is to say too much for him. He has been defined as a cooking animal, a two-legged animal without feathers, that is to say too little for him. The one definition rather describes what man will be, the other what he is; the one exalts him before his time, the other keeps him down at the same low state in which he begins existence.

But while we object to call man as he is at present, an intelligence using organs, we think it an excellent definition of what we conceive a spiritual body to be. God is a pure intelligence, as far as we can see. He is alone in this, as in his other attributes. He is the only intelligence that knows without any helps to knowledge, and to whom all things are naked and open, not by sight, but by insight, for all things live to Him, and in beholding them, he only beholds Himself as in a mirror. The creature can only know by observing, and we can observe only by the aid of instruments. We do not deny the possibility of pure thought or pure reason, though the logic of pure reason, we take to be a contradiction, *ex vi terminis*. Logic being the discourse of reason, or the application of thought to things, transcendental logic is like Socrates slung in a basket — something neither of the earth nor the heavens. Pure thought, or the mind using organs of its own, is conceivable. But in that case the mind cannot travel out of itself. It is in a charmed circle and has no test of truth but the agreement of its own thoughts one with another. But as soon as an intelli-

gence wishes to perceive anything outside itself, it must use organs suitable to that perception. To each special perception there is, as far as we know at present, a special organ. The eye can only see; and again, it cannot choose but see, *i.e.*, it is the alone organ of sight, and it can discharge this function only. The organ is unique, and its function is uniform. So again with the other special senses. Thus, as knowledge is of two kinds, internal and external, an intelligence that wishes to know must use two classes of organs—the laws of thought, or thought organs, as we may call them, to arrive at internal knowledge; and organs of sense-perception, to attain to any knowledge of the external world. Cut off either of these two sources of knowledge, and man at once ceases to be an intelligence in the full sense of the word. Deprive him of the gateways of knowledge which open inward, let him have no sense of the laws of thought and self-consciousness, and he becomes at once an animal, as very young children and idiots are. Deprive him again of the gateways of knowledge which open outward, and man is cut off at once from the external world, and "for the face of nature, presented only with a universal blank."

We do not stop here to discuss which of the two losses would be the greater. Such discussions are idle, and rest on wrong assumptions on both sides. The fact is that man's nature is incomplete without the two gateways of knowledge—the one opening inward, the other outward. Now in death, as we have described it in the previous chapter, one gateway is closed, and

not the other. The lines of "In Memoriam," though enigmatic in themselves, probably describe this:—

> "How fares it with the happy dead?
> For here the man is more and more,
> But he forgets the days before:
> God shuts the doorway of the head."

The doorway of the head, that opens outward, is closed. Hence the intermediate state is one of unconsciousness of the external world. Without the organs of sense-perception, it is impossible to conceive of impressions from without entering the mind, or that we can hold communion with any of the works of God. It is the use of the intermediate state, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that man should be cut off for a while from intercourse with the external world, to spend a Sabbath in silent communion alone with God. The balance between our outer and our inner life will thus be righted, and that tendency to look to the things which are seen and temporal, which is very imperfectly overcome here even in the regenerate, will be then subdued. As Christ must reign till He hath put all enemies under his feet, so the carnal mind, which is the enemy with which the believer struggles to the very brink of the grave, will then finally and for ever be put under. During the intermediate state, reason will get the victory over desire, and faith over reason. It will then become our settled habit of mind to look to the things which are unseen and eternal. As death will be swallowed up in victory at the resurrection morning, so the nature of the first Adam, which was of the earth earthy, will be swallowed up

in that of the Second Adam. At our baptism we profess to put on Christ, and to make no provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof; but the carnal nature remains, yea, even in the regenerate, mortified, but not yet quite dead; cast down, but not destroyed, till the moment of death, when the balance is righted in an instant, and the spiritual nature becomes at once and for ever supreme.

But sanctification being completed by dissolving the present adulterous union which obtains between the desires of the flesh and the mind,* the plan of salvation would not be complete if, after the destruction of the flesh through death, a new union of spirit, soul, and body were not formed by God, even as the world, which was once destroyed by water, and will yet be destroyed by fire, was baptized unto death and renewed thereby. Hence it is that the resurrection of the body was reserved as the crowning mystery of the Christian dispensation. Existence after death the philosopher could anticipate; the immortality of the rational and moral part of man seemed to him more than a surmise. Mind was an uncreated thing, a spark of the divine and eternal Nous; hence the expectation which all looked for except those whose wicked lives led them to wish that death might be an eternal sleep.† But the resurrection of the body

* "O beatum connubium si non admiserit adulterium."—*Tertull. de Anima.*

† Cicero's well-known words—"O præclaram diem cum ad illiud divinum animorum concilium cætumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turbâ et colluvione discedam"—shew that the idea of future existence rested on that of the immortality of mind. It was a mistake, but at least a generous and a noble one. It is spirit, or the image of God reflected in us, which alone will

lay altogether out of the horizon of the wisest thinkers of the ancient world. We do not say that in Egypt the belief in existence after death was not mixed up with certain crude conceptions of the revivification of the flesh, and that this belief led to the practice of embalming the dead. But in India, and afterwards in Greece, this notion that the spirit or ghost could only exist in the same body it once had tenanted was rejected, and they held that the ghost hovered over the place where the corpse lay till it was decently buried or burned, and then reluctantly took an eternal leave of the body, and went to the world of shades. The two expressions used of David, that "he was gathered to his fathers," and "saw corruption," express all that was known of the hereafter of man till the resurrection of Christ had rolled away the stone from the door of the sepulchre. He was "gathered to his fathers" expresses what was thought of the state of the soul; he "saw corruption," what was known to become of the body. The soul might live on, but that the body should rise again seemed to them more than improbable; it was impossible. Death was not the end of the whole of man, but it was the end of a principal part. Body and soul then parted, like the Israelites and Egyptians at the brink of the Red Sea — to see each other again no more. Death might be a deliverance from the burden of the flesh,

enable us to say, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hades, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

the terminus of all man's hopes and fears; but they could not look on it as a stage in the work of redemption, a discipline preparatory to a yet higher state of being. It was enough for the saints of the Old Testament if they could look down into the grave and feel that even in Hades they should not be cut off from His presence, which is better than life itself. We can look farther on, and see beyond this sheol or paradise a state of existence awaiting us, when body, soul, and spirit, all purified, and all perfected, shall be united together, to be for ever with the Lord, and in the midst of his works.*

As death is the deliverance from the burden of the flesh, we see that the resurrection must imply some great and corresponding change in the nature of the body. At present, body and flesh, σῶμα and σάρξ, are indistinguishable. It is not enough to say that flesh has now become *sinful flesh*, and thus, as Bishop Ellicott remarks, that flesh is used in Scripture in *malam partem*. That is very true, and only makes the case

* That the dead in Christ are now with Christ, and in paradise, admits of no doubt after our Lord's words to the dying thief. But it is by no means so clear that paradise is the same as the third heaven to which the apostle says he was caught up. Oertel (see his Hades) contends that all who die, go to hades, or the under world, resting this view on the parable of Dives and Lazarus. Delitzsch, on the other hand, argues that as Christ descended into hades, and afterwards ascended into heaven, so He first proclaimed the gospel to the waiting spirits in hades (1 Pet. iii. 19), and then led captivity captive, leading with Him a train of spirits released from hades, and now first admitted into paradise. This is the explanation, he adds, of the fact that many of the bodies of the saints which slept arose and showed themselves *after His resurrection* in the holy city. There is much to recommend this view of Delitzsch. It agrees very well with the words of the *Te Deum*, "Tu, devicto mortis aculeo, aperuisti credentibus regna cœlorum"—when thou hadst overcome the sharpness of death, thou didst open the kingdom of heaven to all believers.

still worse; but the mystery still remains how the σάρξ is ever to be changed into σῶμα. It is the mystery, for instance, of our Lord's resurrection body, which we have seen above is the case of sinless flesh being changed in the grave into an incorruptible body. Man is now flesh not only in the sense that he is carnal, corrupt, and earthly-minded*—the depraved sense of the word flesh—but also in the sense that when created in innocence he still had an animal nature of flesh and blood, which the apostle says cannot inherit the kingdom of God *ex vi terminis*—as he adds the reason, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. Corruption and incorruption are logical contradictions, they each exclude the other, and thus it is that we stand at the brink of the grave unable to see how the body of flesh and blood that we lay there can ever be changed, even by the power of the Almighty God, into an incorruptible body. This is the point in the doctrine which transcends reason, and where all analogies from the seed-

* Luther has profoundly remarked, "Die Seele ist so tief gesunken in das Fleisch, dass sie mehr Fleisch ist denn das Fleisch selber" (quoted by Caspar's Fusstapfen Christi, p. 181). Thus it is, that if the body degrades the soul in the first instance, the soul again, by becoming carnal-minded, makes the body "twofold more the child of hell than before." Hence the irreconcileable opposition between the flesh and the spirit, so that without death an entire deliverance of soul and spirit from sin would be impossible. Bishop Ellicott (Destiny of the Creature, sermon v.) has well remarked that the contrast in Scripture is between body and soul, flesh and spirit, not between soul and flesh, or body and spirit. Luther has explained this double contrast, that flesh and spirit are the *ideal states*, the *forms*, so to speak, under which our nature ranges itself. Having described the three parts of man as spirit, soul, and body, he adds, "und ein jegliches dieser dreyer sammt dem Ganzen Menschen wird auch getheilet auf eine andere weise in zwey Stucke, die da heissen Geist und Fleisch,"—see the Auslegung des Magnificat, quoted by Delitzsch.

corn wholly fail us. The seed-corn is sown in corruption, but it is not raised in incorruption; it is changed, beautified, multiplied, if you will, but as vegetable matter it went into the grave, and as the same vegetable matter it rises again, possessing the same organism as before, and subject to the same laws of reproduction and decay. In all this our spiritual body is wholly unlike our natural. It will neither have organs of assimilation—for we shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more—nor will it have organs of reproduction—for we shall neither marry nor be given in marriage. If it was difficult to conceive of the Lord Mayor without his fur tippet, gold chain, and glass coach, who can say how far we can abstract our idea of a body from the desires and instincts of the flesh which belong to it at present, and conceive of a spiritual body as our present body, without its appetites and the organs which administer to these appetites? What remains of our body, it will be asked, after the flesh and its desires are withdrawn? Anatomists give us drawings in outline of the muscular and nervous system. Besides the organs of the nutritive or animal life, which, according to Bichat's well-known generalization, are single, there are the organs of the excito-motor system, which are duplicate, and the nerves of which run in converging lines to the brain. The vertebral column divides the trunk of the body into two equal parts, of which the legs and arms are continuations, and along which the muscles and nerves are laid in lines, corresponding on each side exactly the one to the other. Thus, accepting Bichat's generalization

as correct in the main, all the organs of the body fall under these two classes—they are either organs of the nutritive life, including under that the organs of reproduction, or they are organs of the *excito-motor* class, by which intelligence is served, and the connection between mind and body kept up. As we might expect, the control of the will is more complete over the latter than over the former. The functions of the nutritive life are non-voluntary, and, unless in cases of pain and derangement, we are unconscious of their action. It is only in disease, or in cases of strong excitement, that we are conscious of the circulation of the blood, of the digestion of our food, or the functions of the liver, spleen, &c.

Now, we have to suppose either of two cases in order to see how near man approaches to Buffon's definition of an intelligence using organs, and what at present causes him to fall short of it. The one is the case of an unbroken health, such as Adam enjoyed in a state of innocence, when the organs of the nutritive life, the heart, stomach, lungs, &c., discharge the functions of circulation, digestion, and repair of tissue, without conveying through the sympathetic ganglia any special sensation to the brain except that which, as the opposite to disease, we may describe as ease. In the other case, which is that to which our argument leads up, the nutritive life shall cease altogether; and in some way, at present incomprehensible to us, we shall be given pneumatical bodies, *i.e.*, with the *excito-motor* system, but without the nutritive, or that burden of the flesh which now weighs us down, and forms the

inlet for passion and pain, disease and death. The former is the case of the first Adam, the latter that of the second.

It is because our control of the *excito-motor* system is not as strict as it ought to be, in consequence of the will being depraved by the fall, that our nutritive system suffers from indulgences which are not called for by the wants of nature. We overload the stomach, we indulge our passions, we excite the brain through inflaming the imagination, and so a thousand forms of disease and pain are produced—some chronic, some acute, some hereditary, and some peculiar to the sufferer, which puzzle the physician, and make the philosophy of health unattainable by the physician, because he cannot minister to a mind diseased. The laws of hygiene presuppose certain higher laws which lie outside the province of the physician, and of which, unless he is a philosopher and a Christian, he cannot take account.

But suppose, in a new state of being, all the single and nutritive organs were withdrawn as unnecessary, and all the excito-motor organs placed under the strict control of the will, we should then have the conditions of a body without pain or want, disease or death, such as Scripture tells us the resurrection body will be. Even at present, when the control of the will over the excito-motor system is strict and unflagging, when the lust of the eye does not lead to the lust of the flesh, what a train of diseases and ailments are at once cut off? True, that we suffer from the sins of our former unconverted state, and thus disease once produced will

run on with the race and scourge us to the third and fourth generation. So it is that gout, scrofula, epilepsy, and many other diseases become congenital. The excito-motor system, which is under the control of the will, when disordered, will not only derange the nutritive organs, but also transmit disease in these organs to our innocent descendants. Thus it is that man is plagued in the flesh for the sins of the flesh. Our pleasant vices thus become our scourges, and every transgression receives its due recompense of reward. Thus the excito-motor system is the occasion of sin, and the nutritive only the nidus in which sin is laid, and the means whereby it is afterwards punished. The one is directly under the control of the will, and the other only remotely so, but we cannot "trammel up the consequence," and so cut off the punishment of self-indulgence. Could we recall the debauch the instant we felt the pains of indigestion, or the nervous rackings which follow on drunkenness, then indeed we should add "drunkenness to thirst," without fear of remorse, and the warning which bodily pain gives against indulgence of our animal lusts would be lost. It is wisely ordered that the instant an act passes beyond the excito-motor system, it passes out of our control. If by an act of the will we take poison into the body, once it has entered the nutritive organs it is beyond our control. We must eat of the fruit of our own ways.

This is the discipline of life which teaches us the necessity of controlling our wills and appetites. But in a higher state of being, in which there shall be no

unruly wills and affections, it is supposable that the excito-motor system may then be restored to us without those lower nutritive organs, which are like a dead weight at present to keep us in bounds, and to warn us against indulging our passions. It is true that the excito-motor system itself is at present imbedded in the flesh, and dependent on the nutritive life of which it is a manifestation. The nerves are composed of white filaments which always rise from and lead to a ganglion or collection of grey matter, and it has been supposed that the organised white filaments or fibres are the working part of the brain and nervous system generally, and that the grey mass of unorganised globules was the "matrix of the medullary filaments," that is, the source or origin of the nervous force transmitted outwards by certain nerves, and receiving the impressions conveyed inwards by others. Not only thus is the substance of the brain and nerves a pulpy mass adapted to conveying perceptions to the mind, but in addition, the brain itself, as the seat of intelligence and will, is dependent on the nutritive system for the immense quantity of blood which it requires for its healthy action. The only conclusion which we should draw from this fact is this, that in the body, as we know it at present, the excito-motor system is dependent on and inseparable from the nutritive system. Man is thus at present only at the head of the scale of animal life. His nature is divided between the angel and the brute (ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός, Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 1). Even the wise ancients saw this middle state of man: but what they could not see was, that his probation

depended upon it—much less that as the balance between flesh and spirit was destroyed by the first Adam, so it has been redressed by the second, and that "as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." As man exists at present, he cannot exercise his higher organs of sense perception without the lower or nutritive life rightly discharging its functions. The heart must beat, the lungs must breathe, the organs of digestion must make blood, if the brain is to think and the senses perceive and know. But because the higher or intelligent organs are in our present body made dependent on the lower, or organs of nutrition, we are not therefore to conclude it must always be so. We can conceive of an organism as superior to our present as the animal life is above the life of a plant. The distinction between the plant and the animal is this, that a nervous system is wholly wanting even in the highest forms of the one, and never absent even in the lowest forms of the other. Volition manifesting itself by certain acts of co-ordinated motion of the limbs, and these acts the result of certain previous emotions of desire and pain, are the unerring marks of the presence of a nervous system. The lower we descend in the scale of animal life the more imperfect the nervous system becomes, till, in the zoophytes, which stand, as it were, on the verge of the vegetable kingdom, and spend their lives attached to the spot where they had their origin, the body presents a uniform pulpy appearance, in which muscles and nerves seem equally wanting. Thus the advance from the plant to the animal is seen in this,

that in the one the organs of nutrition make up the whole of its life, in the other they make up only a part. There is a higher life by which the animal becomes an intelligence using organs. The will, and the intelligence localized in the brain, receive impressions from without, and then these impressions producing pleasure or pain excite to action. The beautiful discovery of Sir Charles Bell, that the nervous system is duplicate—that for every afferent there is a corresponding efferent nerve, the one the organ of sensation the other of motion, has raised the excito-motor system into a class of organs quite distinct from those of the mere nutritive. There is in every animal a plant life, a system of organs whose functions are adapted solely to the ends of assimilation and reproduction, but over and above there is in every animal, even the lowest, a life by which it deserves to be classed apart as an intelligence using organs and the higher life is contained in the nervous system. The amount of that life is measured by the advance of the nervous system from the lowest and most imperfect ganglia of the insect to the high organisation and complexity of the human brain.

The sensitive life in man at present depends upon the nutritive: but whether it could have been otherwise, it is not for us to say. But at least we may conjecture that the nature of the resurrection body, in which we shall be equal with the angels, will be of this kind, that the nutritive life will then be laid aside altogether, and the sensitive, or excito-motor system, become as much higher than it is now, as

the animal is now above the plant. In the plant, we see nutritive life only, with the absence of all organs of intelligence. In the angel, at the other extreme, there are the organs of intelligence in their highest degree, with the entire absence of the nutritive life. Man is at present at the midway point between these two extremes. As an animal, he is not released from the condition of all animal life, that the higher shall depend on the lower—the excito-motor on the nutritive system. It is on account of this dependence of the higher on the lower, that he is said to be in the flesh. He was made lower than the angels for a little while, and the nature of his probation, unlike theirs (who, as spiritual beings, were capable of spiritual wickedness only) consisted in this, that the organs of intelligence were enabled to resist the nutritive. He should have subdued his appetites to his reason, and submitted his reason to the expressed will of God. This he failed to do, and from that first fatal act of weakness, his nature has been thrown off its balance. It has become more animal than it was intended to be; the desires of the lower life have become more imperious, and the body, which was flesh in the sense only that it was frail, has become sinful flesh, and hence subject to all kinds of diseases, which end in death.

Redemption has delivered us from this bondage of corruption, and hence the crowning work of redemption will be to restore us our bodies, but so raised in the scale of being that we shall never come under the like conditions of frailty in which our first parents

found themselves. They fell, through the desires of the nutritive system, as well as the weakness of the excito-motor. In the resurrection body there will be no nutritive system at all; no appetite or desire of food, through which we can be tempted; and the nervous system, which we have reason to think will be restored to us, will become, as it ought to be, the organ of the intelligence,—an intelligence purified from carnal desires, and filled with the love of God.*

There are some interesting confirmations of this conjecture, as to the nature of the resurrection body, to be gathered from Scripture. We infer that the nutritive system, or the plant life of the body, will not reappear in our resurrection bodies, from the mention of such points as these, that in the resurrec-

* For want of the proper distinction between the nutritive and the excito-motor life in man, the views of the early Church, on the resurrection of the body, wavered between the allegorizing system of the Alexandrian fathers and the Materialistic views of Tertullian and the North African school. Tertullian (De Resurrect. Carnis, c. 61) enumerates all the parts of the body. The mouth, he says, is not only for eating and drinking, but also to praise God; the teeth, not only to chew food, but also to bridle the tongue, and to regulate the respiration of breath. He would even give the stomach its place in the resurrection body, although he recognised with the Apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 13, that God will destroy both it and them, and adapt it to higher uses than for the consuming of food. It is only changed, he adds, not destroyed, for the Apostle's words, 1 Cor. x. 31, suppose the case of eating and drinking being done for the glory of God, and that even the weakest and least esteemed members of the body should have their becoming honour, 1 Cor. xii. 22. Lactantius, also, De Opificio Dei, took the same views of the entire identity of the new with the old. The controversy of the early Church with the Gnostics, inclined them to take the most realist views of the resurrection body, in opposition to the idealising spirit of the Gnostics, who either said that the resurrection was past already, or supposed that the soul, in passing out of the flesh, put on a new and incorruptible body. Both sides seemed to miss the essential truth, that the body we put into the grave is to the resurrection body what the bare grain is to the ear that springs from it.

tion, we shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more, neither marry. But we may also further infer, that the excito-motor will be given to us, from the expressions which speak of the songs of the redeemed. Heaven, it has been said, has been described by negatives, by the absence of pain, hunger, death, or sin. This is very true, but not the whole truth. *Exceptio probat regulam.* The exception is indeed not a little remarkable. The only material occupation, if material it can be called, which the blessed are said to engage in, is music; they have harps in their hands, and a song as a sound of many waters on their lips. Now music is to speech what feeling is to thought. Music is the speech of the affections, as language is of the understanding. The critical faculty, which observes the properties of things, and their relation to each other, and, out of these relations, constructs its systems of science and art, uses speech. The emotional faculty inclines to another form of speech, the best adapted to convey its sentiments. The earliest expression of thought is the monosyllable; usually it is the imitation of the sound which some animal makes, or of the impression it produces on ourselves, as the hiss of the serpent, and our cry of fear, as the roar of thunder, or the awe which it inspires in us. But as our perceptions increase, and the judgment strengthens with them, so our vocabulary increases also; language grows with the growth of the mind, and speech, or the discourse of reason, becomes the mode of communicating our thoughts, one to the other. Now, the emotions, however allied to the

judgment, are, by all psychologists, classed by themselves. We can cultivate them as we do the understanding. As they increase in depth and variety, the mode of expressing them must increase also. The simplest form of expressing feeling is the cry or interjection; and were man only an animal, he would never get beyond the first step, or express more than the single emotions, as they were excited by pleasure or pain. It is the mark of man's superiority to the brute, that his emotions become co-ordinated and governed by reason, as well as his thought. Instead of the first wild cry of pleasure or pain, the scream of the child, or the yell of the savage, he learns to modulate these sounds. Thus melody begins, then harmony; first the single or unison song, then part singing, with its combination of voices, and all the skilful devices for increasing the effect, by majors and minors, fugues, contrepoint and thorough bass. Music is thus the language of the emotions, co-ordinated and combined, in the same way that speech is the language of the intellect. There is a grammar of the one as much as of the other, and the laws of music are as definite as those of speech. When we articulate our thoughts connectedly, the result is speech. When we articulate our feelings connectedly, the result is song. As by the use of the understanding we make language, so by the right use of the emotions we make music. Hence it is, that whatever stirs the emotions, whether the passion of love, or the clash of arms in battle, seems to require the aid of music. The hero's harp, the

lover's lute; from the highly-trained brass band of a crack regiment, down to the war-dance of the savage New Zealander, music responds to that instinct of our nature, which seems to suggest that we must sing our feelings, as we speak our intelligent perceptions.

Now, though we believe that the understanding will be exercised in heaven in a degree beyond our present capacities, the emotions will be even more fully exercised. The difference perhaps will be this, that we shall perceive at once the relation of things as we only dimly do at present, after much toil and labour. We weary our intellect so much by study now, that when we break off from some long and difficult calculation, we seldom do so with the freshness of feeling of the Apostle. Where is our "Oh Altitudo," as an old writer expresses it at the end of a disquisition, as deep and exhaustive as that in Rom. xi. 33. The explanation is, that we have exhausted ourselves over the differentia of things, and have no more admiration left for their unity. Difference lying on the outside of things, unity within; we have been so long piercing the rind that we lose our relish for the fruit. The critical faculty has been exercised at the expense of the emotional; we have no spirit left for praise, for we have spent our strength in abstruse thought. This is why the mathematics of astronomy kill its devotional aspect. The undevout astronomer is mad, says the rhetorical poet, Young. It would be more just to say, with Solomon, that much study is a weariness of the flesh, and that, as there is a limit to our powers of thinking and feeling, we may rob God of his due, by

giving too much thought, and too little feeling to the contemplation of his works. But in heaven this disproportion between our intellect and our emotions will be at an end; for with perceptions increased, and our judgment undisturbed by sin, we shall praise Him with joyful lips, when we shall have learned the judgments of his mouth. Linnæus, falling down on his knees and thanking God for having allowed him to see an English moor covered with broom in full blossom, is an instance of how the emotions will then not be unnaturally divorced from the intellect. Hereafter, to comprehend, to admire, and to adore, will accompany one another, as they do not now. Between presentative and representative knowledge, to use Sir Wm. Hamilton's distinction, there is now a wide gap, which can scarcely be got over at all, and which, when overcome, leaves the mind pleased with its own success, and averse to do anything more than tabulate the results of its own discoveries. The saying of the founder of the Positive School, that the heavens declare the glory of Newton and Hipparchus, is what the fool has said in his heart long ago—the only difference being that the folly has now risen to the lips. It is this disposition to rob God of His glory, which is not a result of science, but only the disease of certain overwrought minds, diseased with study, and unrelieved by prayer and praise.

But, in the future world, this disproportionate cultivation of the intellect, at the expense of the emotions, will not occur. As we shall understand without effort, so we shall praise without ceasing. Hence we see

how it will be, that, with heightened emotions, we shall require more perfect instruments of praise than those we use at present. If it is a good thing on earth to sing praises unto the Lord; if it is a pleasant thing to be joyful, how much more pleasant to think that music will form one of the chief enjoyments and employments of the redeemed? As the Israelites stood by the waters of the Red Sea, smooth as glass, and glittering with the rays of the morning sun, to sing the song of Moses; so the redeemed are described as standing on, or beside,* a sea of glass, mingled with fire, having harps in their hands, to sing the praises of Him who has triumphed gloriously, and has cast the pale horse, and his rider, death, into the sea of the second death, as Pharaoh and his horsemen were into the Red Sea.

There is a remarkable analogy in the metamorphosis of insects to suggest to us what the nature of the resurrection body will be. It is not only the general change from the larva to the imago, but also the pupa or middle state of death, which suggests the possibility of a like transformation in the case of man. The analogy, though imperfectly applied, has been often used before, and lies at the foundation of the well-known fable of Cupid and Psyche. But the allegorists generally went wrong in their application of the analogy. Not knowing the resurrection of the body, they supposed that, as the butterfly (Psyche) sprang out of the chrysalis, so the soul (Psyche) disengaged itself from the dead body, and thus they misread

* ἑστῶτας ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν, Rev. xv. 2. See Dean Alford's note.

the type, and inferred a wrong doctrine from it. The larva, the pupa, and the imago state correspond exactly to the present psychical body, the intermediate state, and the pneumatical or resurrection body. But if there be no resurrection of the body, as the philosophers thought, then the metamorphosis of insects suggests either the Hindoo and Pythagorean idea of transmigration, or the Platonic and Neo-Platonic theory of the immortality of the disembodied Psyche. Now, the analogy from the transformation of insects breaks down either with the doctrine of the metempsychosis, or of the natural immortality of the Psyche. In the one case, the individuality is lost in the migration of the Psyche from one body to the other. And in the case of the immortality of the Psyche, there is nothing analogous to the coma or chrysalis state of the insect. To make the parallel exact, there must be three distinct stages of being corresponding each to each. In the case of the insect, there are two lives: one earthly the other ethereal, divided from each other by an interval of death. Now if the analogy is to teach anything, it must suggest two such lives, with an interval of death between. This the ancients failed to see.

Their legend of the Phœnix illustrates much better their conception of man's future state of existence. The phœnix makes its own funeral pyre, and after flapping its wings, rises from its ashes with a new life. So they conceived of the soul as springing out of the urn in which the body was burned to ashes. The tongue of fire, which we are familiar with in the design

of the funeral urn, depicts their conception of the immortal soul taking its leave of the mortal body. Whether the immortality of the soul suggested the fable of the phœnix, or the converse, is unimportant. In all probability, one hasty conjecture suggested another. Ignorance of revelation in the two books of nature and of grace lay at the root of all their other errors, and of this as well.* Had they observed nature more closely, they would have seen that the butterfly does not spring out of the pupa state at once. Death is not the liberation of the Psyche out of the larva, but the process by which the larva is gradually transformed into a full-grown insect. The analogy of the seed corn, which dies and is buried, should have suggested the right conception of how the natural body rises into a spiritual body. As far as the general thought went, the analogy was rightly seized; but when they tried to apply it in details, the ancients went wrong from not knowing the resurrection of the body, and modern writers too often sanction their error by repeating the play on words between the immortality of the butterfly and the soul or Psyche in the disembodied state. But the true *Psyche* in the case of man is the resurrection

* The fable of the phœnix is used by Clement, Tertullian, Cyril, and other fathers as an argument for the resurrection of the body. Clement (*v. ad* Cor. l. cap. 25) relates the story at length, and with entire faith in its historical truth. He even goes beyond Herodotus, who throws in a *caveat* against the story of the phœnix carrying the egg of the future bird to the temple of the sun, which, "in my opinion," old Herodotus says, "is not credible." Clement adds that the priests in Egypt compute a period of five hundred years by the return of the bird, though he does not say that he has seen a phœnix. The fable of the phœnix suggests no metamorphosis at all from the natural to the spiritual body. It is revival only, not resurrection.

body, not, as the ancients thought, the disembodied soul. From inattention to this, too many writers have failed to see the beautiful appropriateness of the parable teaching of nature. Thus the Rev. W. Kirby, in his chapter on the subject, observes that, "although the analogy between the different states of insects and the body of man is only general, yet it is much more complete with regard to his soul."* If he had said almost the reverse he would have come nearer to the mark. It is to the resurrection body, not to the immortal soul, that nature suggests her parable teaching. With happy inconsistency this excellent writer goes on to contradict his own assertion, and points out very truly the analogy between the resurrection *body* and the imago. He also adds an additional point of resemblance, which Archbishop Whately has also very well applied in his Lectures on the Future State. The butterfly, he says, the representative of the soul, is prepared in the larva for its future state of glory; and if it be not destroyed by the ichneumons and other enemies to which it is exposed, symbolical of the vices that destroy the spiritual life of the soul, it will come to the state of repose in the pupa which is its Hades, and at length, when it assumes the *imago*, break forth with new powers and beauty to its final glory and the reign of love. So that, in this view of the subject, well might the Italian poet exclaim:—

> "Non v'accorgete voi che noi siam vermi
> Nati a formar l'angelica farfalla?"

* *Vid.* Kirby and Spence's "Entomology," p. 38, new ed.

"Do you not perceive that we are worms born to form the angelic butterfly?"

Thus the analogy from the insect to the man suggests three states, not two. In the insect there is the grub and the butterfly, with an intermediate state of death between. In man there is the natural body and the spiritual body, with an existence of the disembodied spirit-soul in hades, corresponding to the pupa state. The old dichotomy, which divided man into body and soul, the one mortal, the other immortal, failed to see the true analogy which the transformation of insects suggests. This is not to be wondered at in pre-christian times; but it is not a little extraordinary that Christian philosophers should have failed to see that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body did not fit in with the old dichotomy of man into body and soul. The analogy from insect life should have set them on the right track, if it were not too often the case that an error once stereotyped goes on repeating itself by the mere *vis inertiae*. Men go on repeating words without weighing their meaning, or suspecting that with a change of sense they cease to connote the ideas they formerly did. Thus the psyche of Apulæus has furnished illustrations for sermons innumerable on the nature of man's existence after death. To do Locke and the school of Christian materialists justice, they have reasserted the doctrine of the resurrection of the body as against the prevailing conception of the immortality of the soul. But failing to grasp the higher truth of the pneuma or life of God in man, they have missed altogether the meaning of the intermediate state. They

have reduced it to a state of entire unconsciousness, which is quite as far from the mark in one extreme as the popular doctrine of an immortal psyche is in the other.

The transmutation of insects suggests the right conception on this subject. There are three stages of being in man, as there are in the insect, corresponding each to each. The larva, pupa, and imago, correspond to the natural body, the disembodied soul, and the spiritual body in man. The trichotomy is the only view which rightly represents this, or makes the metaphor from insect life at all applicable as a parable of the stages man is to pass through.

Dichotomists fail to apprehend one of two truths—either they fail to see the meaning of the intermediate state or of the resurrection body. On the one hand, those who hold with Locke and the materialists that the brain is the organ of thought in as full a sense as that the tongue is the organ of speech, describe the intermediate state as one of entire unconsciousness, and so miss the meaning of that stage of man's being. On the other hand, the spiritualist school of Descartes generally think of the disembodied soul as in heaven or in glory; and so, instead of the resurrection of the body being the full redemption of man, it is rather something superadded to it, and a difficulty instead of an evidence for the truth of the Christian revelation. It is only on the theory of the trichotomy of human nature into body, soul, and spirit that we can give its due emphasis either to the intermediate or the state of final blessedness. Man, like the insect, is destined to

pass through three stages of being, the first preparatory to the second, and the second to the third. He does not lose his identity in passing from the state of the psychical body to that of a psychical pneuma in hades, and from that on to the full perfection of being as a pneumatical body at the resurrection morning. It would be a wrong application of the analogy to say that because the chrysalis state of the insect is one of entire insensibility, it must be so in man.

> "If sleep and death be truly one,
> And every spirit's folded bloom,
> Through all its intervital gloom,
> In some long trance should slumber on.
>
> "So then were nothing lost to man,
> So that still garden of the souls,
> In many a figured leaf enrolls
> The total world since life began."

We need not suppose that because the chrysalis sleeps man is therefore unconscious in hades. That, like so many cocoons hanging on the twigs in a garden, the spirit-soul life of the departed is

> "Unconscious of the sliding hour,
> Bare of the body might it last;
> And silent traces of the past
> Be of the colour of the flower."

The analogy from the insect world rather suggests another thought. The cocoon is not dead, or even sleeping, though it seems to be so. Under its silky cerements the butterfly is forming. Just as the plant

in winter is collecting its forces from underground for a fresh shoot upward in spring, or the egg is developing into the chick, so the cocoon is really alive. In sleep, to use Delitzsch's somewhat cabbalistic theory of the seven powers of life, the fifth, sixth, and seventh, which are the powers of sentient life, fall into inaction; while the other four classes of nutritive life continue in operation. Thus the sleep of the insect and of the human psyche is a life in death—it is only apparent death. Dissect the cocoon and examine it with the microscope, and the future butterfly may be detected, "the wings rolled up into a sort of cord are lodged between the first and second segment of the caterpillar —the antennæ and trunk are coiled up in front of the head, and the legs, however different their form, are actually sheathed in its legs." * For aught we know to the contrary, the resurrection of a pneumatical body may spring out of the psyche-pneuma of the intermediate state, as the imago from the chrysalis. It is certainly incorrect and unscriptural to conceive of it as springing from the *sarx* or flesh which we lay in the grave. That appears to be like the skin or shell of the *larva*, a mere mask to hide the inner and higher life, and is shed in the grave, as insects and many reptiles shed their skin. The psyche-pneuma, which is the real life and individuality of man, then passes into Hades, as the cocoon into its winding sheet, but then either to rise again with a resurrection and immortal body, or not, according as it has put on Christ, and is quickened by His quickening Spirit or not. We have

* Kirby and Spence's "Entomology," p. 36, new ed.

only to repeat what we have said before, that Christ is our life and our resurrection, and that the indwelling of the Spirit quickening our spirits is (Rom. viii. 11) the efficient as Christ is the meritorious cause of the quickening of our mortal bodies.

That all are raised to be judged at the last day, but that all are not raised with pneumatical or immortal bodies seems to be a fair inference if we compare John v. 25-9 with 1 Cor. xv. The resurrection of damnation is distinctly declared, but it is not said that the wicked, whose bodies are sown in corruption, shall be raised in incorruption. It may be so, but the argument *e silentio* rather tells the other way, and instead of inferring, as many divines do, that because the saved shall be given immortal bodies the lost must also be immortalised—"salted with fire," as the expression is incorrectly applied—we rather infer the contrary, and throw on the other side the *onus probandi*, that it must be so. When Scripture is not decisive between two theories surely it is wisdom to take the one which exhibits the character of God as most just and most merciful.

"It doth not yet appear what we shall be." This only is revealed. It is not told us whether many shall be saved or few, or whether any of the many who now are on the broad path which leadeth to destruction may not be saved—so as by fire, *i.e.*, in spite of and out of the burning of the last day. Our inquiries on this subject are critical only and not dogmatical. We undertake rather to point out where others have gone wrong, not to lay down what must be the right theory of the resurrection body.

There are two ways of thinking on this subject—the one mediæval, the other modern, which seem to us to miss the mark in opposite extremes. The conception of the resurrection body which has come down from the Fathers through the schoolmen, and is not abandoned yet, is, that the same *sarx* which is put into the grave is raised again at the morning of the resurrection. This notion, which led the Egyptians to resort to the practice of embalming, took a new form in the Christian Church. As St Paul had treated the thought of the resurrection of the same identical particles as an absurdity, "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die," materialistic conceptions on this subject took a different direction. It was the *burial*, not the embalming of the body, which was now regarded as the point to be attended to. Hence the strong desire to be buried in holy ground,—earth, if possible, as in the case of the Campo Santa of Pisa, which was actually brought from Palestine. As the Jew desired to die in Jerusalem, to be near the place where the Messiah should touch the earth first on the Mount of Olives, so Christians thought of burial in crypts near the bones of martyrs and underneath the altar, where the miracle of the Incarnation in the host was daily repeated. The resurrection of the very particles put into the grave is the point insisted on by Tertullian against the Gnostics in his day, who allegorised the resurrection away altogether. Tertullian's conception became the orthodox one. No other was known to the mediæval Church. Her painters, who were the divines of the people, have expressed this in

the coarsest and most theatrical form. To object to this view of the resurrection was to incur the suspicion of heresy. Even in modern times the resurrection of the flesh is often confounded with the resurrection of the body.*

This arises from not distinguishing between *sarx* and *soma*. The resurrection of Christ (although His was not sinful flesh) was a resurrection, not a revival. So also must ours be. "Thou sowest *not* that body that shall be, but *bare grain*." This is decisive on the subject, and whatever the change may be (on which we are as much in the dark as the man who sowed the first grain of wheat) it is certainly not the same particles of matter which reappear, either in the wheat plant or the man.

The other erroneous opinion in the opposite extreme is, that the spiritual body underlies the natural in our present state of being, and consequently that we have only to be magnetised in some way in order to be *en rapport* with the world of spirits, even while in the flesh.† This is the theory of Swedenborg, on which modern spiritualism has based its delusions. Error is endless, truth is only one—hence we see that the age in shaking off the cold materialism of the French school

* It is true that the original of the creed is σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν, *carnis resurrectionem*, and even in the Church of Aquileia *hujus carnis resurrectionem*, but Jerome accounts for this on account of some of the Gnostics saying that as there were bodies celestial air and light, the expression, the resurrection of the body, did not seem definite enough to meet their opinion.—See Pearson on the Creed, Art. XI.

† "The soul of man is his spiritual body. The body of flesh and blood is only half the human body. Another body underlies it. There is a natural body, the Apostle says, and there is a spiritual, and by this he plainly

has fallen in with the fantastic spiritualism of Swedenborg and others. From believing in neither angel nor spirit it has passed at a bound into the other extreme, and now is ready to say with the Apostle, but in a very different sense, "there is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." The Apostle adds, "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual." The first man is of the earth earthly, the second man is the Lord from heaven. The neo-spiritualists of our day quite overlook this important distinction. They represent the spiritual body as underlying the natural. According to Swedenborg, man is an imperishable spiritual body, placed for a season in a perishable material body. The soul, the true man, is its own organised and spiritual body, and when it leaves the earthly house of flesh it enters at once on its resurrection and final state. The Swedenborgian universe, moreover, is divided into four orders of abodes. In the highest or celestial world are the heavens of the angels. In the lowest or infernal world are the hells of the demons. In the intermediate or spiritual world are the earths inhabited by men, and surrounded by the transition state through which souls departing from their bodies after a while

means a body altogether different from the natural, which is the material, or as Wiclif calls it, the "beestlie" body. Yet, by speaking of both in the present tense, saying of each that it now is, he gives us to understand that the two bodies are contemporaneous and co-existent, so long, that is, as the natural one may endure. By adding that it is to be raised, he intimates that this spiritual body is the immortal portion of our being." Hence, the writer goes on to argue that resurrection occurs (?) in each case at the moment of death."—See Life and its Nature, by Leo Grindon, p. 146.

soar to heaven, or sink to hell, according to their fitness and attraction. In this life man is free, because he is an energy, an equilibrium, between the influences of heaven and hell. The middle state surrounding man is full of spirits, some good and some bad. Every man is accompanied by swarms of both classes of spirits continually striving to make him like themselves. Further, there are two kinds of influx on man: mediate influx, which is when the spirits in the middle state flow in on man's thoughts and affections —immediate influx is when the Lord, the pure Spirit of truth, flows into every organ and faculty of man.

It is easy to see that American spiritualism is only this Swedenborgian theory carried out into details. Spirit-rapping, clairvoyance, and the theory of the medium to convey communications from departed spirits to those who are still in the body are additions to Swedenborg's theory, and additions for the worse. His own notion of immediate influx, or direct inspiration from God, though more extravagant, was in reality far less mischievous than the delusion of modern psychomancy. The root of all these errors seems to lie in the confusion between the intermediate and final state, as if the spiritual body lay under the natural in this present life. If we discard the mystical language in which it wraps its meaning, Swedenborgian spiritualism only amounts to this, that there is an immortal soul which is liberated at death, and lives then in the world of spirits, and perhaps returns to visit this world, and holds communication with its

inhabitants. It is thus only an old opinion under a new name. Swedenborg chose to call the soul a spiritual body or organism. His strange theory that every thing consists of a great number of perfect leasts like itself, every heart is an aggregation of little hearts, every lung is an aggregation of little lungs, every eye an aggregation of eyes, may have perhaps suggested that the soul in the same way is only the homuncule within the man. In this corpuscular theory of the soul it is easy to see that at death the soul or spiritual body survives. But this is not only a different truth from the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, it is directly opposed to it. We have seen how the Platonic theory of the immortality of the soul is opposed to the Apostle's teaching on this subject. This new Platonic theory of a spiritual body is quite as unlike the true doctrine of the resurrection.* The Platonic theory is at least intelligible, but this latter is fanci-

* Man, according to this theory, is a series of forms, one within the other, and successively more perfect, skeleton, muscles, veins, nerves, each forms an Eidolon or mask, underneath which is the true or spiritual body. The true eikon basilike of mind is body. Hence, if you want to see what the soul is like, instead of taking a microscope or an essay on immortality, all we have to do is to contemplate the living, moving human figure in its ripeness and perfection. So Shelley of Ianthe—

"Sudden arose
Ianthe's soul, it stood
All beautiful in naked purity,
The perfect semblance of its bodily frame,
Instinct with inexpressible beauty and grace.
Each stain of earthliness
Had passed away, it reassumed
Its native dignity, and stood
Immortal amid ruin."

See Life, its Nature, &c., by Leo Grindon.

ful as well as unscriptural. It is an old device to vamp up worn-out theories under new names. When we profess to believe in the resurrection body, it is a poor evasion to be put off with the old-world belief in the ghost of the deceased, which is a kind of body in the mystical language of Swedenborg. The immortality of the thinking principle is one thing, the resurrection of an organism adapted to it is another thing. To confound the two together, as modern spiritualists do, is to make an alloy between Plato and Paul, and to pass off an old error under a new name. If this fantastic theory of a resurrection immediate on the moment of death were found only among the professed followers of Swedenborg, we might leave it as a singular error to die out of itself. But as it is creeping into favour among writers not inclined to agree with Swedenborg's other opinions, and is by them put forward in apparent good faith, as their sense of the real meaning of the Apostle's teaching,* it is well to point out that it is only the Platonic doctrine of man's natural immortality disguised in a Christian dress. A philosophical opinion is never so dangerous as when it uses Scriptural language, and passes off, under the form of sound words, conceptions of quite a different character.

Thus, though it doth not yet appear what we shall be, we at least can gather from Scripture what the resurrection body will not be. It will not be the old body of flesh revived, which is the error of one extreme—it will not be the soul liberated at the moment

* See Bush on the Resurrection, p. 78 *et passim.*

of death, and becoming thus a spiritual body, which is the error of the other extreme.

Flesh and blood, we are told on the one hand, cannot inherit the kingdom of God; on the other hand, the apostle's teaching is, that this body of corruption is the buried germ or seed of a resurrection body. The one opinion makes too much of the remains we lay in the grave; the other makes too little of them. To the one they are the base materials of the resurrection body, to be transmuted into precious at the last day; to the other they are mere exuviæ, like the celts, bones, and hatchet-heads of the world's aborigines, to be set in museums hereafter, as relics of a past and lower stage of being. We reject both these theories, the mediæval and the modern, as equally unscriptural. The one reduces the resurrection to be a mere revival of the body that once was; the other destroys the significance of death as the wages of sin. Scripture declares both that we are to be unclothed, and again clothed upon. If the nature of the unclothed state is mysterious, much more may we expect to feel in the dark as to what the clothing upon must mean. If we cannot conceive of spiritual existence out of the body, much more difficult it is to conjecture what the resurrection from the dead can mean. If we cannot see into hades, much less into heaven itself. If the intermediate state is involved in obscurity, much more the final.

Yet the analogy of the butterfly comes to our help, as far as negative conceptions go. We look in vain among the higher forms of animal life for an organism

endowed with the excito-motor system, without the nutritive. In all cases, the fable of the belly and the members is the rule of animal life. Organs of motion, of prehension, even of voice, are all given that the creature may find its food, or capture its prey, as the case may be. The lion roars because excited by hunger, and perhaps all other animals utter their cries under similar conditions—to call their mates, or to warn of danger. The beak of a bird is so adapted for the food it consumes, than an ornithologist can either construct the beak from knowing the food, or describe the food from having seen the beak. In all vertebrates, up to and including man, the intestinal canal is the centre of life, and all its other organs, wings, legs, claws, beak, are but instruments to assist it in finding and securing its food. But in the case of man we find a class of organs capable of higher uses. The human hand, for instance, is such an organ. It helps us to carry food to the mouth, but this is the least and basest of its uses. Man would indeed be only an improved ape, if this were all which the hand could do. It can handle the pen of the ready writer, and the brush of the painter—it can touch the chords of the harp or organ, and so discourse most exquisite music. Even the sensualist school allow that the human hand is that which differentiates between man and the monkey. But they fell into the old *post hoc propter hoc* fallacy, and held that because the hand is an instrument of thought, that it produces thought. It is the mind within which makes the hand what it is, not the hand which makes the mind. Our right hand would soon

forget its cunning, if the brain did not think for it. Handicraft is the earliest manifestation of mind, but the mind itself is older than that which it produces. That which we have said of the hand is true of other organs of the body—the voice in particular. These are not essential to the nutritive life, as such. The higher powers of the eye, the ear, and the touch, and the smelling (of which taste is only a variety, serving a temporary purpose) are less animal than intellectual. They are the organs of an intelligent being, and if that being is to enjoy a life hereafter, and to be placed in the midst of the works of God, to see, hear, and understand them, then it seems to be required, from the nature of the case, that he should be given back these organs, only purified, elevated, and the residuum of what is animal strained off from them. The eye, for instance, is a perfect optical instrument, designed to disclose to us the wonders of creation, not to be used as an occasion to the flesh, or for the mere lust of the eye. The ear, again, is adapted to catch divine harmonies, not to drink in slanders and the distilled poison of wicked or voluptuous speech. The tongue and voice will be given to bless God, and not to curse men, who are made in the image of God. The proper use of the hand is not to reach forth to violence, but to touch the harp, to weigh and test the properties of bodies, and to serve as a general instrument of intelligence.

But what analogy have we in nature for organs thus etherealised and purified from the dross of mere animalism? None in the higher forms of life: the

vertebrate kingdom teaches us only this lesson, "Meats for the belly and the belly for meats, and God will destroy both it and them." But when we descend to the insect, we find, to our surprise, a transformation which not only suggests the possibility that death is only sleep, but also suggests the mode by which organs which serve the nutritive life now may be elevated into exclusively sensitive and percipient organs by and by. The grub is, as its name implies, that which is *grob* or gross—that buries itself (*graben*, hence the word grave) in the carcase, as Australian savages are said to do in that of a whale cast ashore, and gorge themselves there till, sickened with their disgusting meal of rancid blubber, they lie down and sleep off its effects. In the grub state the insect's nutritive life is the all, and there are no limbs at all, or the fewest possible. An enormous pair of jaws, no wings, feet only adapted to crawl slowly from one part of the leaf, when gnawed, to the other—this is the insect in its lowest stage of being. But what a contrast when the larva passes into the imago. The jaws are now replaced by a delicate proboscis, with which it but sips of a sweet, and then flies to the rest. It is a beautiful winged creature, full of eyes, for in its rapid flights it needs quick powers of perception. Its powers of motion are as great as its appetite for food once was. There is now the maximum of sentient with the minimum of the nutritive life, as before in the grub state it was the converse. That the provision in the insect is with a view to the reproduction of its kind does not in the least mar the justness of the analogy; for each

insect, as an individual, passes through three stages—one of nutritive life only; another of coma, in which the nutritive organs die and the sentient are developed; and a third, of sentient life in its highest degree. Man, too, is intended to pass through three such stages; but the last in his case is to be the final one. Whether it would be so but for the incarnation and continued humanity of Christ may fairly admit of question. But Christ having linked his nature to ours, the transformation of the natural into a spiritual body will be the final one. With the resurrection body made like unto his glorious body, we not only die no more, death hath no more dominion over us, but we shall be tempted no more. At the second death, death and hell are cast into the lake of fire; the devil and his angels are there consigned to chains of darkness for ever. And so as there is no place found for the repentance of the incorrigibly wicked, so there is no place found for the temptation of the glorified saints.

Thus on the distinction between sentient and nutritive life we ground our conception of the nature of the resurrection body. It is the scriptural distinction between σῶμα and σάρξ. At present not only have we organs of the flesh, but through the entrance of sin even our organs of sense-perception have yielded themselves as instruments of unrighteousness unto iniquity. Redemption then supervenes, and by the sanctification and indwelling of the Holy Spirit the evil is partly but not yet entirely redressed. The organs of the body are turned to their right use, as instruments of righteousness unto God. The flesh is taken prisoner and

subdued and kept under; and by the higher organs of sense-perception, the eye, the hand, the voice being turned to the service of God, one great source of sin, one *fomes peccati* is cut off at once. The lust of the flesh has no longer the lust of the eye and the pride or wantonness of life to act as a feeder.

But the carnal mind remains, yea, even in the regenerate. Death alone will deliver us entirely from this body of death. As we have before seen, our sanctification or entire separation from sin can only be brought about by the death of that which has become contaminated by sin. The animal nature may be subdued and kept under for a little degree by the living and regenerate spirit; but we "groan within ourselves, even we who have received the first fruits of the Spirit, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of the body." Then at last the σάρξ, the appetitive animal nature, will disappear altogether, and a new σῶμα, or organism, will be given to us, corresponding to the wants of a nature altogether spiritual and Godlike.

Thus the pneumatical body is less related to the flesh which is laid in the grave, than to the pneuma itself, which, during the intermediate state, is with Christ. The first man is of the earth, earthy, Adam from Adamah; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy, and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. The resurrection body is thus spiritual, not carnal, and if spiritual, then the spirit and not the animal nature, which we lay in the grave, is to be

regarded as the nucleus around which it will gather. To be "unclothed," and then "clothed upon" with our house, which is from heaven, are the two states which await us after death. Now this clothing upon clearly implies more than resuming the old clouts of humanity, which we laid aside in the grave. Our present is a body of humiliation. In all probability, the state of animalism was one into which the first Adam was put, as a test of submission, and as a preparation for a higher and angelic state of being. Flesh and blood could not inherit the kingdom of God, and flesh and blood was the body of humiliation into which Adam was put, in order to prove him, and show what was in his heart. Sin has entered in, and made that which was only earthly and animal to become sensual or psychically wicked and devilish, or depraved by the devil. It cannot, therefore, be, that this body of flesh can ever become the fit receptacle for the resurrection life. It will be a *new* body, not the old made new. The house from heaven will not be a house rebuilt with the old bricks, but on an enlarged and beautified plan. The materials will be new as well as the design, and the chief, if not the only point of identity with the old, will be this, that it will enshrine and shelter the spirit in the same way that the trembling house of clay we at present inhabit does. St Paul compares the one to a tent, the other to a building of God. The tabernacle and the temple were identical, not in the sense that the materials were one and the same, much less that the old materials were worked up into

the new edifice; but, in the sense that they were put to the same uses, were adorned with the same precious vessels, and, above all, were the shrine where Jehovah manifested himself, by the ark of his presence, by the Shekinah of glory, and by the cherubim overshadowing the mercy-seat. Or, to take another comparison, whether Paul, the tentmaker, lay out on his travels in a tent of Cicilian goat's hair, or dwelt two whole years in his own hired house in Rome, the dwelling might be equally described as Paul's house. The identity of the dwellings consisted in this, that they were both the homes of the same man, though very unlike in outward shape, and of very different degrees of durability: so of the present psychical and the future pneumatical body. Their fitness to be the home of the soul-spirit is the point of their identity, not so much any material resemblance between them. It is not necessary, Dr Hitchcock says, that the resurrection body should contain a single particle of the body laid in the grave, if it only contain particles of the same kind, united in the same proportion, and the compound be made to assume the same form and structure as the natural body.* This statement is partly right, but does not go far enough. We object to the thought that the resurrection body is to contain *particles of the same kind*, united in the same proportion, for that would amount to a resurrection of the flesh, which, however patristic, is far from a scriptural truth.

Bonnet's theory, that within our material system

* The Resurrection of Spring, p. 26.

there lurks an exquisite spiritual organisation, invisibly pervading it, and constituting its vital power, seems to be the first conception on the nature of the spiritual body, which is at once philosophical and Christian. There is much in the *Palingenisie Philosophique** which is suggestive of the right analogy of what the spiritual body will be, but he has gone too far in maintaining the immortality, not of men only, but of animals as well, and carries the idea of development in nature to such an extent, as to imagine that plants may become animals, and animals men, and men angels. But Bonnet, who was at least a profound entomologist, seems to have struck on the right theory of the resurrection, by adhering closely to the analogy of the butterfly rising out of the chrysalis. Bichat had not suggested the distinction between organic and animal life, and Bell's discoveries on the nerves had yet to be made. But by the light of Bichat and Bell's discoveries, we can see one way to a theory of a Palingenesis of man, in which the flesh and blood of St Paul, the animal life of Bichat, is eliminated, and the pneumatical body or organic life, the *senso-motor* nervous system, as distinct from the mere ganglionic, is retained. Now Bonnet, as an entomologist, observed correctly enough that the butterfly was encased, not in the cocoon only, but even in the larva. Swammerdam had already observed this. By plunging into vinegar or spirit of wine a caterpillar about to assume the pupa state, and letting it remain there a

* La Palingenesie Philosophique ou Idees sur l'etat passé et sur l'etat futur des etres vivans. Geneve 1767.

few days, he then dissected the insect, and detected the future butterfly. He found the wings rolled up into a sort of cord, and lodged between the first and second segment of the caterpillar, the antennæ and trunk coiled up in front of the head, and the legs, however different their form, actually sheathed in its legs.* It was a correct conjecture, therefore, of Bonnet's, that as in the insect, so in the man, there might be an exquisite spiritual organisation invisibly pervading it, and constituting its vital power. Death might be the stage during which the spiritual body rose out of the animal, as the imago develops itself from the larva under the winding-sheet of the cocoon. Bichat's and Bell's generalisations have come since to illustrate still farther what was a simple analogy or anticipation of reason in Bonnet's hands. We now know, as he did not, how much of our present organisation is spiritual, and what is animal only. The nervous system, or organic life, though at present indivisible from the flesh or nutritive life, is clearly distinguishable in idea, and will be one day distinguished in fact, as the butterfly is from the grub.

There is another analogy for the possibility of the separation between the nutritive and the sentient life in the resurrection body. The structure of bone is this, that it consists of earthy matter and gelatine so intimately incorporated, that although the substances are really two, they seem only one; atom answering so to atom, that the whole of the gelatinous matter

* *Vid.* Kirby and Spence's "Entomology," p. 36.

may be burned off by calcination, or the whole of the earthy matter be dissolved by acid, and yet the form of the bone will remain unchanged, as in the case of an ordinary petrifaction under a dropping well. Now, suppose the spiritual body to retain the sentient without the nutritive life, we have the case of the bone, with either the gelatine calcined by heat, or the earthy matter dissolved by acid.

Thus, instead of the old carnal conception of the resurrection of relics, which has come down through the schoolmen from the fathers, and which the Council of Trent has endorsed in its Catechism,* we hold the resurrection of the spiritual body in man, which is embedded at present in the flesh, and inseparable from it, but which shall be recalled from the grave at the last day. The flesh goes to corruption, is lost in the circle of matter, and its particles will never be recollected or revived, as divines once thought. It is foolish to rest the resurrection of the body on the fancied indestructibility of any particle of matter, as Tertullian does with the teeth, or the Rabbins on the bone Luz, the os coccygis, which they fancied was indestructible. "Pound it," they said, "furiously on anvils with heavy hammers of steel, burn it for ages in the fiercest furnaces, soak it for centuries in the strongest solvents—all in vain; its magic structure will remain." The bones are as much

* See "Catechismus Concil Trident," p. 1, 2, ix. "The identical body shall be restored without deformities or superfluities, restored, that as it was a partner in the man's deeds, so it may be in his punishment." The authority quoted to support this is Augustin. See his "De Civ. Dei," xxi. 19-21.

part of the nutritive life in man as the flesh and blood. They are permeated with blood vessels, and grow and decay as well as the other organs of the nutritive life. So also, we admit, it is with the nervous system at present; it has its roots in the flesh, and not only serves the flesh, but is also nourished by it. But it may not be so hereafter. We may then be given a *nervo-motor* system, which shall be pneumatical, and not psychical; from heaven, and not from earth; and which shall grow around the pneuma and fit itself to its wants, as the fleshly body now grows around the psyche or animal life, and is fitted to it.

This conception of resurrection of the body is in analogy with all the works of God, which the other is not. The mechanico-theatrical description of Young carries the popular view to the verge of absurdity:—

> "Now charnels rattle; scattered limbs, and all
> The various bones, obsequious to the call,
> Self-moved advance—the neck, perhaps, to meet
> The distant head; the distant head, the feet.
> Dreadful to view! See, through the dusky sky,
> Fragments of bodies in confusion fly
> To distant regions, journeying there to claim
> Deserted members, and complete the frame."

How unworthy such a theory is of the power and wisdom of God. It is not a question whether the resurrection be a miracle, but a miracle must be at least worthy of its author; it must be a sign, and something more, a sign from heaven. No one

questions that God could re-collect the dust, and set bone to his bone, as in the vision of Ezekiel. But the question is, what has God said that He will do, and what do His other works lead us to suppose He will do? The analogy by which the psychical life clothes itself with flesh in the womb is to the point. It is wonderful how we are fashioned in the secret parts of the earth when as yet there is none of them. The younger Fichte has advanced the theory of a preconscious life, to account for the way in which the Psyche clothes itself in flesh, as we grow before and after birth. This may or may not be a sound conjecture. But we may at least speak of a post-conscious life, a psycho-pneumatical life, after the body is laid in the grave; and the Scriptures tell us that this soul or life is to gather to itself at the last day a body or house not made with hands, and probably by an act of creation on God's part, analogous to that by which the Psyche is quickened in the womb, and begins to clothe itself with flesh.

Farther than this we may not push our inquiries. We have seen that the spiritual body is something different from the disembodied soul or the body of flesh. These are the two contrary errors on the subject, which our inquiries have led us to reject, and here we leave the question. There are not only the direct words of Scripture on which to ground our faith, but also certain analogies from the transformation of insects, and the modern physiological distinction of the nutritive and organic life by

which to confirm and strengthen our hopes. Thus the testimony of revelation and nature rightly interpreted bear in the same direction, and when this is the case, we feel that we cannot be very far from the truth.

SUMMARY.

We have now reached the point where we may take a survey of the ground which we have travelled over, and point out the conclusion to which our inquiry leads. Put in the fewest possible words, our argument may be summed up under the following heads:—

I. We have seen, from comparing Gen. ii. 7 with 1 Thess. v. 23, Heb. iv. 12, and other passages of Scripture, that man is a τριμερης ὑποστασις, a union of three, not of two natures only. These are, body or sense-consciousness; soul or self-consciousness; and spirit or God-consciousness.

II. We have seen that out of the union of three natures in one person, there result two tendencies called in Scripture the flesh and the spirit. Soul or self-consciousness, as the union point between spirit and body, was created free to choose to which of these two opposite poles it would be attracted. This equilibrium between flesh and spirit is the state of innocence in which Adam was created, and which he lost by the fall.

III. We have seen that the fall was not a solitary act of disobedience, but an inclination given to the

whole nature of Adam in the direction of the flesh by which the spirit or image of God was deadened in him, and that this carnal mind, or natural bias to evil, must descend by the law that like produces like from Adam to his posterity, through all time.

IV. We have seen that the posterity of Adam, though spiritually dead, still retain the germ of the pneuma. That germ of God-consciousness, more than reason or intellect, is that which distinguishes man from the brute. It is conscience or the remains of the fallen pneuma which witnesses for God in us, and whispers that "He is not far from any one of us." It is as conscience that the Spirit works in the unregenerate, accusing or else excusing, but never, unless blinded by self-righteousness, approving our conduct. It is through the conscience that the Holy Spirit convinces the world of sin, and though the world cannot discern this witness for God, it is nevertheless the standing testimony that God has not left Himself without a witness within as well as without, that we were "made for God, and that the heart is restless till it rests in Him."

V. We have seen that the new birth is the quickening of that conscience or pneuma by the Divine Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life. The Person and work of the Holy Spirit is thus evidenced by His indwelling in our spirit. So that believers have the witness within that they are born again—the Spirit witnessing with their spirits that they are the sons of God.

VI. We have seen that the grounds on which

reason rests its hopes of existence after death are either fallacious or prove too much. Of the soul or the seat of self-consciousness we cannot say either that it is mortal or immortal. Life is not an inherent and essential property of mind any more than of matter. The soul or self-consciousness can only exist through its union with spirit or God-consciousness, so that the proofs of the life everlasting must rest, not on the argument for the natural immortality of the psyche, but on the gift of eternal life to the pneuma, when quickened and renewed in the image of God.

VII. We have seen that while the separation of soul and body would lead to the inference that the intermediate state is a state of unconsciousness, the contrary inference results from the view that the disembodied soul, when put to death in the flesh, is quickened in the spirit, so that the spirit-soul is conscious even while absent from the body. Thus as our lower or psychical life is maintained by the union of body and soul before the spirit is quickened, so the higher or pneumatical life is continued by the union of soul and spirit although the body sleeps in the grave.

VIII. Lastly, we have seen that the distinction of spirit, soul, and body, suggests the nature of the spiritual or resurrection body. In our present bodies of humiliation there are two classes of organs with distinct and peculiar functions. The one class of single organs makes up what is called our nutritive life. The other class of organs, placed in pairs on opposite sides of the spinal cord, make up our organic life, properly so called. To the plant belongs the nutritive life only; to the

animal the nutritive and sentient, with the germ of the rational; to man the nutritive, sentient and rational, with the germ of the spiritual; and to angels the sentient, rational, and spiritual, without the nutritive. Thus plant life is at one extreme and angel life at the other, and since man hereafter is to be equal with the angels, the nutritive or plant life cannot form part of his resurrection body. To this agree the words of the Apostle, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv. 50). This transformation of man from a psychical to a pneumatical body is analogous to the transformation of insects. In the larva the nutritive life is at its height, in the imago the sentient. The imago or butterfly is thus a type, not of the disembodied psyche as the ancients thought, but of the resurrection body. The resurrection is thus not a rising *again*, but a rising *from* or *out* of the dead world of matter. Thus, "though it doth not yet appear what we shall be," the Christian doctrine of the resurrection is equally opposed to the Greek theory of the resurrection of the disembodied psyche at the moment of death, or the Egyptian theory of the revival of relics. The latter is the notion of the mediæval Church, the *resurrectio carnis* of the creed; the former is the opinion of modern spiritualising philosophers. To the one we oppose the ἀνάστασις τοῦ σώματος, not σαρκος, to the other the ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν.

That the psychology of the Bible should thus throw light on its theology is only what we might expect. In an age when the lands of the Bible have been

explored, and its geography, geology, antiquities, and natural history described by able and scientific observers —in an age when a Palestine exploration fund has been set on foot to make systematic research—and nothing connected with the lands of the Bible is overlooked, "from the cedar of Lebanon to the hyssop that grows on the wall," it would be strange indeed if the psychology of the Bible were not sought out, to explain certain points in its theology, which, even an apostle admits, are hard to be understood (2 Pet. iii. 16). The Bible, taken as a whole, is neither a book of pure psychology, nor even of pure theology. Neither the absolute nature of God, nor the absolute nature of man, is its proper subject, but the relation of the two to each other. Just as astronomy rests on our knowledge of the laws of light, and of celestial mechanics, so with the Bible; its data are a few psychological, and a few theological truths, and our right understanding of the book itself will mainly depend on our understanding the data with which it sets out. The illustration may be carried a point further. As in astronomy, discovery came to a stand when, two thousand years ago, the Alexandrian mathematicians had discovered the principal laws of geometry and their application to celestial mechanics. No further advance could be made till the discovery of the laws of the refraction of light, in the seventeenth century, gave the science a fresh start forward, so that, within a single lifetime, the true theory of the universe was discovered, and La Place admitted that there could be only one Newton, because the law

of gravity could be only once discovered. Bacon speaks of deserts in history, where discovery comes to a stand still, and, instead of philosophers we have schoolmen, and for discoverers only doctors. In speculative theology, there has been a desert of this kind, from Augustine's day, almost down to our own. The Reformation, blessed be God, came to stir up the stagnant pools of scholastic divinity, and sent thirsting spirits to the fountainhead of truth. But the tendency to stagnation soon returned. More Calvinist than Calvin; more Lutheran than Luther; more Anglican than our Anglican reformers, is the verdict which history passes on the divines of the second generation after the reformers. "Catenas," and "Common Places," and creeds and confessions, soon took the place of a free and open Bible. Scholasticism returned under another name, and, to this day, the inductive method is scarcely understood. By the Patristic school, it is openly set aside, as they pin their faith to what they call Catholic consent. Even professed Protestants interpret the Bible too little by its lexical meaning, and too much by the analogy of the faith found in their favourite body of divinity. For almost all questions outside the directly personal one, "What must I do to be saved?" we are still confined to the scholastic method, and try our conclusions by the dicta of this or that Catholic father, this or that Anglican doctor, this or that Puritan divine. With the single exception of unfulfilled prophecy, on which there has been some speculative activity, we are still bound in by the formularies of a few vigorous minds.

Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, would be surprised to find their private opinions raised into dogmas, to question which borders on presumption. The *inferences* which these good men drew from the Bible are raised to a kind of quasi-parity with the Bible. They are given, as it were, a seat on the bench with the judge, and may give their opinion after the court has summed up the case. The result of this cannot but be prejudicial to truth. An erroneous, because indolent, opinion has crept in, that what Augustine and Calvin, for instance, could not see with regard to God's purposes in election, is, therefore, not to be found in the Bible. Thus, the doctrine of election, misunderstood by some divines, led to its rejection by others. Thus controversies have sprung up, blazed and died out, like fires in an Eastern city, no one knowing who first caused the conflagration, and no one attempting to put the fire out, till it has burnt all before it. The only result of these unprofitable controversies is, that this age has settled down to the conclusion, that as free will and predestination are both found in the Bible, but cannot be reconciled, we must believe both as *regulative* truths, to use the language of Mansel, borrowed from Kant. Thus, a scepticism creeps over the mind as to the use of Theology. The cloud under which systematic divinity now rests, must obscure to some extent men's personal faith, and if not, must at least indispose them to fresh and systematic study of those lively oracles, which seem to give answers as oracular and undeterminate as those of Dodona or Delphi. All the while the blame may lie

with ourselves. We depreciate what we do not understand. From blind submission we have subsided into blank indifference. We are in one of those deserts of time with regard to theology.

The way of recovery for divinity is the same as in the physical sciences, which profess to follow the inductive method. Bishop Butler did not overlook this. In a passage in the Analogy, which has been often quoted, he says: "As it is owned, the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so if it ever comes to be understood before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions, *it must be in the same way as* natural knowledge is come at, by the continuance and progress of learning and liberty, and by particular persons attending to comparing and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it, and which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world."* Thus, the way of discovery still lies open to us in divine things, if we have only the moral courage to go to the fountainhead of truth, instead of filling our vessel out of this or that doctor's compendium of truth. Creeds and catechisms should be used as lighthouses are by sea, and landmarks by land, not to stop inquiry, but to point us on our way, and to warn us off sunken reefs, where errorists have struck before. Were Bishop Butler's method of inductive research into Scripture more common than it is, we should not have stood still so long, as if spell-bound by the shadow of a few great names. "It is not at all incredible," the Bishop adds, "that a book which has been so long

* Analogy, p. ii., ch. 3.

in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered." Such a saying is worthy of Butler. It is only a philosopher who can allow for time and prescription. The majority of mankind think that they think. They acquiesce, and suppose that they argue. They flatter themselves that they are holding their own, when they have actually grown up to manhood, with scarcely a conviction which can be called their own. So it always was, and so it ever will be. Divine things are no exception, but rather an instance. The more difficult the subject, and the more serious the consequences of error, the more averse the majority are to what is called "unsettling men's minds," as if truth could be held on any other tenure than the knight's fee of holding its own against all comers. Protestantism has brought us no relief against this torpid state of mind, for, as the error is as deep as the nature of man, we cannot expect any deliverance from it, so long as the nature of man continues the same, and his natural love of truth almost as depraved as his natural love of holiness.

But the way of discovery, as Bishop Butler has told us, still lies open in theology, if we will but enter on it. Let "thoughtful persons trace its obscure hints;" for the Bible, like nature, whispers some of its secrets, and theology itself is but the "science of inferences." If the good textuary is the good theologian, it is only because he knows how to handle the texts, turn them over, as it were, and read the Bible from within as well as from without. One truth of the Bible again

throws light on another. We have seen that astronomy stood still until the science of optics had overtaken geometry; and so Newton, armed with a new instrument, leaped in and took at a rush the citadel, before which twenty centuries had sat down in vain. The psychology of the Bible is the organ by which to unlock the mysteries of its theology. We do not say that the tripartite nature of man explains the mystery of the Trinity. But we set the one over against the other—the three natures in one person of psychology against the Three Persons in one nature of theology. Coupling this with the truth that man was made in the image of God, we have here* something more than a mere coincidence. The psychology of the Bible seems to open to us a door by which we enter in to explore its theology. So again the nature of original sin and the new birth. These are theological truths on which the Church has stood till since Augustine's memorable conflict with Pelagius. We call it orthodox to agree with Augustine, though of those who repeat that phrase, numbers without knowing it, are Pelagians, or at least semi-Pelagians. We say this of them, not in reproach, but to caution

* Mason, the author of "Self-Knowledge," after observing that man is complex, being made up of three parts, remarks on this correspondence with the other mystery of the Trinity. "This consideration," he says, "may serve to soften the prejudice of some against the account which Scripture gives us of the mysterious manner of the existence of the divine nature, of which every man (as created in the image of God) carries about him a kind of emblem in the threefold distinction of his own, which, if he did not every minute find it by experience to be a fact, would doubtless appear to him altogether as mysterious and incomprehensible as the Scripture docrine of the Trinity."—*Self-Knowledge*, Part I. ch. ii.

against allowing themselves to be the "servants of men." From disregarding the Scripture distinction between psyche and pneuma, Augustine closed the door against the Pelagian party, and the result is a strife of fourteen centuries between moralists and divines—the moralists all taking the side of Pelagius, divines of Augustine. As in other controversies, both sides are right in what they affirm, but wrong in what they deny; and the only settlement of this dispute of long standing is to break up the lists, and, dropping our arms, go to the Scriptures with teachable minds. Moralists and divines have tilted long enough without deciding the fray. The remains of good in fallen human nature are not to be found so long as we describe man's nature incorrectly as made up of body and soul only. Till Scripture psychology is brought to throw light on its theology, Augustinians and Pelagians will dispute for ever, and come no nearer a settlement. One simple law in optics, the refraction of light in passing through media of different density, led to the discovery of the telescope, and so created modern astronomy. The element of chance in this was the accident that a Dutch maker of instruments should put two lenses together in the right direction, eighteen hundred years after astronomy had fallen asleep in the arms of the Alexandrian school of Ptolemy. In the same way there are hints in the Bible with regard to original sin and the new birth which have been overlooked for centuries. Our age, by paying more attention to the psychology of the Bible, has come to the right point of view to understand its theology, and so

controversies which have vexed the Church for centuries, disappear like the Ptolomean cycles and epicycles, when Galileo's telescope and Newton's spectrum had put the key of the universe into the hands of science. What the naked eye is to the telescope, that the popular dichotomy of body and soul is to the Christian trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body. We can scan the heavens with the naked eye, and understand the motions of the sun, moon, and stars for all practical purposes of navigation and agriculture. So for the saving knowledge of God and Jesus Christ, mortal body and immortal soul is not so untrue as to vitiate a plain man's understanding of the work of salvation. But for those who are teachers of the Word, and not learners only, defective psychology is more than a psychological error; it emerges in theology, and begins a confused way of thinking on the nature of man, which must end in impairing our conceptions of God. Thus what Sir William Hamilton has said of philosophy in general is now true of psychology as well. A defective psychology must issue in a defective theology. The error may not result in heresy; for, as Augustine has finely said, heresy is of the will, not of the intellect only; *Errare possum hæreticus esse nolo.* Still no error is without its evil consequence, if not in the case of those who hold it, yet in the case of others, whom it causes to stumble and to err from the truth. Much of the unhappy humanitarianism which has affected all churches, particularly those in America, arises from unwise teaching on the divine attributes, and a doctrine of God's

sovereignty which, in any other than good men, we should call blasphemy. We are far from supposing that a sound and scriptural psychology will cure men's errors in theology, but it will at least go some way to allay them. We may even venture to say that it will not be possible without this, though we do not say that by itself it will be enough. Just as the science of optics by itself did not create the Newtonian astronomy, though without the aid of the telescope and the spectrum Newton would never have divined the law of gravity. So one truth in the Bible will help us on to discover another. Controversies arise about things half known. With the key of human nature in our hand, in Gen. ii. 7, it is our own fault if we do not unlock many other doors in the Bible. The hardest dogmas of all, original sin and the new birth, the mystery of existence in the disembodied state, and the greatest mystery of all, the glorified body, are not explained by psychology; but they are at least set in a new light, their contradictions disappear, and we see far enough to feel that all is well,

> "And hear at times a sentinel,
> That moves about from place to place,
> And whispers through the worlds of space,
> In the still night, that all is well."

APPENDIX.

ON SOME RECENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.

THERE is another question not unlike this of Traducianism and Creationism on which the distinction between soul and spirit seems to throw light. The question of the Fatherhood of God, whether in relation to all men as his intelligent and moral creatures, or more particularly in relation to those who are the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus, has lately come up for discussion in Scotland. On the one hand Dr Crawford contends that "God is the Father of all men, that his Fatherly love procured the atonement, and that while there is a special sense in which believers are sons, there is nothing to bar the admission of all men to the high privilege but their own unbelief in it, and indifference to it. To as many as received Him, to them gave he power (or the right) to become sons of God." Dr Candlish, on the other hand, maintains that "the relation which God sustains to His Eternal Son is His only true and proper Fatherhood, and that it is only by their partaking of that relation that angels or men become the sons of God. This latter theory may be resolved into these two propositions—*First*, that God is not, and never has been, in any true sense of the expression, a Father to any of His creatures except to those only who are His children by faith in Christ Jesus; and, *secondly*, that the sonship which God confers on believers is substantially the same relation

which subsists between the first and second person of the Godhead."

A third theory, which is a kind of combination of the two foregoing, is that of Mr Wright, who in a work on the Fatherhood of God contends, as we do, that while God is the Maker of body and soul, he is the Father of our spirits. But as the spirit is entirely dead in consequence of the fall, Mr Wright turns round and sides with Dr Candlish, maintaining that God is not to be considered in any real sense as the common Father of all mankind, but the Father only of these believers in Jesus Christ in whom the spiritual part of their nature has been restored to its proper energy and activity. Now, not to mention other objections, this hypothesis seems to halt between two alternatives, and to decide entirely for neither. Dr Candlish and Dr Crawford's theories are logical contradictories. If we accept the one, we must decide to reject the other. They may both be wrong, but they cannot both be right. We do not see how Mr Wright can adopt Dr Candlish's limited theory of Fatherhood without his other theory of our sonship by adoption, which is its logical corrollary. But Mr Wright seems to waver between a higher and a lower sense of sonship. "Adam," he says, "might in a lower sense be termed a son of God, inasmuch as he received the spirit—his higher and religious capacities—by God breathing into his nostrils, while inasmuch as he was not born of the Spirit he was not in the fullest sense a son of God even in Paradise." This passage might bear a sense in which Dr Crawford would concur, but in another passage in the same page, Mr Wright falls back into agreement with Dr Candlish. "There is not a hint of sonship in all that is said of Paradise, or of man's sin and fall there. Nay, what is revealed of God's treatment of Adam in the garden is palpably irreconcileable with the idea of anything like the paternal and filial relation subsisting between them. In reply to Dr Crawford's position that it was God's Fatherly love which procured the

atonement, and not the atonement which procured this Fatherly relation, Mr Wright contends that the love of God to men was not fatherly, but "a love too deep to be expressed by any of the analogies of earth, a love which we must characterise not as parental but as divine."

This, we take leave to say, is evading, not answering, Dr Crawford's position. The love of God to men surpasses all analogies whether parental or judicial, but the one class of analogies are as just and real as the other. If God is not the parent of all He is equally not their judge. If language breaks down in the one case, it fails equally in the other. But those who do not hesitate to speak of God as the Judge of all men should not object to speak of Him as their Father, unless like Dr Candlish they hold a limited theory of the atonement, and desire to bank up the one limitation of God's judicial forgiveness extending to the elect only by another limitation of His Fatherly character, limited likewise to those who are adopted sons by union with Christ. Dr Candlish's theory is at least logical and self-consistent. We do not agree with it, and shall presently state our objections to it, but at least we do not complain of the argument. It is a masterly attempt on the part of a divine of the old high-Calvinist school to turn the flank of his adversary's position, and by rejecting *ab initio* the doctrine of God's Fatherhood of all men, to guard against the consequences which inevitably flow from it, viz., universal redemption and the limitation of the number of the lost to those who wilfully reject that love of God in Christ.

Thus between the three theories of the Fatherhood of God the universal Fatherhood of Dr Crawford, the particular and adoptive Fatherhood of Dr Candlish, and the third theory of Mr Wright which wavers between the two, we shall not have long to decide. Those who hold a particular atonement reject consistently as we think, the doctrine of the general Fatherhood of God. Those, on the other hand, who hold that Christ died for all men, should go on to hold that there is in all men,

that original image of God on which the truth of the Fatherhood of God is grounded. God is thus the Father of all men whether all men will be saved or not. It may indeed be, that this will be the aggravation of their misery, that, as they would not receive God as a Father, they have now to endure his displeasure as their Judge. This may be the meaning of that expression 'the wrath of the Lamb.' So that those who deny God's fatherly relation to all men, do in reality take from, while they seem to add to his judicial severity. So dangerous is it for divines to warp the truth in favour of any particular system, that what is gained in one direction is lost in another. Dr Candlish would add to the dignity and privilege of believers, by depriving the rest of mankind of part of their original birthright, the right to say "Our Father." That men, in their yet unconverted state, do not use their birthright, does not impeach their claim to it. On the contrary, it is their right to it which is the measure of our duty to send the Gospel to them. A necessity is laid upon us to preach God's fatherly love and pity to men, yea, woe is it to us, if we preach not this Gospel of God's fatherly good-will to the lost. But Dr Candlish's theory would actually diminish, as it seems to us, our responsibility in this matter. We measure abysses by the height from which they sheer down, and loss by the possibility of gain. If man be not a son of God by original constitution, redemption is without a sufficient reason, and an eternal destiny of happiness or misery seems too great an alternative for a creature who was only taken out of the dust of the earth. It is his spiritual origin which he shares in common with angels which makes him like them, capable of an eternal happiness or woe. Dr Candlish has quoted Satan's words in Milton,

> "The Son of God I also am or was,
> And if I was I am, relation stands."

Though he gives these words a strange turn, as if the filial relationship could stand on any other foundation than that of original creation as a son. It seems to us a rash

statement on the one hand to say that God being the Father of all men, will never cast off any of them as finally impenitent, which is the inference which Universalism draws from the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. So it seems to us to be equally rash in the other extreme to reason backward, as Dr Candlish seems to do, that, since the Divine image is extinguished in those who are finally lost, that image was never fully impressed upon them, and that all that is meant of the creation of men in the image and likeness of God, is "the capacity of understanding the Divine will, and feeling a sense of responsibility under it." This is Dr Candlish's bare and negative account of the creation of man in the likeness and after the image of God. On this subject we confess our agreement with Dr Crawford who sums up the objections to Dr Candlish's theory in the following admirable passage, "I confess, however, that I have little confidence in such reasoning, whether as regards the divine sovereignty or the divine Fatherhood. It seems to me to be a much safer and more becoming course to observe the manner in which God actually deals with us, and thence to infer the relation which he bears to us, then to attempt by any speculative agreements to determine that such and such relations must necessarily be sustained, and that such and such procedure must necessarily be observed by Him. And if this cautious inductive process be pursued, I am confident that it will fairly lead to the conclusion that God is at once the Father and the Ruler of his intelligent creatures. For while, notwithstanding many exceptional and anomalous instances, there are upon the whole clear traces of a moral government to be discerned in the ordinary course of divine providence, it is no less indisputable that in God's dealings with the human family, we find amid much that is painful and afflictive, an evident excess and exuberance of divine bounty—a constant and overflowing fulness of beneficence, far beyond aught that mere equity, or justice, on the part of a sovereign ruler could have

dictated, and such as can only be satisfactorily accounted for by ascribing it to the care and kindness of our Father in heaven."*

We need not at any length go into the Scripture proofs of God's general Fatherhood. The burden of proof rests as we conceive with Dr. Candlish and those who would limit this relationship to the elect. Dr. Crawford in his second chapter has given a very good summary of these proofs to which we may refer the reader. Stated in the briefest terms, the following passages seem to us to be decisive on the subject. Neither Dr. Candlish nor Mr Wright has succeeded in breaking down the force of the following proof texts. The first is the decisive one, Gen. i. 26, where man is said to be made in the image and after the likeness of God. We have noticed Dr. Candlish's attempt to narrow the meaning of this to a mere sense of creaturely dependence. It is much more than this. The two expressions imply in the Hebrew, the one a fixed, the other a progressive state of resemblance. The former expression (*Be-tselem*) referring to that fixed or inalienable resemblance to God which man retains in his νους a rational nature, the latter referring to that progressive likeness to God which we gain as we grow in holiness, that purity of heart by which we see God, and as we lose which we lose with it also the sense of the presence of God This intellectual and spiritual likeness to God, the one attached to the Psyche, the other to the Pneuma has been dimmed and defaced in consequence of the fall, but enough of it remains on which to ground an argument for our original dignity, as well as for the higher relationships into which we are brought by redemption. So far from thinking with Dr. Candlish that our ultimate sonship in and through union with the Eternal Son of God supersedes the necessity for any belief in an original sonship of creation, we think that the argument lies the other way. It is because we are sons

* *Vide* The Fatherhood of God, by Dr Crawford, p. 18, third edition.

by creation, that we are entitled to become sons by redemption. Adoption implies an original birthright of sonship and this is the stress of the Apostle's argument (Gal. iv. 6), though it is sometimes taken to mean quite the opposite.

Again the genealogy of our Lord as traced by St. Luke iii. 38, seems decisive as to God's general Fatherhood. Adam is said to be the son of God in the same way that Seth is said to be the son of Adam. There is no break, no qualification, the chain is traced up link by link from one human parent to another till it reaches the last link, and touches the All-Father in heaven. This is a surprising, almost we should say, an unwarrantable statement in any other point of view but one. Dr. Candlish's attempt to get over this plain inference of this view is very unsatisfactory. We regret to find Mr. Wright agreeing with him that the many expressions of Fatherhood scattered up and down the Old Testament imply no more than authorship or creation. Because there is a metaphorical use of Fatherhood, as when Jubal is said to be the father of all that handle the pipe or organ, therefore, to infer it only a metaphor when spoken of God's relationship to men seems to us to take strange liberties with Scripture. There is nothing which may not be explained away by such a process as this.

Another proof passage is that in the Apostle's speech on Mars Hill, where he quotes a memorable sentiment found in two Greek poets, Aratus and Cleanthes. "For we are also his offspring." Dr. Candlish's remark that as these poets were not inspired, the Apostle's quotation of them could not make them inspired, seems to us to be an instance of attenuating Scripture till it means nothing at all. The Apostle's argument means nothing, if it does not mean this, that spiritual beings must have a spiritual parent or author. On the principle that like produces like, the Apostle argues that since men are spiritual, their author must also be a spirit and that as the offspring of God, we cannot think that the

Godhead is like unto gold or silver, or stone graven by art or man's device. Man is thus a witness against his own folly. His nature which is spiritual, is a standing witness for the nature of the unseen and eternal God.

The last passage we shall refer to is the decisive one, Heb. xii. 9. God as our heavenly Father is here contrasted with earthly fathers. There are three points of contrast to be compared each to each. In the one case it was for a little while, in the other case for eternity. In the one case for their pleasure, in the other case for our profit. In the one case they were fathers of our flesh, in the other case of our spirits. Now the comparison loses much of its force if we fail to trace it through these three points of detail: the character, duration, and extent of the discipline. Earthly discipline is partial, temporal, and does not reach beyond our carnal natures. Heavenly discipline is eternal, unerring in its effects, and reaches down to the centre of our being, even the immortal spirit. This difference arises out of the difference of the parental relation in the two cases. We have fathers of our flesh. On the Traducian hypothesis, which we incline to, we derive body and soul by descent from our parents. They are thus the fathers of our flesh. Thus far, and no farther, the parental relationship extends. With our spirits it is different. Here, as we have before remarked, we drop the Traducianist and take up the Creationist theory. Our spirits do not come by descent from our parents. They come from God as they go to God. God is the direct Author of all spiritual life, as He is also the Author of natural life, only in the latter case *ex traduce* by natural descent from our first parents. But he is also much more than the direct Author of spiritual life. He is its parent or father. It is not so much created as derived from Him. Spirit is, as the term implies, that which is inspired in us, and so is breathed out from God. It comes out from Him as Irenæus taught *per afflatum*.

We have thus a test of the exact nature of the Fatherhood

of God, both of its limits and extent. God is the Maker of all flesh, and the Father of all spirits. He is the Creator of one class of life, the Parent of the other. In so far as men are flesh and not spirit, God is their Maker only. In so far as men are spirit and not flesh only, God is their Father. If there were any descendants of Adam who were body and soul only, but not spirit also, then we should agree with Dr Candlish in limiting the Fatherhood of God. But since man is a tripartite nature we are forced to assign the Fatherly relationship to that which is truly God-like in every man—the spirit or conscience. The dormant nature of that conscience in consequence of the fall does not militate against this conclusion. On the contrary, it establishes it. It is because of our original sonship that we see the sufficient reason (as Leibnitz would call it) of that otherwise incomprehensible mystery of the Incarnation and death of the Son of God. Unless we dig down deep into human nature we shall never find foundations solid enough to sustain our faith in contemplating such condescension as this. The telescope of faith which is to resolve the nebulae of doubt in connection with such mysteries as these, must rest on solid supports. Man's original sonship is the earth-line by which we rise to measure the mystery of our adoptive sonship in Jesus Christ.

Dr Crawford has perhaps done wisely, in limiting his argument for the Fatherhood of God to the special points in which he differs with Dr Candlish. He contends justly enough that on either hypothesis, of the dichotomy or trichotomy, God is alike the Father of all men. But as we think the argument is all the more convincing, when we emphasize the distinction between the psychical or intellectual and the pneumatical or spiritual nature in man. Seen in this light, the point where the Fatherhood of God begins is at once self-evident. He is not the Father of our intellect—for God's thoughts are not as our thoughts, or his ways as our ways; but he is the Father of our moral and spiritual nature. This comes by direct

emanation from Himself, and however depraved by the fall, it still remains in every man, and is the ground on which he is capable of eternal life or eternal death. We regret that Mr Wright should have so far adopted the Tripartite theory, and then rejected one of its most obvious consequences. If the Pneuma has ceased to exist in fallen man, then Mr Wright is consistent in siding with Dr Candlish. On any other account of the matter, he is inconsistent with his own admissions. De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est lex. If the spirit is entirely dormant in the unregenerate, it is a mere play on words to speak of the Tripartite nature in man. We see no point of application for the gospel—no *nidus* in the will either for resistance to grace or reception of it. All is simple according to this hypothesis of the will which is that of Jonathan Edwards, but it is the simplicity of a system which has cut away all facts which do not square with it. God's sovereignty is maintained, it is true, but at the expense of his other attributes. A *tabula rasa* is made of human nature and a mechanical theory of grace acting *ab extra* is supplied to account for the mysterious play of desire and will, in acting and re-acting each on the other. It is a matter to us of deep satisfaction that this mechanical theory of the will is generally discredited as much in Scotland as in America. It has been the parent source of many dangerous re-actions in the other extreme. Chimæra chimæram parit. We rejoice, therefore, that in the chair of Divinity in Edinburgh, a doctrine of God's general Fatherhood is taught, which is is the right foundation, as well for man's responsibility as for God's grace. It is in the light of God's Fatherhood that we see both sides of that wonderful parable of the prodigal son. Let us only beware lest we repeat the sin of the elder son, and grudge our Heavenly Father's compassion to all his erring and repentant children.

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